Emergency preparedness plans for local doctors offices,us homeland security department,what to do when your bored during a blackout - For Begninners

This section is a basic checklist of what needs to get done and who's going to do it before evacuating. Cookies are used on this site to personalize content and ads, to provide social media features and to analyze our traffic. Being prepared for a natural disaster, infectious disease outbreak or other emergency where many injured or ill people need medical care while maintaining ongoing operations is a significant challenge for local health systems.
Challenges to developing and sustaining community coalitions may reflect the structure of preparedness activities, which are typically administered by designated staff in hospitals or large medical practices. Health care providers’ focus on emergency-preparedness activities waxes and wanes, reflecting the many pressures and competing demands they face. Providers and policy makers alike increasingly have recognized the value of collaboration through community-based preparedness initiatives to minimize the amount of redundant capacity each provider must maintain.
Using the lens of the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, this study examined the activities of emergency-preparedness coalitions in 10 U.S. The first case of H1N1 influenza in the United States was recorded April 15, 2009, in California. Throughout this time, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) worked to promote communication among partners via conference calls with national organizations representing state and local health agencies, clinician outreach activities, listservs, newsletters, and hearings. A number of different federal, state and local organizations work with health care providers individually and collectively to promote collaboration in preparedness activities. In contrast, much less attention and funding have focused on involving other health care providers, such as independent physician practices, ambulatory care centers, specialty care centers and long-term care facilities, in community-based preparedness activities. While hospitals and public health departments participated in all emergency-preparedness coalitions in the communities studied, involvement of nonhospital providers and other stakeholders varied significantly across the communities (see Table 1). When working with nontraditional partners, community coalitions reported difficulty in aligning goals and securing buy in from those who view emergency management as outside their scope of responsibility. However, such stakeholders as schools and employers can and do influence medical treatment during disasters. Both hospital and community practice respondents acknowledged a sense of alienation from each other, noting that the smaller the practice, the more difficult it is to participate and have a voice in community collaborations. Most primary care respondents agreed that physicians are focused mainly on their patients’ day-to-day needs and do not see preparedness as part of their mission.
A few respondents reported that competition did affect preparedness collaborations, particularly when hospital leaders are guarded about sharing capabilities and needs with peers at other institutions. During the H1N1 pandemic, for example, some coalitions developed plans to distribute supplies in advance. Ultimately, nearly all respondents agreed that successful coalitions require ongoing attention to relationships. Nearly all hospitals working with both hospital-employed physicians and independent community-based physicians reported that hospital-employed physicians are easier to engage, suggesting that markets with larger physician groups and more hospital employment of physicians would be better positioned to build integrated surge-capacity plans. Because of the generally collegial approach to preparedness activities, respondents reported that tighter hospital affiliations in consolidated markets had little impact. While all providers felt the strain of competing demands in allocating resources for emergency preparedness, rural providers were particularly strapped.
Respondents did report that local partnerships and emergency response in small towns were more cohesive because of strong day-to-day relationships among health care providers, first-hand knowledge of the population they serve and a strong community feel. Across sites, respondents consistently reported that hospitals and hospital-owned physician practices typically are much more involved in emergency-preparedness coalitions than other stakeholders, reflecting both the federal financial support hospitals receive for preparedness activities and their size, structure and resources. There are two general approaches policy makers could consider to broaden participation in emergency-preparedness coalitions: providing incentives for more stakeholders to join existing preparedness coalitions or building preparedness into activities providers already are pursuing.
Some community-based physicians and other clinicians, such as those working in large practices or affiliated with large independent practice associations, are able to participate in traditional coalitions despite these challenges. There may be few alternatives for small primary care practices in fragmented markets to participate in traditional coalitions. Consider building preparedness into activities providers already are pursuing.An alternative approach to traditional preparedness coalitions would be to leverage activities providers already are pursuing unrelated to preparedness activities. One option would be to incorporate preparedness activities into existing incentive programs aimed at underrepresented stakeholders, including independent physicians and nursing homes. Other opportunities might include incorporating community-level preparedness activities into care-coordination activities that can count toward patient-centered medical home certification or encouraging electronic health record vendors to include features that facilitate electronic submission of important data to local, state and federal authorities during a disaster.
If collaborative preparedness activities leveraged existing affiliations and activities among stakeholders, the resulting coalitions might look very different from community to community.
For example, nursing homes owned by or closely affiliated with hospitals may use the hospitals’ preparedness staff, making it easy to develop collaborative approaches to preparedness.
This study examined the activities of community-based emergency-preparedness coalitions in 10 communities. I found it via pinterest and will be using it for an emergency preparedness activity I'm helping host at my church. This information may also be shared with our social media, advertising and analytics partners.
Emergency preparedness requires coordination of diverse entities at the local, regional and national levels.
