OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY



INTERROGATION DIVISION SUMMARY

Interrogation of JODL, Alfred

By: Colonel Amen, 15 August 1945

Persons and organizations implicated, and subjects

1. JODI.

- a. Date of birth and last position held in the OKW (2)
- b. Identification of Exhibit "4" (3)
- c. Identification of Document marked Exhibit "B" dealing with creation of Special Staff for the Norwegian Operation (4-5)
- d. Discussions with Hitler and Keitel concerning the Norwegian operation (5)
- c. Quisling's role in Norway operation (7)
- f. Exhibit "D" (excerpts from Rosenberg's diary)(10)
- g. Contemplated operation against the West Document marked Exhibit "E" (13)
 h. Reasons for moving into Norway (14)

INVASION OF NORWAY

Alfred Yodl was born on 10 March 1890. Married for the second time; no children. Last official position: Chief of the Leading Staff in the OKW during the entire war (Page 2).

Jodl identifies Raeder's signature on document marked Exhibit States it is possible that Major Devale, his staff officer, may have attended the meeting discussed in the document, in addition to the persons mentioned therein. One of the Fuehrer's adjutants may have also been present (Page 3).

Identifies document marked Exhibit "B". It refers to the Fuehrer's order to set up a special staff for the Norwegian action which was to be kept absolutely secret. This staff replaced Jodl's operation section which did the ground work. The new special staff which did not involve the OKW was headed by Warlimont. Admiral Kranke represented the Navy; Colonel von Lossberg the Army; and Captain Speck von Stormberg (the Air Force) (Page 4). This staff merely concerned itself with preparations and staff work and did not furnish leaders for the actual expedition (Page 5).

Jodl first heard about the Norwegian invasion in December, 1939. States that it was precipitated by increased English activity in that country (reports concerning British officers in consulates; large numbers of British ships in Norwegian waters; mines laid in 1940; sinking of German vessel Altenmark by British destroyer, etc. (Page 5).

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Jodl met with the Fuehrer and Keitel every day to discuss plans for Norwegian operation (Page 5), since Jodl's staff which made preparations, was working under Keitel (Page 6).

QUISLING'S ROLE IN NORWEGIAN OPERATIONS

Jodl did not speak with Quisling personally. Quisling occasionally talked with members of the Navy and the Fuchrer.

Asked about a meeting at Copenhagen on 4 April 1940 between Quisling and a representative of Keitel, Jodl replies he recalls that around that time members of Canaris' organization had meetings with Norwegians. Does not know for sure whether Quisling was present (Page 7). Assertshe never sent his representatives since this matter concerned intelligence and the politics. "There is no doubt in my mind, however, that we received reports from Norway from Norwegian representatives. These reports were used by our military people." All reports he received on the Norwegian situation came from Quisling's circles. Jodl relates in this connection one false report received presumably from this source concerning heavy fortifications of the Narvik Bay, which were found not to exist.

Never heard of 10,000 pounds remuneration being given to quisling and does not believe this is true. Never heard about quisling's appointment to Prime Minister until it became a fact (Page 9).

Is unable to identify document marked Exhibit "C". It may have originated with Colonel Pickenbruk, who was in charge of the SS at that time (Pages 9-10).

Asked to read document marked "Exhibit D" (excerpts from Rosenberg's diary), Jodl states that the officer concerned must have been an officer of the 'Defensive Operation Section' (Intelligence) (Page 10).

Jodl states that the Foreign Minister was only told by the Fuchrer about the landing 2-3 days in advance. No operation in this war was ept as secret as this one (Page 10).

Cannot recall circumstances leading to Quisling's replacement by Terboven. "There was a difference of opinion in Norway between the Navy and certain unscreenable characters in Norway." The German Navy favored Quisling. Others were of the opinion that Quisling would not find a willing ear in Norway (Page 11).

Knows nothing about Norwegian divisions being furnished to Germany after the invasion. Stresses that Norwegians in the SS were all volunteers (Page 12).

Believes it was Quisling who made reports about the strength of Norwegian troops scattered over strategic points (Page 13).

CONTEMPLATED OPERATION AGAINST THE WEST

Dismisses contents of document marked Exhibit "E" as "silly talk of civilians." "The deciding factor in this was our means of transportation and also what we could use for the later expedition against the West." (Page 13).

Norwegians did not participate in the invasion with the exception of a few guides for the landing operation. This had been proposed by Canaris' section (Page 14).

"We did not want war with Norway. We only wanted to prevent the English being in Norway. A very short time later the English would have been there, and then we would have lost the war at the beginning." (Page 14). Asserts that the determining factor in the success of the Norwegian operation was the element of surprise (P 14).

Quisling cannot be accused of bad intentions. NORWEGIAN operations would have been successful even without him.