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Placer le Scribe en DMZ vise a faciliter l'ouverture des services Scribe sur Internet. Discoverer uses several security mechanisms to prevent unauthorized access to the above resources.
At the most basic level, data in the database is protected from unauthorized access by the database's own security model. The database privileges granted directly to database users (or granted indirectly through database roles) determine the data that users can access. Discoverer uses the database's own security model to ensure that users never see information to which they do not have database access. For more information about the database security model and how Discoverer uses it, see Oracle Fusion Middleware Administrator's Guide for Oracle Business Intelligence Discoverer. Even if they share workbooks with each other, Discoverer users never see information to which they do not have database access.
For more information about the Discoverer EUL security model, see Oracle Fusion Middleware Administrator's Guide for Oracle Business Intelligence Discoverer. Some EUL maintenance scripts supplied with Discoverer grant database privileges to the Discoverer manager and the PUBLIC user (for more information, see Appendix D, "Oracle BI Discoverer Administrative Account Information "). A common use of Discoverer is to provide ad-hoc query access to Oracle Applications databases. Discoverer end users can connect to an Oracle Applications database using their Oracle e-Business Suite user ID and responsibility. An Oracle Applications mode EUL is a Discoverer End User Layer based on an Oracle Applications schema (containing the Oracle Applications FND (Foundation) tables and views).
Oracle Applications EULs employ Oracle Applications user names and responsibilities whereas standard EULs use database users and roles. Oracle Applications multiple organizations support enables Discoverer to work with data from more than one organization.
For more information about the Oracle Applications security model and how Discoverer uses it, see Oracle Fusion Middleware Administrator's Guide for Oracle Business Intelligence Discoverer. Note: This section applies only if the Discoverer installation is associated with the Oracle Internet Directory and the Discoverer schemas. Discoverer managers can give users access to information by using Oracle Fusion Middleware Control to create public connections. Discoverer managers can control users' access to information by restricting users to using public connections or by giving users permission to create their own private connections.
For more information about connections, see Chapter 3, "Managing Oracle BI Discoverer Connections". For more information about Oracle Fusion Middleware Security, see Oracle Fusion Middleware Security Guide. When you install Oracle Business Intelligence, SSL is installed automatically and enabled by default. You can use Discoverer in different network environments that might or might not include firewalls using different communication protocols (that is, JRMP, HTTP, HTTPS).
Note that you must use HTTPS if you want to ensure that sensitive information (for example, passwords, data) is securely transmitted across a network.
If you are deploying Oracle BI Discoverer with Oracle Web Cache, there are security implications for some restricted user environments.
If you have deployed Discoverer in a multiple-machine installation, note that you might want to specify different communication protocols on different Discoverer middle tier machines.
Discoverer Viewer uses standard HTTP or HTTPS protocols to connect Discoverer Viewer clients to the Discoverer servlet. Note: Discoverer Viewer client machines require only a standard Web browser to run Discoverer Viewer. If you are using a firewall, open the firewall for the Oracle HTTP Server SSL port used by Oracle (for example, 4443). Discoverer Plus uses standard Java Remote Method Protocol (JRMP), HTTP, or HTTPS protocols to connect clients to the Discoverer servlet.
In an Intranet environment (that is, inside firewalls), no additional security configuration is required. In an HTTPS environment, Discoverer Plus uses security certificates on the client machine's browser. For more information about deploying Discoverer Plus over HTTPS, see Section 2.5, "About running Discoverer over HTTPS"). If you are using a firewall, open the firewall for the Oracle HTTP Server SSL port used by Oracle (for example, port 4443 on a UNIX middle tier or 443 on a Windows middle tier). Using Fusion Middleware Control, you can specify which communication protocol the Discoverer Plus applet (that is, the Discoverer client) and the Discoverer servlet (that is, on the Discoverer middle tier) use to communicate. Specify this option if you want the Discoverer Plus applet to attempt to use JRMP and if this fails, to use HTTP or HTTPS (depending on the URL) to communicate with the Discoverer servlet. The advantage of using the Default communication protocol is that Discoverer Plus works regardless of whether the client browser is running inside or outside a firewall. Specify this option if you want the Discoverer Plus client to connect using the same method to communicate with the Discoverer servlet as was originally used to download the applet itself (that is, either HTTP or HTTPS depending on the URL). The advantage of using the Tunneling communication protocol is that it is quicker than the Default option, because JRMP is not attempted first before failing and trying again using HTTP or HTTPS. Specify this option if you want the Discoverer Plus client to always use HTTPS to communicate with the Discoverer servlet.
