

WHAT THINGS DO WHEN THEY SHAPE EACH OTHER The Way of the Anarchive

In order to discover some of the major categories under which we can classify the infinitely various components of experience, we must appeal to evidence relating to every variety of occasion. Nothing can be omitted, experience drunk and experience sober, experience sleeping and experience waking, experience drowsy and experience wide-awake, experience self-conscious and experience self-forgetful, experience intellectual and experience physical; experience religious and experience sceptical, experience anxious and experience care-free, experience anticipatory and experience retrospective, experience happy and experience grieving, experience dominated by emotion and experience under self-restraint, experience in the light and experience in the dark, experience normal and experience abnormal (Whitehead 1967: 222)

Bolder adventure is needed - the adventure of ideas, and the adventure of practice conforming itself to ideas (Whitehead 1967: 259)

1. METHOD

"Every method is a happy simplification," writes Whitehead (1967: 221). The thing is, all accounting of experience travels through simplification - every conscious thought, but also, in a more minor sense, every tending toward a capture of attention, every gesture subtracted from the infinity of potential. And so a double-bind presents itself for those of us moved by the force of potential, of the processual, of the in-act. How to reconcile the freshness, as Whitehead might say, of processes underway with the weight of experience captured? How to reconcile force and form?

This was the challenge SenseLab (www.senselab.ca) gave itself when we decided, a few years ago, to develop a concept we call "the anarchive." For us, the concept was initially an attempt to reconsider the role documentation plays in the context of the event. How else might we activate current traces toward future eventing? If an event was emphatically that which could not be archived in advance of its eventing (because its eventing was precisely what made it an event, and a pre-archiving of it would make the archive the event), what could be distilled from it that might carry that eventing forward? And should the capture of that form be possible, wouldn't that capture take us right back into the archive and to the ubiquitous model of documentation we were struggling against? What, then, would be the relationship of the archive to this seeding forward? Was there really "archive fever" in the archive itself (Derrida 1998)? Or would it be the encounter with the force of what else an archive can be that reenlivened it, shifting it internally from archive to anarchive?

Over years of experimentation in three continents (the SenseLab has hubs in Canada, Australia and Europe, with a growing hub in Brazil), we consistently met road blocks. There emerged, over years, an inevitable archive of our work, despite our not giving the archive itself much attention. Did the anarchive need that archive or was its point of departure elsewhere? To begin

to address this question, seeds of anarchiving were composed in different hubs that then travelled across hubs for the re-anarchiving. We did our best to understand how to learn from them. Something was doing, but still it was unclear how the seeds would be capable of feeding forward in a context not our own. If the work of the anarchiving was oriented toward creating a larger process seed bank that collectives, activists, philosophers and artists might want to grow and share, how were the seeds we were creating going to find the independence from our process that would allow them to germinate elsewhere? For our interest was never in creating accounts of our activities. Our interest in the anarchiving was in generating techniques for sharing not the work itself but its potential, and, eventually reaping from others their anarchival potential so that action traces might become mobilized across environments of collective experimentation. If the anarchiving was about harnessing process, how would we do that without muting the very force we were after?

Whitehead's process philosophy goes to the heart of this conundrum. Against method, Whitehead's philosophy assists us, I think, in displacing the unnecessary dyad of force/form, archive/anarchiving, giving us the tools to understand how all experience is made of cracks and captures, archival and anarchival at once.

Whitehead's process philosophy requires that we become thinkers from the middle. To become acquainted with how experience works, process philosophy teaches us, we must see it both from the side of its creation (its passage from force to form) *and* from the side of its perishing (its passage from form to force). Coming in from the middle allows us to feel how all events are cuts in the passage of a process, subtractions from a welter of potential, and thus, to a differing degree, simplifications. This is because every event - what Whitehead calls occasions of experience - is an excision from a welter of unactualized force. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's concept of the actual and the virtual is another way of understanding this passage. The virtual, as they are at pains to underscore, cannot exist - it can only contribute. What hasn't yet actualised does not have a status in the world. It remains potential. How it comes to be will be what it is.

