

OFFICE OF THE U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR THE PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY

INTERROGATION DIVISION SUMMARY

Interrogation of: ERNST KALTENBRUNNER
By: Lt. Col. Brookhart, 18 October 1945, p.m.

PERSONS, ORGANIZATIONS IMPLICATED, AND SUBJECTS

1. KALTENBRUNNER

- a. The RSHA
 - (1) Mueller as principal authority in Gestapo (pp.1-2)
 - (a) No authority to use Kaltenbrunner's name in Gestapo affairs. (pp. 2-3)
 - (2) Amalgamation of Abwehr with Amts 6 and 4
 - (a) Canaris ousted (p.3)
 - (b) Formation of German Intelligence Service under RSHA (pp. 3-4)
 - (c) Amalgamation never in fact effected (p.4)
 - (3) The Abwehr
 - (a) Participation in 20 July Incident (p.4)
 - (b) Corruption in (pp. 4-6)
 - (4) Arrest Procedure
 - (a) Denial of complicity in operation of RSHA arrest procedure. (pp. 10-24)
 - (5) Location of RSHA Offices (pp. 24-35)
 - (6) As Chief of RSHA (pp. 26-30)
 - (a) Was not paid as Chief of RSHA (p. 26)
 - (b) No control over personnel (p. 27)
 - (7) Associates in RSHA (pp. 25-26)
 - (8) Counter espionage (pp. 6-7)
- b. Concentration Camps
 - (1) Classification (pp. 20-21)
- c. Discussion of Documents (Arrest Orders identified by date only):
6 October 1944; 28 September 1944; 30 September 1944; 19 October 1944;
2 December 1944; 6 December 1944; 27 December 1944 (pp. 10-17)
- d. Relationship with: Mueller (pp. 1-2; pp. 25-26; p. 30); Heydrich (p. 29); Schellenberg (pp. 8-9; p. 30); Uhlendorf (pp. 25-26); Canaris (p. 3); Nebe (p. 26, 30).

2. HIMMLER

- a. RSHA
 - (1) Amalgamation of Abwehr with RSHA (pp. 3-4)
- b. Military Chief or Army Reserve (p. 6)
- c. Police Function
 - (1) Retention of executive police power (p. 6, 8, 12)
- d. Relationship with: Schellenberg (pp. 4-6); Mueller (pp. 4-6; Canaris (p. 7); Keitel (p. 4); Pohl (p. 20)

3. MUELLER

- a. Police Function (pp. 4-6, 9-11, 19)

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4. SCHOLLENBERG
 - a. Police Function (pp. 8-9)
5. HEYDRICH
 - a. Police Function (p. 18, pp. 27-28)
 - (1) As Deputy Protector in Prague (p. 17; also pp. 22-24)

ORGANIZATION OF THE RSHA

Kaltenbrunner stated that he "had always been of the opinion" that Mueller had been the sole head of the Gestapo; that he had never been able to make inquiries relative to matters of organizational structure due to Mueller's insistence that all matters remain "secret"; that he had never conferred with Mueller regarding the re-organization of Amt IV. (pp. 1-2)

Kaltenbrunner insisted that he had never authorized anyone in Amt IV to use his name in any official connection (p. 2); that until the present time he had never learned that his name had been used by Amt IV in "unauthorized" matters (i.e. signing of arrest forms, etc.) (p. 3)