The advantage of using the Secure Tunneling communication protocol is that it is quicker than the Default option, because JRMP is not attempted first before failing and trying again using HTTPS. You use the Discoverer Plus Configuration page in Fusion Middleware Control to specify a Discoverer Plus communication protocol. Select Discoverer Plus in the Components area to display the Fusion Middleware Control Discoverer Plus Home page.
Note: This option works regardless of whether the applet is running inside or outside a firewall. The Discoverer Plus applet uses the same protocol to communicate with the Discoverer servlet as was originally used to download the applet itself (that is, either HTTP or HTTPS). The Discoverer Plus applet uses the HTTPS protocol to communicate with the Discoverer servlet. When a Discoverer end user starts Discoverer Plus for the first time on a client machine, they are prompted to confirm that they want to accept a default security certificate. You can specify that Discoverer uses Oracle Single Sign-On to enable users to access Discoverer using the same user name and password as other Web applications. For more information about Oracle Identity Management Infrastructure, see Oracle Fusion Middleware Getting Started with Oracle Identity Management. Oracle Single Sign-On is a component of Oracle Fusion Middleware that enables users to access multiple Web applications (for example, Oracle BI Discoverer and Oracle Portal) using a single user name and password that is entered once. When you install Oracle, the Oracle Single Sign-On service is installed automatically, but it is not enabled by default for Discoverer.
Oracle Single Sign-On, can be enabled for both Discoverer Plus and Discoverer Viewer, but not for a single Discoverer component. If you use Oracle Web Cache to cache Discoverer Viewer pages, note that caching for Discoverer does not work if Single Sign-On is enabled. When you publish Discoverer content in a portlet on an Oracle Portal page, you give portal users access to the Discoverer workbooks and worksheets. User SSO-A using connection Conn-A creates two workbooks Workbook 1 and Workbook 2 in the Marketing EUL. User SSO-B using connection Conn-B creates two workbooks Workbook 3 and Workbook 4 in the Marketing EUL.
Now imagine that user SSO-A creates a List of Worksheets portlet using Conn-A, and chooses the 'Use user's database connection' option in the Logged In users section (that is, in the Select Database Connections page in the Discoverer Portlet Provider).
If you are not deploying Discoverer with Single Sign-On, end users must confirm the database password each time a private connection is used.
If the end user closes the Web browser and then starts the Web browser again (that is, creates a new browser session), they are prompted to confirm their database password. To store private Discoverer connections in non-Oracle Single Sign-On environments, cookies must be enabled in the Web browser. In non-Oracle Single Sign-On environments, a Discoverer end user can only access private connections created using the current machine and current Web browser. Discoverer does not support Single Sign-On details propagation when running against a multidimensional data source (for example, in Discoverer Plus OLAP).
For more information about configuring Discoverer Plus OLAP, see Chapter 5, "Configuring Discoverer Plus OLAP". Discoverer only uses the Oracle Single Sign-On identity to determine what data is accessible.
The Oracle database's (Enterprise Edition Release 1 and later) powerful Virtual Private Database (VPD) feature enables you to define and implement custom security policies. Providing a VPD policy based on GUID or Oracle Single Sign-On user names has been implemented in the database, the data returned to a Discoverer worksheet is restricted to the data that the respective GUID or Oracle Single Sign-On user is authorized to access (and depending on the conditions described in the previous paragraphs).
Configures the Discoverer middle tier machines so that Oracle Single Sign-On authentication is necessary to access the Discoverer URLs.
Creates a Discoverer public connection called 'Analysis', that has access to a workbook called 'Sales'. Creates a database LOGON trigger that sets variable CONTEXT1 to the value of the GUID (extracted from the application context information passed to the database by Discoverer). To enable the Oracle Single Sign-On user name to limit Discoverer data, in step 4 replace the GUID, with the Oracle Single Sign-On user name. The Sales workbook is used by two Discoverer users at ACME Corp., Fred Bloggs and Jane Smith. User 'Fred.Bloggs' authenticates through Oracle Single Sign-On and accesses the top level Discoverer URL. User 'Jane.Smith' authenticates through Oracle Single Sign-On and accesses the top level Discoverer URL. Jane sees different data to Fred, despite the identical database connection, workbook, worksheet and database query. Having created a VPD policy in the database that uses GUIDs or Oracle Single Sign-On user names to determine the data that users can access, you can set up a Discoverer Worksheet portlet to only show the data that can be accessed by the current Oracle Single Sign-On user name. In the Users Logged In region of the Select Database Connections setup page for the Discoverer Worksheet Portlet. When you select the above option, Discoverer passes the worksheet portlet user's Oracle Single Sign-On user name to the database. Select the Display different data by allowing users to customize database connection option. You can modify database LOGON (and subsequent) triggers to use the GUID or Oracle Single Sign-On user name passed by Discoverer to further control the data that is available to the Oracle Single Sign-On user. The GUID or Oracle Single Sign-On user name passed by Discoverer is available as early as the execution of the database LOGON trigger. If Discoverer is not configured to use Oracle Single Sign-On, the SYS_CONTEXT function call returns NULL. The Oracle Single Sign-On user name is available with Oracle9i (Release 1 and later) databases. You can use the eul_trigger$post_login trigger instead of, or with, the database LOGON (and subsequent) triggers to further control the information that is displayed in a Discoverer worksheet based on the GUID or Oracle Single Sign-On user name.