There are two general approaches policy makers could consider to broaden participation in emergency-preparedness coalitions: providing incentives for more stakeholders to join existing coalitions or building preparedness into activities providers already are pursuing. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, many health care providers have adopted emergency-preparedness plans, including participation in such activities as community-wide drills and tabletop exercises, to strengthen their ability to respond to a disaster.


While conducting normal operations, providers must prepare for low-probability, high-impact events that can sharply increase demand for care and stress capacity to the breaking point. By April 26, the government determined that H1N1 represented a national public health emergency and began releasing stores of personal-protective equipment and antiviral medications to states from the strategic national stockpile. In some cases, the CDC altered guidance as data emerged, for example, reversing a recommendation to close schools for suspected or actual cases once the lower risk of severe illness became known. First, preparedness activities, such as planning, training and participating in drills, do not generate revenue for health care providers but have costs in staff time and materials. Few communities involve independent practitioners other than maintaining a list of those willing to volunteer in the event of a disaster, for which no special training or expertise in disaster response is required. Nonmedical stakeholders, such as police, fire, coroners, school systems and employers, have varying degrees of involvement in medical emergency planning collaboration. For example, one community coalition reported contacting long-term care facilities to offer funding to stockpile antiviral medication but found no takers. Some offer on-site health care, which may serve as an alternate source of care that is not always coordinated with hospitals or independent practices, and others may require documentation from a clinician before potentially affected people can return to school or work. According to respondents, state and local medical societies generally have not played an important role to date in helping small practices to collaborate with each other or other stakeholders. In practice, sharing happened less formally; for example, a single institution would make a request through the coalition and another coalition member would respond.
In some hospital systems, the system’s preparedness plan directly encompassed physician practices owned by the hospital system. Rural respondents reported depending on buy in from a smaller pool of institutional leaders, and these leaders did not always perceive value in allocating limited funding and staff time for emergency management and participation in coalitions. For example, outside Seattle, three small rural hospitals pooled funds to hire a shared emergency manager across the facilities. As one rural South Carolina respondent noted, a small town in which people know and look after their neighbors can help responders identify and protect more vulnerable community members in an emergency situation. However, most attention has focused on population-level management of obesity or chronic illness rather than disaster preparedness and response.
Other stakeholders, particularly smaller and independent primary care practices, could potentially contribute to preparedness efforts, but there are significant barriers to involving them in traditional coalitions in a sustainable way. Policy makers could encourage groups whose participation is currently limited in most communities, such as independent physician practices, to join traditional preparedness coalitions that meet regularly to develop joint plans or coordinate responses.
In communities where these types of practice arrangements are common, participation may be sufficient to generate broad-based coordination through traditional coalitions. For example, programs that offer extra payment to primary care practices to coordinate care of patients with specific chronic conditions might also encourage and reward coordination related to emergency preparedness or the creation of business continuity plans. Employment of physicians is only one of the ways markets vary—hospitals may be independent or tightly affiliated with one another, nursing homes may be closely linked to local hospitals or to national chains, and health information may be shared widely or not at all. Similarly, hospitals and physician practices using a common electronic health record platform may find it easier to share real-time information about utilization and to prepare jointly for surges.
There is no one-size-fits-all approach, and coalitions alone may not meet the needs of some communities, particularly those with extremely fragmented physician and other health care sectors.
Eight of the communities were chosen from the Community Tracking Study (CTS), an ongoing study of local health care markets in 12 nationally representative metropolitan communities. This document was prepared for CDC by the Center for Studying Health System Change under Contract No. To open the file correctly, please click the Information Bar on the top of the browser window, and select "Allow Blocked Content".
Given the diversity of stakeholders, fragmentation of local health care systems and limited resources, developing and sustaining broad community coalitions focused on emergency preparedness is difficult.
Moreover, rather than defining and measuring processes associated with collaboration—such as coalition membership or development of certain planning documents—policy makers might consider defining the outcomes expected of a successful collaboration in the event of a disaster, without regard to the specific form that collaboration takes. Maintaining preparedness is a daunting task, given that emergencies can spring up at a national, regional or local level and take forms as varied as a global pandemic, a regional hurricane or a local outbreak of food-borne illness.
While there is limited funding for preparedness activities, hospitals are not subsidized to keep beds empty and supplies stockpiled for a disaster, and it is impractical for trained staff to sit idle until a disaster strikes. The H1N1 influenza pandemic was the most recent national event that required large-scale preparedness and response.
The spring phase of H1N1 peaked in May and June 2009, with a slight decline before picking up again in late August. Respondents reported that CDC guidance was generally well received, and nearly all respondents turned to the CDC on a regular basis during the H1N1 pandemic for information and guidance. Given the low probability of certain events, stockpiling supplies and committing staff to emergency preparedness often are not high institutional priorities.4 In addition, community coalitions require competitors to work collaboratively. Regional or specialty-based medical societies may maintain similar lists and can provide basic training in disaster planning through continuing medical education.