The amalgamation of the Abwehr with Amts 6 and 4: Hitler was dissatisfied with the operation of the Abwehr under Admiral Canaris-- basically because of certain mis-information in connection with military matters. Canaris was held responsible for this failing. (p. 3) Likewise friction arose between Canaris and Himmler in view of the fact that the OKW-Abwehr often times concerned itself not only with military intelligence but also political intelligence, the latter was intended to be handled by Amt 6. (p. 7) In February 1944 the Abwehr was separated from the OKW and placed under Himmler looking toward the creation of a coordinated German Intelligence System. Its varied functions -- counter espionage, positive espionage, etc. were to be placed under appropriate divisions of Amts 6 and 4, principally under Amt 6. Kaltenbrunner was informed by higher authority that he was to take over the intelligence phases of the Abwehr unit placed under 6 and 4. (pp. 3-4) Lengthy negotiations between Himmler, Schollenberg, and Mueller extended from February through June in an attempt to properly allocate the respective Abwehr functions to the appropriate unit of Amts 6 and 4. The final outcome was that OKW Abwehr was to be attached to Department 4; the Department dealing with Active Espionage was to be attached to Amt 6. (pp. 5-6) Kaltenbrunner stated that in fact the re-organization never actually went beyond the negotiation and paper stages. The Abwehr in actuality remained intact as was evidenced by the active participation of that group in the 20 July Incident. (p. 4) Kaltenbrunner believes that the negotiations were prolonged principally because of the wide-spread corruption in the OKW group. (Refers to Rittmeister von Lodebur as authority on this subject). (pp. 4-6)

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The importance of the alleged "re-organization" was heightened by what followed the 20 July Incident. Himmler became the Chief of the German Reserve Army. That position coupled with the removal of the Abwehr from the OKW and its assignment to Amts 4 and 6 placed Himmler in a very advantageous position. For this reason he was unwilling to relinquish the executive police powers over these offices to a "civilian such as Kaltenbrunner." (p.6)

Kaltenbrunner admitted that he was deeply interested in the reorganization because it directly affected his sources of information for his political reports; that he conferred with Schellenberg regarding the developments. However, he was not successful in advancing his proposals since Schellenberg was determined to assume the position as Canaris' successor. To this end many political reports were never sent to Kaltenbrunner but were forwarded by Schellenberg directly to Himmler in order to enhance the Schellenberg's position. (pp. 8-9)

Kaltenbrunner stated that he had nothing to do with the reorganization of Amt IV; that all such matters were handled between Mueller and Himmler. The issue brought into focus the struggle between Mueller and Schellenberg for Himmler's favor. (p.9)

Counter Espionage: The State Police whose function was the maintenance of the security of the Reich was concerned with the apprehension of a spy. Likewise the OKW-Abwehr was charged with this function. (pp. 6-7)

ARREST PROCEDURE

Kaltenbrunner was presented with a series of teletype messages and arrest order forms bearing his signature:

a. Message of 6 October 1944, arrest and internment of Wickik (2) signed by Dr. Kaltenbrunner. The document bears the figures IV A 6. Kaltenbrunner states that such is a definite indication that the signature was unauthorized since Mueller was the head of that Office. (p.10)

b. Order for arrest, 28 September 1944, relates to a German woman arrested for sexual intercourse with a Pole. Kaltenbrunner stated that each of such cases was decided by Himmler; that the order was not signed by Kaltenbrunner under order of Himmler; that it "must have been signed by Mueller". Kaltenbrunner stated that the fact of Himmler's sole authority in these matters was widely known throughout the Reich. (p.11)

c. Teleprint message dated 30 September 1944 ordering internment of German who refused to work. Kaltenbrunner denied that he in fact signed the message. He denied that he had ever been informed of this mis-use of his name. "I had less executive powers than the smallest Chief of a State Police Department". (p.13)

d. Arrest Order, dated 19 October 1944, signed Dr. Kaltenbrunner, called for arrest of a German guilty of "religious propaganda". Kaltenbrunner denied that he had the authority to sign such an order; that the act of signing was

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the responsibility of Mueller; when reminded of the cases in which he had effected the release of certain persons -- he stated that such was done not by his own hand but on the basis of requests which he had addressed to Himmler or Hitler. He vehemently asserted that he had neither the power to "arrest" nor to "release." (pp 14-15)

c. Teleprint order for arrest, dated 2 December 1944, signed Dr. Kaltenbrunner. Kaltenbrunner again denied his authority to effect such an order. (p.15) Kaltenbrunner made the same reply regarding messages dated 6 December 1944 and 27 December 1944 respectively, relating to the same subject matter. (pp.16-17)