A firewall is one system or a group of several systems put in place to enforce a security policy between the Internet and an organization's network.
In other words, a firewall is an electronic 'fence' around a network to protect it from unauthorized access. Typically, an organization using a Web Server machine that communicates across the Internet has a firewall between its Oracle HTTP Server machine and the Internet. A demilitarized zone (DMZ) is a firewall configuration that provides an additional level of security. Firewall policies vary across organization and there are a wide variety of bespoke and off-the-shelf firewall packages in use. A good firewall configuration assumes that resources in the DMZ will be breached, and if this happens, the firewall should minimize damage to the internal network and any sensitive data residing on the network. The HTTPS protocol uses an industry standard protocol called Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) to establish secure connections between clients and servers.
Deploying Discoverer Viewer in an intranet (that is, inside a firewall) requires no additional configuration after an Oracle installation. Deploying Discoverer Plus in an intranet (that is, inside a firewall) requires no additional configuration after an Oracle installation. Discoverer Viewer requires no additional configuration if the firewall allows HTTP traffic to pass through.
Discoverer Plus requires no additional configuration if the firewall allows HTTP or HTTPS traffic to pass through. Configure mod_ossl to use HTTPS (for more information, see Oracle Fusion Middleware Administrator's Guide for Oracle HTTP Server) and deploy Discoverer Viewer on an HTTPS URL. Configure mod_ossl to use HTTPS (for more information, see Oracle Fusion Middleware Administrator's Guide for Oracle HTTP Server) and deploy Discoverer Plus on an HTTPS URL. In Discoverer Viewer, ensure that client browsers display a closed padlock or other equivalent symbol (browser dependent) in the Discoverer Viewer browser's status bar. In Discoverer Plus, ensure that the client displays a closed padlock symbol in the bottom left-hand corner of the Discoverer Plus applet window. 13.9.10 Can I configure Discoverer for both intranet users and users accessing Discoverer through a firewall? Yes, you can deploy Discoverer using any standard Network Address Translation (NAT) device. One of the most significant improvements in the ISA Server 2004 firewall over the old ISA Server 2000 firewall is multinetworking.
ISA Server 2004 multinetworking allows you to connect multiple interfaces (or multiple virtual interfaces using VLAN tagging) and have complete control over the traffic that moves between networks connected by the ISA Server 2004 firewall. Using public addresses is sometimes necessary if you have an established DMZ segment with multiple hosts using public addresses and you do not wish to change the addressing scheme because of overhead involved with making the appropriate public DNS changes. However, you can also use publishing rules to make the public address DMZ host available to Internet users.
One of the major drawbacks of ISA Server 2000 Web publishing scenarios was that you always received the IP address of the ISA Server 2000 firewall in the published Web servers’ log files.



The table below describes the ISA Server 2004 behavior for allowing remote access to DMZ segments using public address and private addresses. This configuration allows you connect to your DMZ hosts using their actual public addresses. This configuration requires that you connect to the published DMZ host via an IP address bound to the external interface of the ISA Server 2004 firewall.
There are some interesting results based on whether the Web Proxy filter is enabled on an Access Rule.
Before finishing out this discussion, I should mention that you do lose a amount of security for certain scenarios when you decide to use Access Rules instead of publishing rules to allow access to your DMZ hosts, to the extent where the ISA Server 2004 provides little more security than a PIX or Netscreen device. Web publishing rules allow you to prevent users from using IP addresses instead of FQDNs to access resources on the DMZ host. Web publishing rules allow you to configure custom Web listeners, which provide features such as Exchange Forms-based authentication, delegation of basic authentication and RSA SecurID authentication.
Server publishing rules expose incoming connections to the application layer filters dedicated to protecting specific services. If you publish a public address Web server on a DMZ segment using Access Rules, you are still protected by the HTTP security filter.
