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SPECIAL INTERROGATION REPORT (CSIR) No. 5

- Bull Economic Admin

HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION OF THE  
FELDWIRTSCHAFTSAMT IM OKW  
with an Annex on  
Amtsgruppe Ausland in the Wehrwirtschafts- und Ruestungsamt.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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1. INTRODUCTIONa. Source

Name: ZINNEMANN, Dr. Curt  
Rank: Oberstleutnant  
Interrogated: 15 Aug 1945, U.S.F.E.T., M.I.S. Center

b. Preamble

In the summer of 1935 ZINNEMANN was drafted by Oberst THOMAS for service with the Wehrwirtschaftsstab (War Economy Staff). He was commissioned a "Hauptmann, Ergaenzungs-Offizier" (Captain, Supplementary Officer) on 1 Aug 35, but with the seniority date of rank retroactive to 1 Apr 34. On 1 Jan 40 he was promoted to the rank of Major and on 1 Apr 42 to Oberstlt. From 1 Feb 36 until late 1938 he served as THOMAS' adjutant. In September of the latter year he underwent an operation on a stiff leg, absenting himself from duty until December. His second wife died in Mar 39 and ZINNEMANN, never of robust health, suffered a nervous breakdown. During July and Aug 39 he did some work in the office, but it was not until Mar 40 that he was able to return to work full time. Throughout the war he was active in the Wehrwirtschafts- und Ruestungsamt (War Economy and Armaments Office), in the department concerned with observation of foreign economies. ZINNEMANN was captured 5 Apr 45 in MEININGEN by the 11th Armd Div and subsequently processed through PWE 15 to this Center.

One previous report on ZINNEMANN has been published by U.S.F.E.T., M.I. S. Center. This was CSIR/2, Notes on Japan, dated 10 Aug 45.

The following abbreviations are used in the text of this report:

We Wi Stab	Wehrwirtschaftsstab (War Economy Staff)
We Wi Amt	Wehrwirtschaftsamt (War Economy Office)
We Wi Rue Amt	Wehrwirtschafts- und Ruestungsamt (War Economy and Armaments Office)
We Wi Stab Ost	Wehrwirtschaftsstab Ost (War Economy Staff "East", a department of the We Wi Rue Amt)

2. INTERROGATION RESULTSa. THE WE WI STAB(1) Origin.

In the spring of 1935 Oberst Georg THOMAS--then chief of the Heereswaffenamt (Army Weapons Office)--was ordered by the Minister of War, Feldmarschall von BLOMBERG, to set up a special staff for the purpose of studying problems of war economy. This staff was also to be charged with supervising the procurement of arms and other equipment for the revived conscription army. Heretofore each of the commanders-in-chief of the three branches of the OKW (i.e. the army, navy and air force) had been determining the amounts of equipment required within his own command, the actual procurement being handled by the Waffenamt (Weapons Office) of that command. The provision of food and clothing and the construction of barracks for the troops had been the responsibilities of the administrative office within each of the three arms. Thus under this system the three commands had been competing with each other for the available supplies, provoking economic instability, threatening to unbalance the price and wage scales and to exhaust the insufficient stocks of raw materials. It was the primary purpose of the We Wi Stab to coordinate the demands of the armed forces, balancing them against the existing economic system and supplies. Experience gained in World War I had proved that the economic factor is as important to the successful waging of a war as military tactics and strategy, and that as such it must be given equal consideration.

(2) Difficulties of Organization.

In order to accomplish the mission a Wehrwirtschaftsinspekteur (War Economy Inspector) with a staff of expert economists was assigned to each Wehrkreis. The Inspekteur was charged with the supervision of all those agencies within his Wehrkreis which the We Wi Stab had designated to furnish the Wehrmacht with supplies. It took almost a full year to organize the inspectorates because of the difficulty in finding qualified personnel. The We Wi Stab was obliged to train its officers and military officials for the work, since in creating an economic office to work within the framework of the Wehrmacht itself they were acting without established precedent.

(3) Personnel.

Most of the men recruited for work with the We Wi Stab or in the inspectorates had been active or reserve officers in World War I. They were now reinstated as Ergaenzungsoffiziere (Supplementary Officers) and were listed in a separate rank list. Both active and reserve officers of the new Wehrmacht took precedence over them in promotions. ZINNEMANN cites his own case as a typical example of the difference in age between the old Reichswehr officers and those of the new Wehrmacht, and the much slower advancement of the former. This inevitably caused a serious rift in the officers' corps with the realization on the part of the older men that they were being used only as a means to an end, leveling the road for youth not "sickened" by old concepts. Among the Ergaenzungs-offiziere there was a general and increasing distaste for National Socialist principles, as well as personal rejection of the man HITLER. Those working in the higher staffs and central headquarters confirmed and strengthened this prejudice as they became increasingly aware of HITLER's failures as a political and military leader. Within the offices of the We Wi Stab were hung very few pictures of the Fuehrer; this omission was in itself a radical departure from orthodoxy and indicative of the attitude of these officers. An exception to the general rule were the Ergaenzungs-offiziere of the Luftwaffe. For them, by the grace of Goering, promotions were more rapid and National Socialism was as a direct consequence held in higher esteem.

(4) Oberst Georg THOMAS.