Kaltenbrunner pointed to the fact that all of the arrest orders offered for identification were issued from Prague and addressed to Darmstadt. Heydrich at one time had an office in Prague. Heydrich's exercised executive police powers and while in Prague as Deputy Protector probably issued such orders from Prague. Kaltenbrunner stated that undoubtedly the subordinate officials in Prague "assumed" that when Kaltenbrunner took over Heydrich's position in the RSH that he also was clothed with executive police powers. (pp. 17; see also pp. 22-24)

The Schutzhaft Arrest: Kaltenbrunner stated that Heydrich had the direct authority to sign the Schutzhaft arrest. With the death of Heydrich these functions were assumed by Himmler. (p.18-19)

"By order of the Chief": Kaltenbrunner stated that orders signed by Mueller "By order of the Chief" referred to Heydrich as "chief". After 1943 the term could only have been used through error. (p.19) Kaltenbrunner says these minor cases would not come before an official of high position. (p.23)

OFFICES OF RSHA

Kaltenbrunner's Office and Dept 3 of RSHA: No offices of the Secret Police were located at 102 Wilhelmstrasse. Reichs Leader SS' Office; Secret State Police Dept.: 8 Prinz Albrecht Strasse.

Kaltenbrunner stated that none of the Amts of RSHA were located at 8 Prinz Albrecht Strasse; that had he (Kaltenbrunner) assumed Heydrich's position he would undoubtedly have had his offices at the latter address. (pp. 24-25)

ASSOCIATES IN THE RSHA

Ohlendorf was Kaltenbrunner's closest contact in the RSHA. He had frequent contact with Schollenberg at the mess table. Later he was in closer contact with Mueller because of the combined mess facilities they had to eat together. (pp. 25-26)

AS CHIEF OF THE RSHA

Kaltenbrunner stated that he was not paid as Chief of RSHA. He was first paid as a General of the Order Police, later as a Lieutenant General of the Order police. His last salary was that of a General of the Waffen SS. Highest

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salary: 1800 RM. per month. (p.26) Kaltenbrunner conceded that his title was that of Chief of the RSHA but insisted that he did not carry out the functions of that office. (p.26)

Kaltenbrunner stated that he "...did not take over the political section of Departments 3 and 6 in the same way as I found it..." Departments 4 and 5 and 6 Mil were under Himmler's direction. (p.27)

Kaltenbrunner stated that he had no control over personnel matters in the RSHA. "The highest function I could carry out was the function of promoting a driver". Kaltenbrunner then referred to the wide appointive powers of his predecessor, Heydrich, to illustrate that he Kaltenbrunner did not, in fact, fill Heydrich's former position. (p.27)

Kaltenbrunner stated that he was unaware of the details of organization within the RSHA; that none of the charts which were prepared were ever submitted to him; that ~~all~~^{all} such matters were handled by Department 1 under the direct supervision of Himmler. (p.29)

Kaltenbrunner insisted that he had no other departments directly under his control; that in time he, through his intelligence system, became indispensable to other governmental agencies and ministries and as a result "I was no longer responsible to Himmler alone". (p.29) In such a position it would have been too dangerous for Himmler to have vested Kaltenbrunner with executive powers in police matters. (pp. 29-30)

Further illustrating his "insignificant position" Kaltenbrunner stated that the Chief of Amt I was apparently authorized to make changes in the organization of the RSHA and present them to Himmler for approval. Kaltenbrunner would then be notified -- the exception; Kaltenbrunner was permitted some word in the matter of an important post in the SD. (p.30)

CONCENTRATION CAMPS

Kaltenbrunner stated that "Class I Camps" refers to work assignment-- "the lightest type of work". (p.16) Class II, when used in relation to Dachau, referred to work in the gardens and fields. (p.20) Kaltenbrunner again denied that he had any jurisdiction in matters pertaining to the camps and denied that he had ever had any dealings with Pohl. (pp. 20-21)