The remainder of this article will describe how to publish a public address DMZ host using Access Rules. The most common problem I’ve seen with ISA firewall admins who put together public address DMZ segments relates to the routing table entries on the upstream router.
Network adapter configuration was always a bone of contention for ISA Server 2000 admins and I anticipate it will continue to be for ISA Server 2004 admins.
DNS is a critical issue for the ISA Server 2004 firewall because the firewall can perform proxy name resolution for Web Proxy and Firewall clients.
If you choose to put a DNS sever on a DMZ segment which is authoritative for your publicly accessible domains, do not allow this DNS server to act as a DNS resolver. If you do not wish to host your own DNS servers and do not use DNS on the internal network, then configure the ISA Server 2004 firewall to use a public DNS server, such as your ISP’s DNS server. Never EVER put a public DNS server address on the same NIC that has your private DNS server address configured on it. The DNS server address should be configured on the top listed interface in the Network and Dial-up Connections window. Bottom line: get your DNS house in order before publishing your public address DMZ servers to the Internet. After the DNS situation is handled and the network interfaces on the ISA Server 2004 firewall are properly configured, you’re ready to install the ISA Server 2004 firewall software. The host on the DMZ segment uses an IP address valid for your subnetted block used for the DMZ. The DNS server address on the DMZ host’s NIC will be the IP address of the DMZ interface on the ISA Server 2004 firewall.
With the DMZ server in place, we can now get in front of the ISA Server 2004 management console and create the rules to make it all happen.
IMPORTANT: You may have noticed that ISA Server 2004 comes with several Network Templates that purportedly simplify configuration of the trihomed DMZ network. In the Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration Server 2004 management console, expand the server name and then expand the Configuration node.
On the Welcome to the New Network Wizard page, enter a name for the rule in the Network name text box. In the Select Network Adapters dialog box, select the DMZ network interface and then put a checkmark in the interface’s checkbox. Now that the DMZ network is defined, the next step is to configure the route relationships between the DMZ network, the Internal network and the Internet (which is the External network, which is defined as any network for which you haven’t defined a network). In our example, we want a route relationship between the DMZ network and the Internet, and a NAT relationship between the DMZ network and the Internal network. On the Networks node in the left pane of the console, click on the Network Rules tab in the Details pane. On the Welcome to the New Network Rule Wizard page, enter a name for the rule in the Network rule name text box. In the Add Network Entities dialog box, click the Networks folder and then double click on the DMZ network. In the Add Network Entities dialog box, click the Networks folder and double click on External. The next step is to create the route relationship between the DMZ Network and the Internal Network. In the Add Network Entities dialog box, click the Networks folder and then double click on the Internal network.
We use a Server Publishing Rule in this example so that the DNS filter’s protection is applied to connections from the DMZ host to the DNS server on the Internal network.
In the Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration Server 2004 management console, click the Firewall Policy node.
On the Welcome to the New Server Publishing Rule Wizard page, enter a name for the rule in the Server publishing rule name text box. On the Select Protocol page, select the DNS Server protocol from the Selected protocol list.
Review your settings on the Completing the New Server Publishing Rule page and click Finish. The Internal network DNS server needs to be able to query Internet DNS server to resolve Internet host names. In the Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration Server 2004 management console, click the Firewall Policy node in the left pane of the console. On the Welcome to the New Access Rule Wizard page, enter a name for the rule in the Access Rule name text box. On the Protocols page, select the Selected protocols entry from the This rule applies to list.
In the Add Protocols dialog box, click the Common Protocols folder and then double click the DNS entry.
In the New Computer Rule Element dialog box, enter a name for the computer in the Name text box.
The next step is to create an Access Rule that allows HTTP from the External network to the DMZ host. In the Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration Server 2004 management console, click on the Firewall Policy node in the left pane of the console and then click the Create a New Access Rule link in the Tasks tab of the Task Pane. On the Protocols page, click the select the Selected protocols option from the This rule applies to list and click Add. In the Add Protocols dialog box, click the Common Protocols folder and double click the HTTP entry. In the Add Network Entities dialog box, click the Networks folder and double click the External entry.
In the New Computer Rule Element dialog box, enter a name for the DMZ Web server in the Name text box.
Now that the Web server is published, we’ll create another rule that allows inbound access to the SMTP server on the DMZ network. In the Add Protocols dialog box, click the Common Protocols folder and double click the SMTP entry.
In the Add Network Entities dialog box, click the Networks folder and double click the External network.
