

Interrogation of SCHELLENBERG, Walter
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Schollenberg was Chief of Amt VI from the autumn 1941 until the end. He examined a chart of the RSHA as of the end of 1944, and after making some corrections, agreed that he would swear to its correctness and would sign it when presented in final form.

Witness first met Kaltenbrunner in Vienna just after the Anschluss. He described the channels through which protective custody arrests were executed in Austria at that time. For general cases (a) State Police Command Vienna, (b) Amt VI, (c) Heydrich. In prominent cases the channel was (a) Inspector of the State Police, (b) Higher Police and SS Leader (Kaltenbrunner), and then (c) Berlin. Schollenberg considers Kaltenbrunner responsible for all cases handled in Austria during his service as Higher Police and SS Official.

Schollenberg next met Kaltenbrunner in January 1943 when the latter was appointed Chief of the RSHA. All Amt Chiefs were summoned to Himmler's headquarters at Loczen in East Prussia. Himmler informed the Amt Chiefs that Kaltenbrunner was appointed as Heydrich's successor. Schollenberg had the impression that Himmler in no way limited Kaltenbrunner's jurisdiction in his functions. Kaltenbrunner was Chief from the beginning and kept Schollenberg in the background even when matters of his Amt were discussed between Himmler and Kaltenbrunner. As an example of Kaltenbrunner's exercise of authority over his department, Schollenberg stated that all important matters from Amt VI had to go through Kaltenbrunner's office and he had to consult with Kaltenbrunner on an average of every three or four days when there were numerous telephone calls and a vast number of memoranda inbetween. During the first months of Kaltenbrunner's service as Chief of the RSHA, Schollenberg stated there were meetings called by Himmler for all Amt Chiefs together with Kaltenbrunner, during which Himmler emphasized that Kaltenbrunner was Heydrich's successor and should exercise complete control over all the branches.

From the time of Kaltenbrunner's appointment until October 1943, Schollenberg's influence with Himmler was limited. From October 1943 until February 1944, when the Canaris case broke, Schollenberg was persona grata with Himmler and from the spring 1944 until the end Schollenberg was in close contact with Himmler.

Schollenberg states that Kaltenbrunner was informed of all the discussions he had with Himmler, but from the middle of 1944, he started to give unclear reports to Kaltenbrunner and to withhold information. He cited as an example that he gave definitely misleading information on his astrological influence with Himmler. Schollenberg stated "I gave all reports in the form which best served my interests".

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Following 20 July 1944 and particularly after November and December 1944, Kaltenbrunner was in direct contact with Hitler, often by-passing Himmler.

When questioned as to Kaltenbrunner's jurisdiction over the various Amts, Schellenberg stated that his authority was the same over all the Amts. With regard to the individual Amts, he stated:

- AMT I Nothing was done in this Amt without submission to and approval of Kaltenbrunner. Brigadeführer Schulz and Oberführer Ehrlinger, the leaders of this Amt, could certainly testify to this.
- AMT II Kaltenbrunner had a special interest in this Amt because he was of the opinion that money was power, and he wanted to be informed about the smallest detail. He appointed SPACIL, an old acquaintance, as Chief of the Amt; this man had no qualification and was looked upon by other Amt Chiefs only as Kaltenbrunner's paymaster. Kaltenbrunner delegated to Spacil all monetary functions. Schellenberg avoided financial problems which he believes would have been present in dealing with Spacil by obtaining permission to handle all Amt VI financial matters within his own Section. Nevertheless, Schellenberg had to submit to Kaltenbrunner all cases covering more than RM 50,000 for either foreign or internal use.
- AMT III All reports by this Amt were submitted to Kaltenbrunner who made use of them in connection with internal politics. Schellenberg believes that Ohlendorf assisted Kaltenbrunner to a great extent through his reports. During the first year in office, Kaltenbrunner wanted to remove Ohlendorf because he thought the latter was spending too much of his time in the Ministry of Economics. Schellenberg says Kaltenbrunner wished to replace Ohlendorf with Rudolf Mildner, an old friend of Kaltenbrunner's from Vienna. However, Ohlendorf's reporting agency was of such assistance to Kaltenbrunner that the removal did not take place.
- Ohlendorf and Schellenberg were not on good terms. Ohlendorf criticized Schellenberg with not being an old time reliable National Socialist and took occasion to tell him personally that his character was not reliable and that he was only ambitious and that he (Ohlendorf) did not have any confidence in him. However, when Ohlendorf in 1944 - 1945 saw that the developments proved Schellenberg's pessimistic attitude, Ohlendorf began to lean upon Schellenberg. Ohlendorf also criticized Schellenberg for his failure to take command of an Einsatz Group in the field, and said this was another reason why he was unreliable because he had never proven himself. Schellenberg stated he had been asked to take

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command of such a group but he knew how to dodge it and did so.