Differentiating force and form is necessary not because they are oppositions but precisely because they are so close, and so entwined. Tendencies of one-another, force and form co-compose. To understand this co-composition, their differing contributions must be attended to. When Whitehead says that a process philosophy is not interested in the continuity of becoming but in the becoming of continuity, he is emphasizing that experience is not born of pure flow, pure togetherness, pure continuity, but rather is created from capture, crack and cut, continuously splintering from the field of potential to create new durations, new events. Relation as immanent to the occasion. There is no absolute relatedness in process philosophy. Rather, there is an account much closer to Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the relation of non-relation which Brian Massumi defines this way: "The paradox of relation can be summed up in the term relation-of-nonrelation. Elements contributing to an occurrence come into relation when they come into effect, and they come into effect in excess over themselves. In themselves they are disparate. If they are in tension, it is precisely as a function of the differential between their

positions. It is as a function of their distances from each other. The factors do not actually connect. Their distance is enveloped in a field effect that is one with the tension culminating in the strike of an event" (2011: 20).

When Whitehead writes "the connectedness of things is nothing else than the togetherness of things in occasions of experience" and "no things are 'together' except in experience; and no things are, in any sense of 'are,' except as components in experience or as immediacies of processes which are occasions in self-creation" what he means is exactly what Massumi outlines above (1967: 233, 236). There is no "general" togetherness, only a *togetherness in the event*. Massumi continues: "If we apply this concept of the relation-of-nonrelation to what occurs between occasions of experience, we are led to treat the experiences themselves as differentials. The consequence is that occasions of experience cannot be said to actually connect to each other. They may be said to 'come together' only in the sense of being mutually enveloped in a more encompassing event of change-taking-place that expresses their differential in the dynamic form of its own extra-being. That occasions of experience do not actually connect is Whitehead's doctrine of 'contemporary independence'" (2011: 20-21).

There is no thread connecting all experience a priori. There is no generalized concept of process. Relations are born of the event. All occasions of experience embody relation as the force of their coming-together. This lived relation is always both force and form. There is no outside from which we could cut out part of the process of an occasion's coming to be, putting form on one side and process on the other. Similarly, there is no way in which to think of process without its coming to form, since it is from a process's "taking" that a perspective is created, from the point of view of the occasion, of that very process. Without form, there is only the wildness of what has not yet come to be, and there is no purchase here for experience as we know it. What we know as the resonant field of force-form is not process as such, but the differential active in the "taking" of form. An occasion of experience is lively with that differential, a cleaving, in the now of experience, of an always-differing force-form composition.

Continuing with Whitehead, the question becomes one of technique: How is it that these compositions are produced? And, keeping in mind that "such occasions are only rarely occasions of human experience" how do we make techniques operative that are not solely focused on human experience? How do we enliven the human-more-than-human differential at the heart of the force-form of composition? (1967: 233).

A technique is not a method. "Some of the major disasters of mankind have been produced by the narrowness of men with a good methodology," Whitehead reminds us (FR). Technique does work with a certain figure of subtraction, however. In the context of method, as I've argued elsewhere, the question is always one of pre-valuing modes of encounter for use in new instances. Methods are inherently diagnostic, functioning with general categories that are understood to be transportable across contexts (2016: 26-45). The subtraction here functions categorically: the stakes are set up in advance. In the case of technique, something quite different is operative. Following from the work of Gilbert Simondon, I use technique as the making-

operational of conditions of emergence that work as platforms for relation. Techniques as we've developed them at SenseLab are never generalized: new events require new techniques. And each technique needs to be continuously honed, shifted toward what I've theorized as the "outdoing of technique," or technicity (Manning 2013: 32). Subtraction here functions very differently than it does in the context of method. A culling of tendencies takes place for each shift from technique to technicity, as it does in the honing of technique itself. But this subtraction is not a generalized account of what must be left out in order to make sense of the situation at hand. Subtraction here tunes toward addition: it attunes to what has been left out, to what is excessive in the event, to what else is operational in the field of encounter.