THOMAS himself had been sharply antagonistic to the Nazi regime from its inception because the direction of its foreign and domestic policies made war inevitable. Aware of German economic deficiencies, THOMAS frequently and urgently pointed out that they were headed for a war with virtually no possibility of success. On that point he agreed fully with Minister Dr. SCHACHT, who with Oberbuergermeister Dr. GOERDELER frequently visited him during the late 30's. ZINNEMANN himself heard THOMAS express his opposition to a war. Confidential lectures on this subject were given by THOMAS and also by Major BEUTLER (since deceased), who was his first general staff officer. These lectures, included in the instruction courses of the Kriegs-Akademie and the Wehrmacht-Akademie, consisted chiefly of statistical comparisons between the economic potentials of the world and of Germany, that of the latter being presented as highly inadequate. On his occasional tours of inspection through the country's plants and factories THOMAS never failed to comment to leading industrialists on the economic impossibility of a successful war. Other points in which he believed and which he discussed publicly were: the need for a standing armed force, in view of the comparatively high economic potentials of France and Russia; the folly of contemplating a war, since it would cause a formation of opposing powers essentially the same as in World War I; the revival of hatred for Germany due to the Nazi regime's irresponsible use of force. These statements inevitably came to the attention of the Party leaders and a few years later THOMAS was broken in rank. ZINNEMANN assumes that THOMAS was arrested in connection with the incident of 20 Jul 44.



b. THE WE WI AMT IM OKW

(1) Organization.

On 1 Jan 38 the We WI Stab offices were moved from Bendlerstrasse 27 (a building adjoining the well known Shell Haus in BERLIN W35) to rooms of the old Generalkommando Haus at Kurfuerstenstrasse 63. At the same time the We WI Stab was renamed "We WI Amt" and THOMAS was promoted to Generalmajor (Brigadier General). During ZINNEMANN's tenure of office as adjutant, 1 Feb 36 until late 1938, the general plan of organization was:



ZINNEMANN named two men who would probably be able to give a more complete detailed picture of the organization: General HUENERMANN, THOMAS' last Chief of Staff, last known to be working with the service in France; also Oberstlt. DOEHNER, ZINNEMANN's successor as adjutant, last known to be administrator of the archives of the We WI Amt in MUSKAU, believed to have been in VACHA/Thuringia at the end of the war.

(2) Personnel.

Personnel of the We WI Amt in 1938, as remembered by ZINNEMANN, were:

Chief of We WI Amt	Generalmajor THOMAS
Head of First Dept	Oberstlt. HUENERMANN
Head of Second Dept	Fregatten-Kapitaen RIEVE
Foreign States Section	Oberstlt. MATZKY, with four officers

In the crisis after the regulation of the Sudeten German problem, Oberstlt. HUENERMANN became Chief of Staff, and Major der Luftwaffe Wilhelm BECKER joined the First Dept. BECKER was also put in charge of the Foreign States Section.

(3) Activities.

The tasks of the office expanded tremendously when it took over the trusteeship of economically important producing agencies in Austria, Saarland and Sudetenland, and later those in Bohemia and Moravia. The observation of foreign economies continued to be neglected, and showed no serious or worthwhile results.

c. THE WE WI RUE AMT(1) Changes.

In the spring of 1939 the mission of the We Wi Rue Amt was officially expanded to include complete supervision of the production of armaments. The name of the office was correspondingly changed to "We Wi Rue Amt" and the Wehrkreis inspectorates were renamed "Ruestungs-Inspektionen". Their duties and functions were not materially affected by the change. In consideration of the increasing importance of raw materials, the Raw Materials Subsection of the Second Dept was set up as a complete section under Oberstlt. BECHT. When in the summer of 1939 war seemed more imminent than ever, the We Wi Rue Amt began to draft former officers and reserve officers for training. The staff of instructors attached to the Chief of Staff taught a four weeks' course in all aspects of the organization and administration of war economy to all We Wi Rue Amt officers and officials, those of the inspectorates as well as those in the central office.

(2) ZINNEMANN's duties.

Due to ill health, ZINNEMANN worked only at odd intervals in the period from Sep 1938 until Mar 1940 (see para 1,b.). He was therefore replaced as adjutant of the We Wi Rue Amt and instead transferred to the Foreign States Section. There he was assigned the heretofore neglected observation of the territories in Asia and Asia Minor. His sources were the domestic and foreign press and reports of scientific institutes. Reports from the Abwehr section of the OKW on this subject were remarkably rare.

d. THE WE WI RUE AMT DURING THE WAR(1) Outbreak of War.


War came as a surprise because it developed within a very few days, without the customary protracted buildup to a crisis. Consequently the We Wi Rue Amt was caught unprepared with the armaments program still in its beginnings. ZINNEMANN comments that the war was thus started in a senseless fashion, without sufficient forethought, without sufficient planning; that the immediate successes were possible because they were won against only minor fractions of the eventual array of opposing forces; that a prolonged duration of the now inevitable world war could only lead to economic failure, barring the entry of unforeseen factors. Such a factor seemed present at the time of the pact with the Soviet Union in view of that nation's economic resources, particularly of food and fuels. This advantage was lost when Germany declared war on the USSR; from that point on economic failure and, as a direct consequence, military failure were foreseeable.