AMT IV Here, Mueller, because of his special knowledge of the Gestapo, had much independence. However, all important matters were discussed with Kaltenbrunner. Schollenberg saw Mueller often, after the daily Amt Chief Meeting, discussing with Kaltenbrunner details pertaining to Amt IV. After 20 July 1944 there was a very close co-operation between Kaltenbrunner and Mueller, but it can in no way be said that Mueller ran Amt IV independently. In the beginning Kaltenbrunner was prejudiced against Mueller but in the course of time this obviously changed, and from the end of 1943 an almost intimate connection existed between Kaltenbrunner and Mueller. Schollenberg described Mueller as a henchman of Heydrich's and said that while he was undoubtedly the strongest man in the Gestapo, he was nevertheless subordinate to Kaltenbrunner as Chief of the RSHA.

AMT V Kaltenbrunner had little interest in criminal matters of non-political nature, but here also, all important matters were reported to and decided upon by him. Kaltenbrunner took a special interest in corruption cases and wanted to personally handle cases of corruption within the Party. As an example, witness described how a Ortsgruppenleiter from Munich had been arrested by Amt V after the case had been prepared by Amt III. Gaulleiter Fieseler intervened and Kaltenbrunner had a big row with Bormann. However, he (Kaltenbrunner) had to give in and the arrested man was released.

AMT VI Witness stated that Section VI-E (Balkan) under WANNECK, and Section VI-S (Kommandos) under SKORZENY were under the responsible direction of Kaltenbrunner. On paper these Sections belonged to Schollenberg, but in reality, because of the friendly relations between the Section Chiefs and Kaltenbrunner, much took place of which Schollenberg was never informed. Schollenberg had a continuous fight trying to obtain information about the actions of the groups. In all organizational matters, regarding both Amt VI and Amt Mil, Schollenberg had to defer to Kaltenbrunner's decisions. This was true also in the relationship between Amt VI and Amt Mil.

AMT VII This was a small Amt of no great importance, of which Schollenberg had little knowledge. It handled archive materials and clippings and had no field organizations or operative agents of any kind outside the head office.

Schollenberg was of the opinion that in protective custody cases determination to arrest, the step and length of internment were in the hands of Kaltenbrunner and Mueller. That is, the individual case

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was in their hands until delivery to a concentration camp. From then on, the case was under Pohl.

Schellenberg knows that Kaltenbrunner gave direct orders in matters of arrests, especially in connection with the incident of 20 July 1944. As an example, witness mentioned that he received orders direct from Kaltenbrunner and Mueller to arrest Admiral Canaris.

As far as witness remembers, every protective custody case had to be approved by Kaltenbrunner. The vast number of arrests, of course, made it impossible for Kaltenbrunner to handle every case personally, but in principle, every case had to be approved by Kaltenbrunner before or after arrest. The arrests and treatment of important persons were always handled by Kaltenbrunner personally.

Mueller could sign for Kaltenbrunner, but had to report this afterwards. In certain routine matters, Gestapo leaders were delegated to take people into protective custody. This was about 1943. However, there existed time limits for internment ordered by these leaders.

A so-called police preventive custody also existed where no approval by Kaltenbrunner or Mueller was necessary.

Schellenberg does not know if Pohl brought about arrests. He pointed out that inmates in the concentration camps consisted not only of "Gestapo inmates" but also Russian and Polish PWs and other laborers. Decisions concerning these were probably taken by higher SS and police leaders together with Himmler.

Criminals were sent to the concentration camps by Amt V.

When questioned about the fact that many telegraphic orders emanated from Prague, witness stated that the card index concerning protective custody inmates had been evacuated to the neighborhood of that city because of air raids. The set up at Prague was purely technical.

Witness stated that he did not know of Hitler's Commando Order of 18 October 1942. However, he had heard Kaltenbrunner and Mueller discuss this order in connection with the breakout of American and English prisoners from a camp near Breslau in 1944. The foreign office had protested the shooting of a majority of the escapees was against international law. Kaltenbrunner, Mueller and Nebe discussed how to get out of the dilemma and all agreed to try to draft an apologetic report. The difficulty was that about 50 PWs had been shot by the Gestapo. They agreed to draft a report in which it would be stated that some of the PWs had been killed by bombs and others had been shot while attempting to escape. Schellenberg believed that the orders to execute the PWs originated with Hitler then to Kaltenbrunner then to Mueller. This shooting is an example of relationship and authority of Kaltenbrunner to Amt IV.

Witness did not know of the meeting of Keitel, Jodl, Warlimont or others concerning these shootings.

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Witness told the following about the creation of Amt Mil. It was decided upon about 12 February 1944, after the Canaris incident, which was brought about through the desertion of Vermehren from K.O. to the British in Turkey.

