

TRANSLATION.

~~Letter~~ from 35.02
Savings - Aus
to I

At the suggestion of my defense counsel I am giving the following truthful description:

1. I heard Hitler speak for the first time at a small meeting in Munich, in November 1922. I had previously heard a bit about him, and I was interested to get to know him and his people.
2. A few days later I decided to become a member of his party. I had an interview with him at which he explained to me his then generally known aims. The reason for my joining the movement was the personality of the Fuehrer which right from the beginning made a strong impression on me, and the fact that it was the only party in Germany which had as the main point of its platform the rehabilitation of Germany - without compromise. It was principally my national feeling and the realization that without taking into consideration the social question, the national question would not be solved. I found both clearly united in Hitler's statements.
3. I did not return from Sweden in 1921 in order to be active politically, but I had the intention of doing something in aviation. For the time being I decided to undertake some studies at the University of Munich and to take courses which would introduce me to economics.
4. At the beginning of January 1923 the Fuehrer spoke to me and asked me to take over the leadership of his SA which I promised to do. As far as I can remember, I officially took over at the beginning of March 1923. The position as commanding officer of the SA which at that time was practically confined to Upper Bavaria, Lower Bavaria was my only function. It was my task to enlarge and firmly establish it.
5. The relations between SA and NSDAP were as follows: The SA was an integral part of the Party and at that time only a member of the Party could be an SA man. It had been founded, and this remained its main task, to protect Party meetings which at that time were exposed to serious disturbances. It was organized in a military fashion insofar as the Freikorps showed a certain military shape. It was not anti-Republican, since we were not interested in a revival of the monarchy.
6. I have answered concerning the special aims of the SA in 1922/23 under point 5. In November 1923 it had the task, in collaboration with other patriotic organizations, to execute the revolution in Munich.
7. The members of the SA could be armed at any time. The arms were, however, not given to them but kept in certain places just as was the case in other patriotic organizations (patriotic associations, Oberland, etc.) In the way of arms there were hand weapons which were still available from the war, guns, machine guns and some heavy artillery.
8. At that time they were not yet being trained in special street fighting tactics. Training followed the old military principles of fighting.
9. Question 9 is answered under point 8.

10. The decision to undertake the revolution in Munich 1923 was taken at such short notice that no discussions took place as to what was to happen afterwards; no discussions were held or commitments made as to what was to happen to the SA afterwards.

11. Question 11 is answered under point 10.

12. I did not say to the Fuehrer in January 1923 that the organisation of the SA had been completed since at this time I had merely begun to take charge of the SA inofficially, and then officially from March 1923 on. I have at no time reported to Hitler that my task with reference to the organisation of the SA had been completed.

13. Before the revolution of November 8/9, 1923 in Munich there was naturally a discussion about the strength of the SA. This did not refer to the SA alone, but also to the strength of the other patriotic organizations which took part in the revolution.

14. After I had been severely wounded at the Feldherrnhalle, I was taken by car to the house of a friend in Garmisch. Three or four days later, after the wound had been dressed, I was taken across the Austrian border, at midnight, and thence to Innsbruck to the hospital there.

15. The Munich police did not assist me in my flight. However, a police captain in Garmisch did help me, who knew me from my aviation period during the world war.

16. In Austria I spent months in the hospital. There I rarely met men of the Party who came to see me. Only after my recovery did I take up contact with the Austrian NSDAP and several representatives from Germany. Such a meeting took place only once, in Vienna. At the end of April 1924 I left Austria and went to Italy. From this time on, after Vienna, I have had no more contact with the S.A.

17. From the beginning of 1924 up to my election to the Reichstag in May, 1928 I was not politically active in the Party, since I was working on economics. Only after my election in 1928 did I become politically active in the Party to the fullest extent. I am therefore unable to say whence the money came for the election campaign of 1928.

18. Question 18 is answered under point 17. As far as I know, industrial concerns at that time did not contribute any funds.

19. Only in 1933 did I become the Political Plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer. This was not a Party office, but a personal appointment by the Fuehrer. It was my task to deal with all parties which existed at the time, as well as with Government offices, whenever necessary. It became even easier to carry on such negotiations since shortly thereafter I became president of the German Reichstag, and as such had to have contact with all parties in the Government. The Fuehrer's assignment comprised no other tasks or duties. Fights in the streets of Berlin came under the jurisdiction, first, of the local SA leader, Stennes, and second, of the Gauleiter, Dr. Goebbels.