(2) Personnel. (For organization of the We Wi Rue Amt see para (3), next page)

To the best of ZINNEMANN's knowledge, personnel during the first year of the war were:

Chief of We Wi Rue Amt	General d. Inf. THOMAS
Adjutant	Oberstlt. DOEHNER
Chief of Staff	Oberst d. G. (Colonel of the General Staff) HUENERMANN; succeeded by Oberst d.G.z.V. (Colonel of the General Staff on special assignment) von GUSOVIVUS
Amtsgruppe Inland	Kapiteen z. See MEENDSEN-BOHLKEN, successor of RIEVE
Amtsgruppe Ausland	Oberstlt. d.G.d.Luftw. (Lt. Col. of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe) BECKER

(3) Organization of the We Wi Rue Amt During First Year of War.



(4) Subordination of THOMAS to TODT.

Already by the second year of the war THOMAS' position was precarious. He was subordinated to Reichsminister Dr. TODT, who by a decree of 17 Mar 40 had been made Reich Plenipotentiary for Armaments and Munitions. This was for THOMAS a personal defeat attributable to the disfavor in which he was held by Party leaders. Actually there were other reasons. It had been difficult for THOMAS, professional soldier and not a Party member, to cope with conflicting civilian and Party agencies. A Party member, one more capable of dealing with civilian authorities, seemed necessary to complete successfully the tremendous task of rearmament on an unprecedented scale. The other agencies working in the same general field as the We Wi Rue Amt and therefore to some extent interfering with its mission were: the Wirtschaftsministerium (Economic Ministry), Goering's "Four Year Plan", the Reichsarbeitsminister (Labor Minister), the Preiskommissar (Price Commissioner), the Reichsbank, the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German Labor Front), the Verkehrsminister (Transportation Minister), the Ernährungsminister (Food Minister), the Reichsforstmeister (National Chief of Forestry), and in the sphere of foreign trade the Auswaertiges Amt (Foreign Office). ZINNEMANN does not know what were the internal consequences in the We Wi Rue Amt of TODT's appointment. From his associates he learned that working with TODT was not unpleasant, for he was competent and businesslike.



(5) Additional Inspectorates.

In 1940 economic inspectorates were established in Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France. Their specific functions were unknown to ZINNEMANN, but their organization was probably identical with that of the Wehrkreis inspectorates in the homeland. Other inspectorates were similarly set up in Serbia and Greece in 1941. Also a Wehrwirtschafts officer was attached to the German military mission to each allied state.

e. THE WE WI AMT(1) Transfer of Functions.

Further reorganization of the We Wi Rue Amt in the OKW was to take place when Albert SPEER succeeded Dr. TODT as Minister of Armaments and Munitions upon the latter's death in Feb 42. The functions relating to armaments, which had been exercised heretofore by the We Wi Rue Amt, were transferred to the Ministry of Armaments and Munitions under SPEER. The two sections of the office transferred to the SPEER ministry were the one charged with armaments inspections in the Wehrkreise and the section charged with economics investigations in the occupied territories. In this way the functional scope of the We Wi Rue Amt was reduced, and the office became known simply as the Wehrwirtschaftsamt (War Economy Office).

(2) Other Aspects in the Reorganization.

(a) The We Wi Stab Ost continued as an integral organizational part within the We Wi Amt. It was, during the last few months of the war, under supervision of General d. Inf. STAFF and had three Wirtschafts-Inspektionen (Economic Inspectorates) on the Eastern Front, one at each army group. Each inspectorate was sub-divided into Kommandos, and a Kommando was attached to each army. During the retreat, there was a shift in responsibilities and functions of the army groups and of the civil administration in the rear areas. The inspectorates and Kommandos were abolished, and Wehrwirtschafts-Offiziere (Military Economics Officers), known as Heeres-Wirtschaftsfuehrer and Arme-Wirtschaftsfuehrer, were substituted. Similar positions were created in the West and on other fronts. The duty of these officers was to secure supplies for the army and to render assistance in connection with the removal and protection of important industries.

(b) The function of the We Wi Amt had been so reduced that Gen THOMAS was forced to ask for another assignment. As HITLER was opposed to him, it is probable that he was not dismissed only because KEITEL interceded for him. The latter used him as a so-called General z.b.V. Nr. 1 (General with special assignment No. 1) at the office of the chief of the OKW. The records carried him as Wirtschaftsberater (Economic Consultant). Presumably this assignment did not show any results. Gen THOMAS retained Oberstleutnant DOEHNER as his adjutant and moved to MUSKAU, Oberlausitz, when his office was destroyed during an air attack in Nov 43. The new office was located in the castle of Count von ARNIM. The records office of the We Wi Amt was in the same town. It is said that Gen THOMAS in his new position was working on an outline for the history of the German war economy.

(c) His successor was BECKER, former chief of the Amtsgruppe Ausland, while Oberst TROITZSCH became deputy head, charged with supervision of the Wehrwirtschafts-Offiziere in allied countries.

(d) Nearly all documents were destroyed during an air raid on the night of 22 Nov 43. A new office was opened in the Ziethen Barracks in FRANKFURT a. d. ODER. Some sections, such as the Kriegsgeraetehandel (Commerce in War Material) and the Mineraloelbewirtschaftung (Management of Petroleum), were transferred to the Drei-Linden School in WANNSEE. A new set-up was not established, but Oberst d. G. KIRSCH became chief of the foreign section and had under his supervision Gruppen West, Ost, and Sued.

f. THE FELDWIRTSCHAFTSAMT (FIELD ECONOMY OFFICE)(1) Introduction.