One community, Greenville, reported heavy involvement from the coroner’s office, while another, New York City, worked with large employers. According to a Chicago respondent, "Some schools told people that kids couldn’t come back to school without a doctor’s note.
A hospital respondent in another community coalition cited reluctance to work with nursing homes because of the perception that they are primarily looking for a place to offload patients in an emergency.
However, respondents across all sites generally agreed that providers put normal competitive dynamics aside for preparedness efforts and meet and share information on capacity and supply chains when needed.


Many respondents noted issues with securing adequate amounts of personal-protective equipment.
As one respondent said, “Rural hospitals are facing huge budgetary issues right now. At the same time, public health preparedness experts have sought to develop methods to evaluate community coalitions. Changes in local market structures, such as increased hospital employment of physicians, also may diminish barriers in some communities. Likewise, hospital efforts to work with physician practices and long-term care facilities to prevent avoidable readmissions might incorporate preparedness activities. Each of these factors may affect how planning responsibilities, staff and information are most efficiently shared in preparation for and during a disaster.
It is important to note that collaborations based on existing affiliations and less-formal relationships would still require some oversight to avoid situations where disparities in market position may leave some providers at a disadvantage in securing needed information and supplies during a disaster. Instead, policy makers may want to emphasize outcomes, such as safe, efficient management of surge demand or receipt of needed information by stakeholders, and allow communities flexibility regarding processes and participants. This would make sustainable collaboration difficult to monitor objectively, which could be important if policy makers intend to link sustainable collaboration to grants or other funding sources or design formal methods to identify and qualify participation by particular stakeholder groups.
As a prolonged, low-mortality event, H1N1 tested community preparedness, clarified the challenges different stakeholders face, and pointed to ways to broaden and strengthen local collaboration. And, unlike other events that health care organizations must prepare for, such as Joint Commission inspections, there are no predictable, short-term consequences for failing to engage in collaborative, community-level disaster planning. The focus on hospitals reflects their historic importance in providing staff, space for planning and response, and treatment of emergency victims, including such specialized services as decontamination or burn care. While they were beset with other challenges, rural communities were particularly well positioned to take advantage of strong day-to-day relationships among providers (see box below for more about rural communities).
Hospital staff in nearly all sites reported challenges with fit-testing disposable protective face masks because of the staff time required and because fit-testing alone consumed a substantial proportion of their inventory. Some health systems did expect employed physicians in community practices to work collaboratively in disaster planning. In most cases, rural communities ultimately rely more on regional partnerships with state health departments and urban health care partners for mutual aid or access to stockpiles, even though those entities’ priorities typically are geared to more populous areas.
This study’s findings suggest that preparedness work could be integrated with broader care delivery, with possible implications for how to evaluate coalitions.
Rural communities adjacent to the Greenville, Phoenix and Seattle markets were included as well. The study findings and conclusions are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Vaccines were available by early October 2009, at first for high-risk populations only, but more widely by December as supply increased. Physicians and other clinicians employed by hospitals or working in community-based practices owned by hospitals usually fall under the umbrella of hospital preparedness activities.
Even in a disaster where victims seek care at hospitals, community-based clinicians can play a role.
In some cases, this reflected a commitment at the highest levels of organizations, but, in other cases, it reflected rapport among preparedness staff. Maintaining adequate supplies, particularly of masks, was a challenge when hospitals in a community, as well as public agencies, were competing for the same products. High levels of physician participation in those markets were attributed to hospital systems setting the expectation that physicians would participate and paying them for their efforts, and, in some cases, even allotting them administrative time to participate in preparedness or other system-level work.
That’s the mentality at small as well as big hospitals, [but] you can multiply that by 100 for small [rural] hospitals. No rural respondents described working with their state office of rural health on emergency preparedness. Lack of time, training and sometimes simply awareness that they have a role in disaster response also are important factors. Two additional sites were added: New York City because of significant investment in preparedness and Chicago to increase Midwestern representation.
For example, in a disaster, hospitals generally try to discharge as many inpatients as possible, and community-based providers could help by seeing or contacting discharged patients to ensure they are receiving needed follow-up care. Even if the CDC and other agencies could secure sufficient funds, they would be competing against many other incentive programs aimed at physician practices—for example, adoption of health information technology, greater care coordination and performance improvement. Sixty-seven telephone interviews were conducted between June 2011 and May 2012 with representatives of state and local emergency management agencies and health departments, emergency-preparedness coalitions, hospital emergency preparedness coordinators, primary care practices and other organizations working on emergency preparedness and response. Other respondents reported frequent communication among competing hospitals on shared pandemic plans and hospital policies for emergencies.
A two-person research team conducted each interview, and notes were transcribed and jointly reviewed for quality and validation purposes.



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