20. In 1923 my official position was Commanding Officer of the SA. After the Reichstag elections of 1928 my main task was that of a Reich speaker, in order to conduct meetings. The duties of a Reichstag deputy are known. As Political Plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer since 1932 up to the accession to power I have listed my duties under point 19. I would like to add that as Political Deputy of the Fuehrer I conducted ^{to a great extent} the negotiations leading towards the formation of the Cabinet ~~in~~ in 1933.

21. In 1923 Hess led an SA batallion in Munich. Then, after Hitler had returned from the fortress at Landsberg, he became, as far as I know, his private secretary, and remained in that post until the seizure of power, when he got the central (main) political position. I do not know what other special positions Hess had in his capacity as the Fuehrer's secretary, since I took no active part in the life of the Party from 1923 to 1928. From the end of 1923 to the end of 1927 I lived outside of Germany.

22. It is a fact that Hitler repeatedly gave orders that the SA was not to commit any illegal acts so that the Party would not get into difficulties and might again be banned.

23. Question 23 is answered under point 22.

24. Violations of this order occurred ~~frequently~~ repeatedly on the part of lower leaders. It was especially the then highest SA leader, Captain v. Pfeffer and his Berlin SA leader, Capt. Stennes, who opposed this legal deportment and wished to give to the SA a stronger, revolutionary character. This attitude explains violations of this order. Hitler was extremely angry about this; it led later to the dismissal of Pfeffer and Stennes. The revolt of the Berlin SA in 1931 within the party finds its basis in this conflict.

25. If the ban on the wearing of uniforms was repeatedly violated, this also must be ascribed to the local and higher SA leaders.

26. In the period 1930 to 1933 Hitler considered street fights as illegal. He of course did not consider it illegal when SA men or groups who had been attacked, defended themselves. Frequently, after meetings of National-Socialists or Communists there were clashes and fighting among the followers of the opposing parties, which, however, did not assume the proportions of street fights.

27. Question 27 is answered under point 26.

28. I cannot remember today that I sent a telegram to the 5 SA men in Beuthen, but it is absolutely possible.

29. If I have sent such a telegram, I can for the above reason not give you the text - not after 13 years.

30. I cannot make any statement concerning the activity of the SA in Hessen in August and September, 1931. The reason may be that after I

had resumed my political activity in 1928, I was looked upon with distrust by the Supreme SA leader v. Pfeffer and his subordinate leaders, since I had been the former Commanding Officer of the SA. They were afraid that I might again be interested in that position. For this reason the Berlin SA leader had received instructions from the Supreme SA leadership to be extremely reserved towards me. I therefore had practically no contact with the SA during this period and am only slightly informed concerning events.

At that time methods were already introduced, which were opposed to our policies, which made it possible for non-Party members to become SA men. It was the aim of the then Supreme SA leader to make the SA as independent from the Party as possible. Even when Hitler took over the supreme leadership of the SA and appointed Roehm Chief, the latter pursued this tendency which finally led to the events of July (means June) 30, 1934.

31. I had heard about the documents which Mr. Best worked on, but really do not remember exactly what happened.

32. I do not know the content of the documents. I knew nothing about their publication.

33. Question 33 is answered under point 32.

(sign.) Hermann Goering

34. The aims and intentions of the Party were naturally also directed toward fighting the Treaty of Versailles. As far as military armament was concerned, the main point was to get the other countries to disarm in the same manner as Germany. If they were not going to comply with the regulations set down in the League of Nations, it was self-understood that Germany on its part would rearm for ~~itself~~ her required security.

35. For the time being there was no talk of reconquering the territories which had been lost as the result of the war 1914/18. However, there was always the attitude among the German people and within the Party that Danzig and the Polish Corridor were an incongruity. The incorporation into Germany (Anschluss) of Austria and the Sudetenland were even then considered a policy which had to be pursued by every German Government. There was also the opinion that Poland had received too much German territory.