Upon the desire of Minister SPEER, the We Wi Amt was renamed during the summer of 1944. The name then adopted was Feldwirtschaftsamt (Field Economy Office) to show the connection with the other military departments, such as the Feld-Kommandantur (i.e., field headquarters in rear areas and occupied countries), the Feld-Gericht (Judge-Advocate General's Department), the Feld-Geistliche (Chaplains), etc. Even at that time no new set-up resulted. Generalleutnant BECKER was replaced by the former chief of We Wi Stab Ost, General der Inf. STAFF, holder of the Knight's Cross, the Iron Cross, and the War Service Cross with Swords.

(2) Reorganization and New Assignments of Personnel.

With appointment of Gen STAFF came the beginning of the end phase in the eventful development of an apparatus new in this war. Gen STAFF reorganized the office. He brought with him all the leading personalities from the military and civil sections of the Wi Stab Ost. This latter office ceased to exist when the retreat in the East occurred. Reorganized, the Feldwirtschaftsamt had five major sections. The internal organization, together with the names of the chief personnel in charge so far as ZINNEMANN remembers, is given in Table I below. (For personalities in the Abteilung Ausland of the Feldwirtschaftsamt, see Annex "B").

TABLE I

Organization of the Feldwirtschaftsamt

Summer, 1944

Section or Unit	Officer In Charge
Chief of Feldwirtschaftsamt	General d. Inf. STAFF
Chief of Staff	Oberst MUSSET (formerly Chief of Staff of Wi Stab Ost)
Chef-Abteilung (Miscellaneous and Administrative Section)	Oberst TIETZE (formerly Chief of Personnel Section, Wi Amt)
Gruppe Personal (Personnel)	
Gruppe Abwicklung des Wi Stab Ost (Disbandment of Wi St Ost)	
Referat Kriegstagebuch (War Diary)	
Abteilung Ausland (Foreign Section)	Oberst d. G. KIRSCH
Gruppe Ost	Oberstleutnant Dr. ZINNEMANN
Gruppe West	Kapt. z. See Dr. STUEBEL
Gruppe Sued	Oberstleutnant Dr. REMTSCH
Abteilung Mineraloel (Petroleum Section)	Kapt. z. See GRIEBEL

(Continued next page)



Section or Unit	(Continued)	Officer in Charge
Amtsgruppe Feldwirtschaft		General STAPF
Abteilung Wirtschaft (Economics Section)		Official of the Reichswirtschafts- ministerium (Reich Ministry for Economics)
Abteilung Rohstoffe (Raw Materials Section)		Unknown
Abteilung Ernahrungswirtschaft (Food Section)		Official of the Reichnsehrstandes (Reich Food Ministry)
Abteilung Forstwirtschaft (Forestry Section)		Official of the Reichforstmeisters (Reich Ministry for Forestry)
Abteilung Arbeitseinsatz (Man- power Allocation Section)		Official of the Reichsanstalt fuer Arbeitsmittlung (Reich Institute for Employment Service)
Amtsgruppe Wehrwirtschaft		Oberst Dr. RUDELSDORFF
Abteilung Wehrwirtschaft (Wehrwirtschafts Officers in foreign countries)		Oberst TROITZSCH
Abteilung Kriegsgeraetehandel (Section for Commerce in War Material)		Oberstleutnant Dr. RADTKE
Abteilung Verkehr (Traffic Section)		Oberst d. Luftw. WERNICH
Abteilung Wehrmacht-Truppen- bedarf (Section for Wehr- macht Troop Requirements)		Unknown

### (3) Functions of the Feldwirtschaftsamt.

(a) The major function of the reorganized office was to provide the troops with supplies, a task becoming increasingly difficult. The combat zone had moved back into the area over which the civilian administrative agencies exercised authority. Close cooperation with the civil administration was necessary. It was for this reason that the Amtsgruppe Feldwirtschaft was established under the direct supervision of the Amt chief. For the same reason, the chiefs of section within the Amtsgruppe Feldwirtschaft were officials taken from the technical ministries and assigned for the duration to functions connected with the military establishment. They remained civilian officials and concurrently supervised their own civilian employees.

(b) Other functional expansion in the Feldwirtschaftsamt necessitated the creation of a new unit in the office to supervise the work of the Wehrwirtschafts-Offiziere (Military Economics Officers) in the allied countries, who were concerned primarily with economic matters of interest to the Wehrmacht. This new unit was headed by Oberst TROITZSCH, who had charge not only of the Wehrwirtschafts-Offiziere, but also of the Wehrkreis-Kommandos. These latter positions had been created at the time when the function of armaments inspection was transferred from the We Wi Amt to the Ministry under SPEER. The duties of the officers in the Wehrkreis are not known to ZINNE-MANN. However, they appeared limited, and the officers concentrated mainly upon aiding the Wehrkreisbefehlshaber in instituting protective and rescue measures.

(c) The other sections of the Feldwirtschaftsamt carried out the same functions with which they had been charged before reorganization of the office, but on a smaller scale because of territorial losses. Indicative of this reduction in the scope of functions is the reduction in personnel of the office.

By autumn 1944 the personnel had reached a low point, and the staff was even further reduced upon removal of the office to MEININGEN. The Auslands Abteilung, for example, consisted of only nine officers and nine male and female employees. The Gruppe Ost within the Auslands Abteilung consisted finally of only two officers, one sergeant, and two female employees. Constructive activity was then no longer possible.