Next, go to the Web Server on the DMZ segment and open the Internet Information Services (IIS) Manager console from the Administrative Tools menu in the Start menu.
In the Internet Information Services (IIS) Manager console, right click on the Default Virtual SMTP Server and click Properties.
We demonstrated that the Access Rules controlling inbound access from the Internet to the DMZ host work correctly using the procedures in the previous section. You may wish to see the original IP address of the external network host instead of the ISA Server 2004 firewall’s IP address when you publish the Web server using a Access Rule. In the Microsoft Internet Security and Acceleration Server 2004 management console, right click on the Inbound to Web Server rule and click Properties. On the Protocols tab, click the HTTP entry in the Protocols list and click the Edit button. While disabling the Web Proxy filter on the HTTP protocol solves the problem of controlling the source IP address on the Access Rule published Web server, you do lose out on the Web Proxy filter for all Web communications that aren’t made through the Web Proxy client configuration.
An alternative is to create your own Protocol Definition that is defined as TCP 80 Outbound.
I hope you enjoyed this article and found something in it that you can apply to your own network. Cloud Admin CON is a cost-effective, convenient opportunity for busy System Administrators and IT Managers to stay up to date on the most recent industry trends and vendor solutions and build their network of IT experts and vendors. TechGenix Ltd is an online media company which sets the standard for providing free high quality technical content to IT professionals. We host a number of web services and applications on the servers in here in the PaperCut office.
This strategy will provide an extra layer of protection as a compromise on the server in the DMZ (say hosting your website) will not automatically mean a compromise on your internal network. The control script and its brief setup procedure should work on most modern Linux distributions. Typically, you set up database security by using a database administration tool or SQL*Plus.
To provide such access, Discoverer managers can use Discoverer Administrator to create Applications mode EULs. For more information, see Section 14.1, "About Discoverer connections and Oracle e-Business Suite".
Discoverer managers running Discoverer Administrator in Oracle Applications mode grant access permissions or task privileges to Oracle Applications responsibilities instead of roles.
Discoverer end users can query and analyze data from the set of organizations to which they have been granted access. For more information, see Oracle Fusion Middleware Administrator's Guide for Oracle HTTP Server. If you are using a firewall, open the firewall for the Oracle HTTP Server port used by Oracle (for example, 80). In an HTTPS environment, Discoverer Viewer uses SSL security certificates on the client machine's browser. When you run Discoverer Plus for the first time over HTTPS (that is, in Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) mode), you must install your Web server's security certificate into the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) certificate store in all client machines that must run Discoverer Plus. However, it is slower outside the firewall on the initial connection because JRMP is tried first. If they use an HTTP URL, Discoverer does not start (for more information about troubleshooting HTTPS problems, see Section E.7, "Discoverer Plus reports RMI error"). For example, if you want to encrypt Discoverer Plus data, you might want to configure Discoverer Plus to use the HTTPS communication protocol. If JRMP is not available, the Discoverer Plus applet uses HTTP or HTTPS (depending on the URL) to communicate with the Discoverer servlet. In an Oracle Single Sign-On environment, if a Discoverer end user starts Discoverer without having been authenticated by Oracle Single Sign-On, the user is challenged for Single Sign-On details (user name and password). However, portal users accessing Discoverer workbooks only see data to which they have database access.
In other words, when a Discoverer end user chooses a private connection for the first time in a browser session, they are prompted to confirm the database password.
If an end user wants to use a different machine or different Web browser, they must re-create the private connections.
You can create a VPD using the database ID, and using the D4O_AUTOGO file to control scoping (or striping) in the database when starting a Discoverer Plus OLAP session. Discoverer uses database user names and roles internally to manage business area access, workbook sharing, and scheduling. Among other things, the VPD feature enables you to enforce fine-grained access control based upon attributes of a user's session information (referred to as application context). The VPD policy determines the data that is returned, based on the value of a variable called 'CONTEXT1'. The difference is determined by the VPD policy being based on the GUID (or Oracle Single-Sign-On user name). The VPD policy can then use the GUID or Oracle Single Sign-On user name to restrict the data that is returned to the worksheet portlet.
In this configuration, the DMZ is an extra network placed between a protected network and the Internet. This method allows you to use the public addresses your servers have already been using and leverage the full stateful application layer filtering power of the ISA Server 2004 firewall.
This is in stark contrast to the ISA Server 2000 networking model, where traffic moving between internal networks was not exposed to firewall policy and you had to create a "poor man’s DMZ" using RRAS packet filters.