36. The acquisition of so-called "living space" in Continental Europe was sometimes discussed as a principle of the aims and intentions of the Party without, however, any definite idea as to how this space should be created. The discussion took place roughly in the same way as it was done in theory in Hitler's book "Mein Kampf".

The Fuehrer was always ready to relinquish his claims on the South Tyrol and Alsace-Lorraine if permanent peace with Italy and France could thereby be achieved.

37. Whenever there was talk of required "living space", one thought of the East exclusively. This the more so since one was convinced that at some time Russian Bolshevism would make its advance into Europe and that Germany would be the first line of defense. In such an event, this question was also to be solved.

38. I do not know what Hess' views were concerning Russia. I have already stated under point 37 how it was planned to gain territory as a result of repelling the definitely to be expected attack on Germany by the Bolsheviks. Several times the Fuehrer exposed his opinion that under any circumstances territory would have to be acquired in the East.

39. I do not know what ideas Ribbentrop had with reference to the East prior to the outbreak of the Polish war. I discussed foreign affairs with Ribbentrop on extremely rare occasions, practically never.

After the outbreak of the Polish conflict a definite territorial program was set up for the East, which for the time being did not include any Russian territory. This was included only when the Fuehrer became convinced that he would have to anticipate a Russian attack by taking preventive measures.

40. Whether individual National-Socialists made proposals to the Fuehrer in this direction, I do not know, since it was always the Fuehrer himself who talked of his aims and in which sense they were to be realized. He frequently changed his aims - from trying to attain his goal by political combinations over a long period of time -

to attempting a solution through a struggle, perhaps even attack.

41. I read "Mein Kampf" in 1926.

42. Naturally I found myself in agreement with many of the ideas expressed in that book. Towards certain ideas I had my own reservations. After such a long time I can remember the content only in its broader phases.

43. The Fuehrer was so changeable in his tactics and theories that it may be said that "Mein Kampf" shows only in part what he did, or wanted to do, under certain conditions. He changed his opinions and tactics frequently on the basis of the development of a situation. As far as philosophical notes are concerned, they probably do give a picture of his basic principles.

44. This question is answered under point 42.

45. I never spoke to either Frick, Frank or Rosenberg about the principles laid down in "Mein Kampf". Hess and Rosenberg probably believe most closely in these principles. Hess for the reason, as far as I can remember, that he was present when the book was written.

46. The definition of the Fuehrer principle was clearly defined for us and represented the absolute power of command and authority of the Fuehrer, and the implicit obedience of his followers. This principle applied: Authority from above, and responsibility from lower to higher echelons. With the successes of the Fuehrer, and his extremely intensified authority and popularity among the people, the Fuehrer finally became the personification of the absolute representation of the will of the people, not only de jure, but also de facto.

47. Naturally the Fuehrer principle was one of these basic principles on which the NSDAP was based, and on which the struggle for the liquidation of the Weimar system, and the creation of the Third Reich was based.

48. The duty to be obedient was absolute under the Fuehrer principle, and was considerably strengthened by the added civil service and soldier oath. It could not be compared to the spirit of obedience under the previous regime.

49. I do not remember the military oath of the period before Hitler since I never took it. My last military oath, i.e. the one before the oath to Adolf Hitler, was the oath the German Emperor and King of Prussia who was my Commander-in-Chief when I became a soldier.

50. The platform of the NSDAP ~~xx~~ does not mention a master power or a master race of people of German blood. Neither does it mention the domination or oppression of other nations. Only a part of the party advocated this policy, later especially the S.S. I personally have never in my speeches used such words as master people, master race, superman. Neither have I advocated such policies.

51. This doctrine has never been explained to me, but, as stated under

point 50., it was advocated by certain sections within the party.

52. I never read Rosenberg's books and/^{read} only a few of his speeches. I am therefore not able to say whether he preached this doctrine, but do not think it is impossible. I have never discussed this point with him.

53. No. The duty to recognize this doctrine was not imposed on party members. I do not know how this ~~matter~~ was handled in the SS.

54. Legislation was not based on this doctrine. It is true that a law was passed for the protection of German blood, but it was not based on the principle of a master race. It was principally destined to eliminate the Jews from the German race, and represents the racial-political principle of the NSDAP vis-a-vis racially foreign blood.

(sign.) Hermann Goering