(4) Location of the Office.

When the fighting started near FRANKFURT, the office was moved to BERLIN-WANNSEE, and during the middle of Feb 45 it was transferred to the Drachenberg Barracks in MEININGEN. Because of events at the front and disrupted communications, further work was impossible. On 31 Mar 45 orders were issued to destroy the greatest part of the documents, and only a few were hidden in the cellars of the barracks and in two iron chests. The letters were removed to a tavern in BIBRA, 15 km south of MEININGEN. The remainder of the office in BERLIN was transferred in Mar 45 presumably to LANDSHUT, Bavaria. The records office was moved from MUSKAU to VACHA, southwest of EISENACH.

g. FINAL DAYS OF THE FELDWIRTSCHAFTSAMT

When the documents of the office at MEININGEN were destroyed, the senior officer, Oberst RUDELSDORFF, was given the very difficult task of defending the area and was appointed combat commander of MEININGEN. He tried, without success, to decline accepting this meaningless duty. His deputy was Oberst KIRSCH, while ZINNEMANN was charged with responsibility for maintenance of telephone communications with the outposts and with BERLIN. On 1 Apr 45 a CP was established in a house on the slope of the west bank of the Werra at HELENEN-HEIM. There were no troop units assigned for the defense of the area, and the troops available consisted of approximately 500 officer candidates of the Hungarian army, parts of the replacement training battalion in MEININGEN, and some 500 stragglers who had retreated from the front in the FULDA sector, a total of not more than 1,200 men with whom to hold a front of 20 km. The weapons available consisted only of rifles and some 200 Panzerfauste. There were no heavy weapons nor machine guns. One day a battery of rocket projectors appeared and opened fire from behind the lines, but the next day this battery was nowhere to be found. On 2 and 3 Apr there was some patrol activity. On 5 Apr 45 MEININGEN fell almost without resistance since its active defense had not been ordered.

3. CONCLUSIONS

This is the only report which will be issued on information received from Oberstleutnant Dr. Curt ZINNEMANN on this subject.

(Ed: RLS, GET)

For the AC of S, G-2: .

*William R. Philp*

For WILLIAM R. PHILP  
Colonel, F.A.,  
Commandant

Distribution "D"  
23 Sep 45

HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CENTER  
APO 757A N N E X "A"ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE AMTSGRUPPE AUSLAND  
IN THE WEHRWIRTSCHAFTS- UND RUESTUNGSAMTSource: ZINNEMANN, Dr. CurtRank: Oberstleutnant1. INTRODUCTION

a. Organizational and functional details about the Amtsgruppe Ausland, the section of the We Wi Rue Amt (see paras 2c&d, pp 3-6) in which ZINNEMANN worked throughout the war, are given below. The major concern of this section was with the economies of foreign countries. In the early days of the war, it had to contend always with the time factor. Thus, it was still working on its preliminary analysis of the Polish economy during the summer of 1939 while the actual campaign for the country was being conducted. The analysis did not appear until after the conclusion of the campaign. The economic inspectorate for Poland which had advanced with the troops was thus forced to work without supporting material or adequate briefing. Preliminary analyses and studies constantly followed in the wake of the actual events they should have preceded. This was because throughout the war even the highest military leaders failed to brief the section or to give any indication of which areas and economies were of interest.

b. In early May 41, ZINNEMANN, as specialist on Asia and Asia Minor, was detailed to go to Syria and Lebanon, there to study economic conditions on the spot. At the same time he was to aid RAHN, then plenipotentiary of the Reichsregierung (Reich government), in the task of supplying arms for the projected uprising in Iraq, these arms to be taken from the demobilized French troops in Syria and Lebanon. Upon his arrival ZINNEMANN was told by RAHN that the latter problem had already been settled, despite the refusal of General DENTZ, French High Commissioner for Syria and Lebanon, to have any part in the affair. ZINNEMANN found the economy primitive, unworthy of study, so after two weeks of idleness he reported back on 6 Jun 41 to BERLIN. It is his recollection that RAHN's activities resulted in the furnishing of about eight field pieces with ammunition 100 old machineguns and 1000 rifles to the insurgents in Iraq. The venture was in addition given the support of 12 German and 16 Italian fighter planes; nevertheless by the end of May 41 it had collapsed. Major von BLOMBERG, the son of Feldmarschall von BLOMBERG and leader of the German squadron, was killed during the uprising.

2. IMPORTANT PERSONNEL

a. In early Jun 41 upon his return from Syria and Lebanon, ZINNEMANN was put in charge of Gruppe Ost, one of the subsections within the Amtsgruppe Ausland. In that position he replaced Oberst d. Luftw. DIETRICH, who was thereupon transferred to the We Wi Stab Ost.