You might remember that ISA Server 2000 required the use of public addresses on a DMZ segment. You still want to use the current IP addressing scheme on the servers so that Internet hosts reach the DMZ severs using the same IP addresses (actually, same DNS mappings) used previously. ISA Server 2004 firewall policy provides two methods you can use to control traffic moving through the firewall: Access Rules and Publishing Rules. It’s especially confusing if you’re accustomed to the ISA Server 2000 way of doing things, where you always had to NAT between untrusted and trusted hosts. In this case, the PocketPC PDA host on the Internet uses an IP address on the external interface of the ISA Server 2004 firewall to access the DMZ host. This was problematic for organizations that had already invested large sums of money in log analysis and reporting software that pulled information from the Web server’s logs.
The log files on the published servers will show the original source IP address of the remote host. Connections are not made to the actual IP address of the DMZ host and your public DNS records may need to be changed to reflect this fact. Examples include the SMTP filter that blocks buffer overflow attacks, the DNS filter which blocks a number of DNS exploits, and the POP3 filter which blocks POP3 buffer overflows. The HTTP security filter provides very deep application layer inspection for all HTTP communications moving through the ISA Server 2004 firewall.


This method allows you to continue to use the public addresses your servers have been using, but continue to leverage the full stateful application layer filtering power of the ISA Server 2004 firewall.
When you create a public address DMZ segment, you need to subnet your public block and assign one of the subnets to the DMZ segment. In your production environment, you would subnet your public address block and create a routing table entry for your DMZ segment’s subnetted block on your router upstream from the ISA Server 2004 firewall.
There are a number of reasons for this, the primary issue being whether or not you host your own DNS services. The ISA Server 2004 firewall uses DNS settings on its NICs to query the appropriate DNS server. Note that this configuration will cause problems with name resolution for internal network hosts, and cause problems with Web Proxy and Firewall client connections.
For example, if you have a trihomed ISA Server 2004 firewall and a DMZ interface, an Internal interface and a public interface, the Internal NIC should be on the top of the list and the DNS server IP address should be configured on that interface.
DNS settings are critical and if the DNS configuration on your ISA Server 2004 firewall is incorrect, you will experience connectivity problems that are difficult to troubleshoot and it will give you the false impression that the ISA Server 2004 firewall "does not work". While I hate to tell people "please see blah blah blah" for instructions on how to do something (because you end up wasting a lot of time trying to figure out how the information at blah blah blah solves the specific problem at hand), I’m am going to refer you to another article on how to install the ISA Server 2004 firewall.
Note that this article is based on the Beta2 version of the product and the final interface will look at bit different.
The published DMZ host uses the IP address of the DMZ interface on the ISA Server 2004 firewall as its default gateway.
We use this configuration because we will configure a NAT relationship between the DMZ segment and the Internal network and a Server Publishing Rule that publishes the DNS server on the DMZ interface’s IP address. This is useful if you want to use the SMTP server on the DMZ segment as an outbound SMTP relay. However, I recommend against using these templates because they make assumptions about the route relationship between your networks and require you to configure firewall access policies that are not very well documented, nor are they very well understood by the fledgling ISA Server 2004 admin. This allows us to use Access Rules to allow external hosts access to the DMZ segment and a server publishing rule to hide the IP address of the DNS server on the Internal network. This is the case whenever the DMZ host needs to establish new outbound connections to servers on the Internet based on the destination host name. In the Task Pane, click the Tasks tab and then click the Create a New Server Publishing Rule link. This is the interface on which the Server Publishing Rule will listen for incoming connection requests to the Internal network DNS server.
We can create a DNS Access Rule that will allow the Internal network DNS server access to Internet DNS servers using the DNS protocol.
While you do not benefit from the full firewall feature set provided by a Web publishing rule, this option allows you to expose the actual IP address of the Web server to the Internet and the security provided by the HTTP Security Filter still applies to the Access Rule.
In this example, we haven’t configured a special default Web page, so we’ll see the Under Construction page. The next step is to confirm that the Server Publishing Rule allowing the DMZ host access to the DNS server on the Internal network works correctly.
Note the first two entries triggered the Publish Internal DNS Server rule and the subsequent entries triggered the Outbound DNS Internal DNS Server rule.
On the Parameters tab, remove the checkmark from the Web Proxy Filter checkbox in the Application Filters frame. Hold down the CTRL key on the keyboard and click the Refresh button in the browser’s button bar. This means that outbound connections from SecureNAT and Firewall clients will not be handled by the Web Proxy filter and they will not benefit from the Web Proxy cache and other features provided by the Web Proxy filter.
You can use this custom Protocol Definition to publish the DMZ HTTP server host using an Access Rule.