Kaltenbrunner once told Schellenberg that Fegeldein had suggested to Hitler that Canaris be removed and Himmler be entrusted with the German Intelligence Service. Himmler ordered Kaltenbrunner to draft an order to be signed by Hitler for the creation of the new intelligence service. Kaltenbrunner went to Posen to discuss matters with Himmler who was attending a meeting of Government Presidents there. Mueller and Schellenberg, with one expert each, received orders to join Kaltenbrunner. After discussion, they were ordered to draft the above-mentioned order.

Mueller and Schellenberg disagreed in many points while drafting the order especially in the wording of the paragraph concerning Section 3, counter-espionage. Mueller wanted this Section for his Amt IV and furthermore wanted to word the order in such a form that his Amt would have all the influence on matters of counter-espionage. Schellenberg wanted to get the German Intelligence Service out of the claws of RSHA.

Finally Schellenberg's draft consisting of three sentences was approved. Schellenberg names Dr. SANDBERGER, his expert, as witness to the discussions he had with Mueller. Mueller had tried to obtain Kaltenbrunner's support but Schellenberg's draft remained. Kaltenbrunner took the draft to Himmler, who sent him as his deputy to the Fuehrer with a draft ready for signature. Schellenberg believes that Kaltenbrunner discussed the order with Keitel and Jodl and then with Hitler, or perhaps it was in reverse order. Keitel and Jodl approved and two or three days later Hitler signed.

During the first days of March, a meeting was held in Camp Zeppelin in Zossen between people concerned with the transfer of the foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence from the old Amt Ausland and Abwehr to RSHA. General Winter, Chief of Central Office of Armed Forces, was Keitel's representative and presided. Kaltenbrunner and Mueller wanted the previous agencies to disappear completely and be incorporated in Amt IV and Amt VI, but Colonel Hanson from Abwehr and Schellenberg had agreed to do their utmost to maintain an Amt Mil. Kaltenbrunner and Mueller were very indignant that Schellenberg opposed their standpoint and on their return journey Kaltenbrunner accused Schellenberg of having tried to deceive him.

Long negotiations took place between Schellenberg and Colonel Hanson, Chief of Section 1 (Espionage) and Colonel Freytag von Loringhofen, Chief of Section 2 (Sabotage). Mueller negotiated with the Chief of Section 3 (Counter-espionage). The discussions concerned the set up of the new agency Mil and its relationship to Amt VI. Furthermore, the transfer of finances, personnel, property, disciplinary measures and continuation of information service to the Armed Forces. A delay in creation of the new

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agency was caused by difficulties regarding front intelligence service and the difficulty in deciding under whose jurisdiction officers and men transferred into RSHA should be. Questions about recruiting and training of new personnel were also difficult. Finally the negotiations led to an order which was signed on 12 May 1944 by Keitel as Chief of OKW and Himmler as Supreme Chief of the new Intelligence Service, and the new set up became effective. About 14 or 15 May 1944, a three day meeting was held in Salzburg, attended by all senior and important officers of the Amt Ausland and Abwehr. Keitel and Himmler talked. Kaltenbrunner gave a speech. Schellenberg gave a scientific lecture.

After 20 July 1944, Hanson "was not there". Kaltenbrunner wanted to dissolve Amt Mil and merge it with Amt VI, but Schellenberg succeeded in preventing this and took over the handling of Amt Mil temporarily. There was no change in Kaltenbrunner's influence.

July - August 1943, Schellenberg had made an exhaustive study of Russia and its war potential. Because of this memorandum, Schellenberg and his counselors were accused of defeatism by Kaltenbrunner and it was only through Schellenberg's influence with Himmler that his removal to a concentration camp was avoided.

In November 1943, Schellenberg had discussed with an American, Howitt, in Stockholm, the possibilities of negotiating peace. Kaltenbrunner destroyed Schellenberg's attempts.

Schellenberg believes that Einsatz Groups and Commandos were always formed in connection with the occupation of foreign countries. He assumes that the first groups were formed in the Balkans. In the West Amt Canaris was active. Somewhat later Heydrich admitted that Security Police and SD were used there but not as Einsatz Groups.

About the end of May or beginning of June 1941, Schellenberg took part in discussions in Berlin concerning operations of Einsatz Groups within the frame work of the Army. Quartermaster Corps General Wagner represented the Army at these discussions. It was decided how the Security Police and the SD were to operate. The operational area of the Army was divided into three sectors: front, rear operational area, and rear Army area. In front area, the commandos were subordinated to the Army as well as to operations as to supply. In the rear operational area, the Security Police and SD were independent as to operations but under the Army the questions of supply. In the rear Army area, which already was under civilian rule, the Einsatz Groups and Commandos were completely independent of the Army.