b. At the time of ZINNEMANN's return, the chief of Amtsgruppe Ausland was Generalleutnant der Luftwaffe Dipl. Ing. Wilhelm BECKER, who had been employed formerly in the personnel office of the chief of the Luftwaffe. Immediately subordinate to him in the summer of 1941 were one or two General Staff officers from each of the three commands of the Wehrmacht. They were detailed to the office usually for a period of from six to nine months for the purpose of study. The duty of directing investigations pertaining to the economies of foreign countries devolved upon Oberstleutnant MATZKY, Oberst d. Luftw. DIETRICH, and Oberst-



leutnant Dr. RENTSCH, heads respectively of the Gruppen West, Ost, and Sued within the Amtsgruppe Ausland. In addition, there were Oberstleutnant Dr. RADTKE in charge of Gruppe Kriegsgeraetehandel (Commerce in War Material) and Schriftleiter (Chief Editor) Dr. REUTER in charge of Gruppe Wirtschaftliche Propaganda (Economics Propaganda). As mentioned above, ZINNEMANN in early Jun 41 was put in charge of Gruppe Ost, replacing Oberst DIETRICH, who was transferred to We Wi Stab Ost.

c. Later Oberst d. G. KIRSCH was to replace BECKER as chief of the Amtsgruppe Ausland when the latter was promoted to the position of Chief of the We Wi Amt, and Kapt. z. See Dr. STUEBEL was to replace Oberstleutnant MATZKY as head of Gruppe West. In the summer of 1944, upon creation of the Feldwirtschaftsamt to replace the We Wi Amt, the name of the Amtsgruppe Ausland was changed to Abteilung Ausland. The new Abteilung Ausland consisted only of Gruppen Ost, West, and Sued, while the subsection (Kriegsgeraetehandel) under Oberstleutnant Dr. RADTKE formerly in that section was transferred to the newly created Amtsgruppe Wehrwirtschaft.

### 3. FUNCTIONS

In 1941 the Amtsgruppe Ausland had three major functions.

a. It accomplished, under direction of Oberstleutnant Dr. RADTKE, the delivery of war materials to allied or neutral countries after the volume of shipments had been decided upon by the Fuehrer. In the summer of 1944, this function was transferred to the Amtsgruppe Wehrwirtschaft in the newly created Feldwirtschaftsamt.

b. Through especially adapted reports prepared with a view to their propagandistic mission, it kept the press and radio informed on matters pertaining to the war economy of foreign countries.

c. It exploited all incoming information pertaining to the war economy of foreign countries. Such information was derived mainly from the following sources: Amtsgruppe Abwehr (Intelligence Service) of the OKW, reports of commercial attaches, articles in foreign economics journals, studies by German and foreign economics institutes and universities, experiences of Wehrwirtschafts-Offiziere (Military Economics Officers) in allied countries, and reports on PW interrogations by the Abwehr during the later phases of the campaign against the Soviet Union.

### 4. PUBLICATIONS AND STUDIES OF THE AMTSGRUPPE AUSLAND

a. The intelligence obtained from these sources was kept up to date constantly. Economics information of interest to civilian authorities was mimeographed weekly or bi-weekly and disseminated under the title of "Wehrwirtschaftliche Nachrichten" (Military Economic News) to all Reich ministries as well as to offices of the OKW concerned with economic questions.

b. Where information was sufficient, special publications were issued about a country in general. These publications consisted of the textual content and of an appendix containing charts and statistics. Up to 1941, such studies had appeared on Poland, France, Belgium, Finland, and the oil producing areas of the Near East and the Caucasus. The latter of these studies was prepared by ZINNEMANN. Another work published in 1941 was on the USSR and had been prepared under the editorial direction of Major d. Res. JONAS, director of the Koenigsberg Fair. The contents of this work were based, until 1938, upon official Soviet statistics and, from 1939 to 1941, upon detailed information which became known during conferences with the Soviet trade delegation. A second comprehensive work on the Soviet Union was prepared, but was not published because the various aspects of trade and industry in the more than unknown USSR had been investigated so little that for the time being the various chapters of the study about economics had to be looked into separately. Before the end of the war adequate study had been

done to describe such economic aspects of the USSR as mineral oil, coal, tank manufacture, steel and iron. In addition yearly indices were published on industrial enterprises with special issues on MOSCOW and LENINGRAD. These indices contained such information as plant name, plant number, names of directors and chief engineers, machine depots, number of workers, source of energy, raw materials used, and the production program. A special list, including a map and a description of power distribution, was prepared of all important power plants; and another list was prepared of all cement mills.

c. Investigations about the food situation and development of the population of the USSR had advanced so far that a special work upon these matters was to have appeared not later than the summer of 1945. A study was being made also of the chemical industry, and research in the field of non-ferrous metals and steel alloys had been undertaken too. Statistical computations on transportation capacity were only half completed. Reports were published periodically on foreign trade, with particular emphasis on the progress of lend-lease shipments from the United States and Great Britain. A report on the manufacture of artillery was on the point of being published.

d. Before the end of the war other studies appeared on all Balkan countries, the Orient, Egypt and certain parts of Africa, North America and Great Britain, Scandinavia, and all territories under Japanese influence. Studies on the latter subject were prepared by Unteroffizier Dr. Max BRUECHER, who must have been captured in WUERTEMBERG in Mar or Apr 45.

e. Every three months, information about the most important developments concerning labor potential, the food situation, raw material procurement, and war production in the leading foreign countries was put at the disposal of the higher echelons of the Wehrmacht and of the Minister fuer Ruestung und Kriegsproduktion (Minister for Armaments and War Production) in the form of a short pamphlet with a limited circulation of about twenty copies.