What we ended up with was a public address trihomed DMZ segment hosting a server that is accessible via its public address.
Individual focus sessions are scheduled to run consecutively, allowing you to attend all sessions, or selectively choose only those you wish to attend.
Oracle ASO encryption incurs little performance overhead, although performance varies depending on several factors (for example, the operating system, the encryption algorithm). The folders in the EUL must be based on Oracle Business Views (available in Oracle Applications 11i). If you are using a nonstandard or private SSL signing authority, you must install the root certificates in the browser. Having provided Single Sign-On details, the user can display the Discoverer connections page and start Discoverer without having to enter a user name or password again. In other words, two different users accessing the same workbook might see different data, depending on their database privileges. In other words, if you create a VPD policy for an Oracle Single Sign-On user, Discoverer does not restrict the list of workbooks that it displays based on the Oracle Single Sign-On identity.
This VPD functionality is commonly employed as a way of controlling access to data using the currently logged-on user's Oracle Single Sign-On identity.
Other organizations (or remote parts of the same organization) connecting to this Web Server machine typically have their own firewall, known as a Client-side firewall.
Unlike traditional packet filter based firewalls (PIX, Netscreen, SonicWall, etc.), the ISA Server 2004 firewall performs stateful filtering and stateful application layer inspection on all communications moving through the firewall. Unlike the ISA Server 2000 firewall, which saw the world as "trusted versus untrusted (LAT versus non-LAT), the ISA Server 2004 firewall sees all networks as untrusted and applies firewall policy to all connections made through the ISA Server 2004 firewall.
The ISA Server 2000 DMZ segment had to use public addresses; you didn’t have the option to use private addresses because the ISA Server 2000 firewall routed (instead of NAT’d) connections to the trihomed DMZ segment using simple stateful packet filters (akin to the PIX). You can do this with the ISA Server 2004 firewall by configuring a route relationship between the Internet and the DMZ segment containing the servers you want to "publish".
Before we get into the specifics of how to publish servers on a public address segment, let’s take a look at some of the aspects of the new ISA Server 2004 networking model. The reason why we use this IP address instead of the actual DNS server address is that we’re publishing the DNS server on the Internal network.
ISA Server 2004 fixes this problem and allows you to choose to pass the original client IP address to published Web server, or to use the ISA Server 2004 firewall’s IP address.
The exception is when you create an Access Rule to connect to an HTTP server on the DMZ segment. Source IP address will be that of the ISA Server 2004 firewall, unless you configure the Server and Web Publishing Rules for forward the original source IP address (you have a choice of forwarding the original client’s source IP address or the ISA Server 2004 firewall’s IP address to the published server).
When using SSL to SSL bridging, the ISA Server 2004 firewall "unwraps" the SSL tunnel, exposes the connection to the ISA Server 2004 firewall’s deep stateful application layer inspection mechanisms, and drops connections containing exploits and suspicious characteristics. If you use Access Rules to publish the public address DMZ hosts, the application layer filters will not protect you against these exploits. The HTTP security filter allows you granular control and is configurable on a per-rule basis, so that you’re not stuck with a single HTTP security policy for all the rules on the ISA Server 2004 firewall.
You can then bind the first valid address of a subnetted block to the DMZ interface and the first valid address of another subnetted block to the public interface.
You do this by configuring the router to use the IP address on the external interface of the ISA Server 2004 firewall as the gateway address for the DMZ segment’s network ID. This implies you have control over the upstream router, which makes public address DMZ segments a moot point for hobbyist ISP accounts. If you have the incorrect DNS server configuration, you can experience either slow name resolution, or no name resolution at all, which gives the end user the impression that "the ISA Server 2004 firewall doesn’t work".
For this reason, you should choose another firewall for SOHO environments that do not have an established DNS infrastructure.
However, there should be no significant differences in the actual procedures you carry out when you install the ISA Server 2004 firewall software.
The DMZ host does not use the Internal network IP address as its default gateway because it does not have access to addresses on the Internal network unless we give it access, and we’re not going to do that. The SMTP relay needs to be able to resolve the MX domain name for each outgoing mail message and it can use the DNS server on the Internal network to get this done.
The ISA Server 2004 firewall needs to know the IP addresses used on the network and the route relationship it should use when connecting to any other network. I’ve already seen a large number of network configuration and troubleshooting issues related to using the Network Templates. However, if you do not select the interface, you will not see the correct Network Interface Information in the frame at the bottom of the dialog box. Note that even if we used a route relationship between the DMZ and the Internal network, we could still create a Server Publishing Rule to allow the DMZ host access to the DNS server on the Internal network. An example would be when you have an SMTP relay on the DMZ segment that’s used to relay outbound mail for your organization. The basic configuration of the HTTP Security filter provides a good level of protection and you can customize the HTTP Security Filter to provide an enhance level of security to your Access Rule published Web server.