##### 5. METHODS AND TECHNIQUES OF PROCURING INFORMATION ABOUT FOREIGN COUNTRIES

a. Some information was provided by Abteilung 1 (Operational Intelligence Section) of the Abwehr. The We Wi Amt itself never practiced espionage, but was simply an exploiting agency. The interrogation of PW was done also by the Abwehr. For that purpose, the We Wi Amt furnished the Abwehr with questionnaires relative to matters which had not been clarified previously. At conferences once or twice a year, interrogators from the Abwehr and the Ic officers from commands at the level of corps and higher were oriented upon the most important matters of interest to the We Wi Amt. Specialists among the PW were questioned by the Ic of the army group or, in the East, by the technical expert of the Ausserstelle (branch office) of the We Wi Amt and, in special cases, by the Gruppe Ost itself.

b. After such interrogation, many of the well qualified technicians were released from captivity, sometimes after only three months, and were placed in positions utilizing their skills and knowledge. Upon conclusion of hostilities, thousands were already employed at positions similar to the ones which they had held formerly. Others, although still PW, could work unsparingly in industry or agriculture. ZINNEMANN indicates that they drew what was an adequate diet comparable even to that for native workers and says that it even came to a point where the PW and foreign workers who remained at their jobs had more to eat than officers in the high command. ZINNEMANN cites as an example himself and his colleagues, who secured only the lowest ration obtainable as a normal consumer despite the exhausting work in which they were engaged. To this fact, and to the psychological effects of aerial bombardments, he attributes the fall in the creative powers of himself and his colleagues from year to year.

c. Of the information secured from interrogation, not more than one-half was useful. Statements of PW on the Eastern front yielded only small details, and only after years of systematic questioning was it possible to secure a representative picture. For example, in order to secure a clear concept of agricult-



ural developments in a given district, thousands of isolated reports had to be brought together. Some 100,000 interrogations provided the information for a fairly accurate file and chart on agriculture for the years 1940-1944 inclusive, showing the amount of foodstuffs produced, weather conditions, composition of the labor force, the size of the harvest, and the number of draft animals, motor vehicles, and mechanized equipment. The big picture was completed from information gathered from the contents of letters in captured mail shipments. Another file, pertaining to industry classified by branches, was the result of some 200,000 interrogations.

d. Accurate computation of war material production was difficult in the beginning, but later was facilitated by deciphering the manufacturing number on each tool and weapon. From 1943 on, it was possible to establish the monthly production of armor and artillery pieces on the basis of the printed or stamped numbers on each object.

e. Investigations of aircraft were made by the Ic organization of the Luftwaffenfuhrungs-Stab (Command Staff of the Luftwaffe). The information was exploited by the technical bureau of the Supreme Commander of the Luftwaffe. The information was then transmitted to the We Wi Amt for its use.

f. Investigations in connection with the building of war and merchant ships were made by the Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine. This command also secured information about tonnage demands for logistics purposes and furnished this information to the We Wi Amt.

g. Gruppe Ost within the We Wi Amt procured no information from secret agents, for espionage in the USSR was something impossible and the office was forbidden to spy on Japan. The Japanese, too, were not able to send spies into the USSR and as a result were badly informed about the internal affairs of that country.

h. Another source of information about economic factors in foreign countries was found in the official communiques giving approximate industrial and other achievements in those countries. Where such communiques were issued, as they were by the United States, the urge to spy was forestalled most effectively.

i. Information of some value could be secured also from press reports. The reliability of such information differed among countries. The American press could be relied upon, and the Swedish and Swiss newspapers were well informed. ZINNEMANN contends that the reliability of news during peacetime and especially during war-time has a direct relationship to the degree of independence of the press, i.e., that the more independent the press is, the more reliable the news is.

j. The radio, except for the MOSCOW station, brought no worthwhile information pertaining to economic matters. That station broadcast laws and regulations. Study and evaluation of them was often of great value. In addition the Russian press printed items commending or condemning certain factory managers by name. Through interrogation of PW it was possible to compile a list of plant managers, and in this way it was possible to determine the plants to which the items had reference. Additional information was secured by monitoring broadcasts from the East, as all big plants were in radio communication with MOSCOW and were administered from there. Secret information, however, could not be secured in this way.

#### 6. AUSSENSTELLEN (BRANCH OFFICES) OF THE AMTSGRUPPE AUSLAND

a. As an aid to Gruppe Ost in the Amtsgruppe Ausland, Aussenstellen were organized at the level of the army groups on the Eastern Front. As forward agencies of the Gruppe Ost, their functions were to secure intelligence about the economy of the USSR, to utilize the material themselves, and to forward the results either as single items when obtained or as short studies to the Amtsgruppe Ausland for use in connection with the work of Gruppe Ost. Within the army



group, the Aussenstelle functioned in cooperation with the Ic and the Abwehr Nachrichten. The heads of the Aussenstellen were available for purposes of consultation to the chief of staff of the respective army groups and were subordinated to his command. The personnel consisted of a Dienststellenleiter (branch office head), three officers or specialists, and some clerks.

b. The first Aussenstelle was established in May 42 in the Heeresgruppe Sued in POLTAWA and was under the command of Oberstleutnant Dr. Prinz REUSS (HEINRICH XXXVI). Subsequently it was under Heeresgruppe A in the Northern Caucasus, later again under Heeresgruppe Sued, then under Heeresgruppe Nord-Ukraine, and finally under Heeresgruppe Mitte with its last location near PRAGUE. In Jan 45, Prince REUSS relinquished his command to his deputy, Hauptmann d. Res. z. V. (Captain of the Reserve on special duty) GEIPEL, a manufacturer from LEIPZIG. Then Prince REUSS, as the scion of a former governing family, retired from the army. Before the war he had been consultant to CHIANG KAI-SHEK in CHUNKING. His family is related to the royal families of England and of Holland.