Note that when we use an Access Rule instead of an Server Publishing Rule, we will not benefit from the protection we get from SMTP filter.
This demonstrates that the Access Rule allowing inbound access to the DMZ Web site worked correctly. This shows that the DMZ host made a DNS query to the Internal network DNS server and the DNS server on the Internal network then queried Internet DNS servers to resolve the name.
The big problem with this approach is that you do not have the protection of HTTP Security filter or the Web Proxy filter. We accomplished this task by using Access Rules instead of Web and Server Publishing rules. For more information about Oracle ASO encryption, refer to the Oracle database documentation. For more information about deploying Discoverer Viewer over HTTPS, see Section 2.5, "About running Discoverer over HTTPS"). For more information, see Oracle Fusion Middleware Guide to Publishing Oracle Business Intelligence Discoverer Portlets.
For more information about setting up a VPD, see Oracle Database Advanced Application Developer's Guide. Information that conforms to the organization's firewall policy is allowed to pass through the firewalls enabling server machines and client machines to communicate. DMZs typically hold servers that host a company's public Web site, File Transfer Protocol (FTP) site, and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) server. Check out this article for a full discussion and step by step details on how ISA 2004 firewalls accomplish this amazing feat! This includes hosts connecting through a VPN remote access client or VPN gateway connection. In contrast, the ISA Server 2004 firewall allows you to route between the Internet and a DMZ segment, or NAT between the Internet and DMZ segment.
Publishing Rules always NAT the connection, even if you’re using a public address segment and have a route relationship between the source and destination host. The route relationship allows us to do this and preserve the existing DNS records mapping the DMZ host to its actual IP address. Even though we are using public IP addresses, NAT is performed because we’re using a publishing rule. This is true for publishing rules on public and private address DMZs for all publishing rules: both Web and Server Publishing. Connections deemed to be safe are then re-encrypted and sent to the published Web server via a second SSL link, which is created between the ISA Server 2004 firewall and the published Web server. This is a quantum leap ahead of the URLScan method of filtering HTTP communications through the firewall (URLScan was used in ISA Server 2000 for HTTP stateful inspection).
This provides a higher level of protection and control than any other firewall on the market. If this routing table entry is missing on the upstream router, then no primary incoming connections, and no responses to incoming connections, to and from the DMZ segment will work.
However, there’s no reason why you can’t create private address DMZs with a hobbyist ISP account.
In your production network, you’ll install and configure the services you require, which might include a front-end Exchange Serve publishing OWA, OMA, ActiveSync, RPC over HTTP and other services.
In our current example, the DMZ network will be named DMZ and we will assign the entire IP address range for its network ID to the network. Its important that we use a Server Publishing Rule instead of a Access Rule so that the DNS filter can protect the DNS server on the Internal network. Note that I’m waffling a bit here, because I haven’t yet completed tested the side-effects of disabling the Web Proxy filter on the HTTP protocol :-).
The advantage of this configuration is that we didn’t not need change our public DNS configuration, which would have been the case if we used publishing rules. However, the Oracle Single Sign-On user can view only worksheet data that conforms to the VPD policy defined for that Oracle Single Sign-On user.
In fact, the ISA Server 2004 firewall allows you to decide how you want connections to be routed between any two networks: route or NAT. This allows the Internet host to connect to the IP address on the external interface of the ISA Server 2004 firewall and effectively hides the IP address of the DMZ host.
On your production network, you would include all the IP addresses in the subnetted block you created for the DMZ segment.
By avoiding the use of Network Templates, you will assure that you have a secure configuration and that your firewall configuration and Access Policies are precisely what you intend them to be.
This is the address of the external host that made the inbound request to the DMZ SMTP server (which is at the same address as the DMZ Web server).
On the other hand, we lost out some security because Web and Server Publishing Rules make greater use of the ISA Server 2004 firewall’s sophisticated application layer filtering feature set.
In this case the original client IP address is preserved because the is no application filter proxying the connection and replacing the source IP address with the ISA Server 2004 firewall’s IP address.
Please note that we do NOT sell or rent the email addresses belonging to our subscribers; we respect your privacy. In this example, the source IP address is the IP address on the DMZ interface of the ISA Server 2004 firewall computer.
The reason for this finding is that the Web Proxy Filter is automatically associated with the HTTP protocol.



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