c. Another Aussenstelle was established during May 43 at Heeresgruppe Mitte in SMOLENSK and was under command of Oberstleutnant Dr. Wevell von KRUEGER. During the autumn of 1944, Von KRUEGER was used in another capacity, and at that time his deputy, Hauptmann d. Res. BURKHARDT, a city planner, took charge of the work. During the retreat and encirclement of KOENIGSBERG, the material of this Aussenstelle was destroyed.

d. A third Aussenstelle was organized in Feb 45 at the Heeresgruppe Sued in the northern part of Hungary; however practically nothing was accomplished by it, as the end of the war followed shortly after its creation.

#### 7. RELATIONSHIPS OF THE AMTSGRUPPE AUSLAND WITH OTHER AGENCIES

In accordance with its purpose, the Amtsgruppe Ausland maintained a constant exchange of information with the departments in the Generalstab des Heeres, in the Luftwaffe, and in the 1st and 2nd Abteilungen der Seekriegsleitung. These offices were interested mainly in the studies on the personnel and material potentials of foreign countries. In addition, however, these three authorities maintained their own specialists to observe matters pertaining to war economics in foreign countries. In consequence, Amtsgruppe Ausland constituted more or less an additional information bureau.

#### 8. EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AMTSGRUPPE AUSLAND

a. The office can be described only as a small military research institute concerned with the economics of war. It operated under at least two limitations. First, because of its insufficient staff its work lagged behind developments in the fields of its major interest. Second, its functions overlapped or duplicated those of other agencies. For example, the same field of activity was covered by the Ministry under SPEER, who had named KEHRL to be Leiter des Planungsamtes (Director of the Planning Office). The Reichs-Sicherheits-Hauptamt (RSHA) also exercised similar functions. While the staff of the Amtsgruppe Ausland was reduced constantly beginning in the spring of 1942 from 200 officers, clerks, and enlisted personnel to 30 employees in Feb 45, the other offices continued to build up their organizations without regard to the war situation.

b. In addition, the information on foreign countries which was produced by the office was never taken seriously. The reason for this may have been either that HITLER relied completely on his own functionaries, or that his general distrust of military advisors impeded objective evaluation of their work. Important data on foreign economies were sometimes submitted to Feldmarschall KEITEL; he once returned a note in his own handwriting saying "The Fuehrer makes his own calculations." It became clear to ZINNEMANN and his associates not only that this was a true statement of fact, but also that KEITEL was neglecting to transmit to HITLER any information tending to contradict the Fuehrer's opinions and so provoke his "bad humor or indignation." Thereafter the texts of all messages and reports were cautiously worded to avoid giving offense. Under these circumstances the experts of the Amtsgruppe Ausland lost interest and the work, already hindered by lack of personnel, slowed down even more.

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APO 757

A N N E X "B"

PERSONALITIES OF THE ABTEILUNG AUSLAND OF THE FELDWIRTSCHAFTSAMT

Source: ZINNEMANN, Dr. Curt

Rank: Oberstleutnant

The following is a list of experts and their special fields within the Abteilung Ausland of the Feldwirtschaftsamt (see para 2,f, page 7).

(1) CONCERNING THE USSR

- (a) Population and Food Supply. Oberstleutnant Dr. ZINNEMANN. Specialist Dr. MARQUARDT from POTSDAM, who worked at Aussenstelle Sued in Hungary and was captured presumably by the American forces.
- (b) Raw Materials. Specialist Dr. FRANKE from BERLIN.
- (c) Petroleum, Aluminum, and Synthetic Rubber. Oberstleutnant d. Res. z. V. Dr. Otto POEPPELMANN, whose last civilian position had been as director of the Gymnasium in EMDEN. As expert on Russian matters, he was evacuated with others from MEININGEN to GOTHA and was captured by the Americans.
- (d) Armament Industry. Hauptmann Dr. Werner GEBAUER from LOEBAU, Saxony. His last position was as liaison officer to the Army General Staff. He went to South Bavaria where he was supposed to have placed in safety an extensive collection of documents.
- (e) Power and Chemistry. Hauptmann d. Res. z. V. Walter THIELE, a former pharmacist who was discharged from the service at the beginning of 1945 as he was more than 60 years of age.

(2) CONCERNING THE SPHERE OF JAPANESE INFLUENCE

- (a) Manchuria and Japan. Specialist Unteroffizier Dr. Max BRUECHER, a very intelligent economist and independent businessman, born in SHANGHAI. As the Asiatic expert he was working on research problems pertaining to Manchuria and Japan. ZINNEMANN believes that the interrogation of BRUECHER and the location of his surveys would be of utmost value in the determination of information pertaining to the economy of Japan.

Information should be obtainable also from General Gerhard MATZKY, a brother of the Oberst MATZKY active in the We Wi Amt, as he was Military Attaché in TOKIO until Apr 41. (See also CSIR/2, which contains information about ZINNEMANN's own knowledge of Japan.)

- (b) CHUNGKING, China. Oberstleutnant Prinz REUSS, who lived in PRILLWITZ, but probably moved westward upon advance of the Red Army.