The question of method is allied to the archive. To what degree is the archive a method for the accounting of process? To what degree does it generalize across instances of experience? If we consider, for instance, the ubiquitous forms of archives in the fine arts, what we tend to find chiefly are representations of what are considered primary works. Of course, much work has been done on the archive in the last several decades, much of it to address this very issue.¹ But without a strong stance against the generalization of experience, and without a vocabulary for rethinking the tendency to perpetuate the form/process dyad, even the best experiments tend to fall prey to the problem of representation. With this in mind, the issue for us was to try to become acquainted with techniques that would subtract differently, that would engage creatively with the seeds of a process without reembalming those seeds into a digestible, (re)presentable form.

But to continue with Whitehead for a moment: all of these questions require, it seems to me, a practice of entering from the middle that allows us to generate an account of experience that is pulled in at least two directions at once. For every coming-to-form carries its excess. This virtual share of force is what keeps form active, shifting and moving. Whitehead calls this "creativity," emphasizing that all compositions of force-form carry unrealized potential. It is important to retain the notion of the "unrealized" here. These are not Platonic "ideas." The unrealized is non-actualised in the occasion as it has come to be. As such it cannot be named, and it cannot be abstracted from the occasion. The virtual is real, as Deleuze reminds us, but unrealized. Our work, as regards the anarchive, is to devise techniques that can make the unrealized as real felt. One such technique which I've theorized at length is that of autistic perception, the direct perception of the more-than of experience in the making that seems to be part of many autistics' experience. This form of perception, which does not initially subtract the force of form, is not relegated to autistics - it is simply much more keenly experienced by autistics. While this quality of direct perception is not well suited to those quotidian practices that require quick differentiation of subjects and objects, it is unquestionably a skill artists work to hone. What if this became a more widely shared skill? What if perceiving objects and subjects as delimitations

¹ A few books on archives include: Charles Merewether (Ed) *The Archive* (MIT, 2006); Ian Farr (Ed) *Memory* (MIT, 2012), *Archive Journal*, with pieces such as Jane Birkin's "Archives Remixes: Critical Perspectives and Pathways – Radical Archives" (*Archive Journal*, issue 5, 2017) <http://www.archivejournal.net/issue/5/archives-remixed/art-work-and-archives/>

of life were seen as the limited subtraction it actually is? These are questions the anarchic moves us to ask.

2. CONCRESCENCE

If form and force are always in co-composition, the occasion of experience, even on the side of its atomicity, or absoluteness, must be seen as also possessing a potentially boundless creativity. The concept of concrescence, which is at the heart of Whitehead's process philosophy, gives a sense of the holding together, in the occasion, of boundless creativity *and* absoluteness. With the initial grasping of experience (prehension) through which the occasion begins to "take," there is already a certain concrescence, a certain growing of the grasp's attunement to form. Both the growing and the forming are held in the concept. As Whitehead writes: "the word Concrescence is a derivative from the familiar latin verb, meaning 'growing together.' It also has the advantage that the participle 'concrete' is familiarly used for the notion of complete physical reality. Thus Concrescence is useful to convey the notion of many things acquiring complete complex unity" (1967: 236). Concrescence is the growing into form, the "concrete" passage where form detaches itself from the welter of experience to express itself "just this way."

When I said that it was necessary to read Whitehead from the middle, I meant that we need to read him from the perspective of concrescence, moving at the same time in the direction of a process growing into itself, the necessary eclipsing of the excess in order that the form "take" absolutely, and the germinating force of what still participates, even if it does not actually take form. To think from this middling assures us of not getting caught in the process/form dichotomy. For there is great movement here, forms "taking" and perishing and "taking" again differently. And with that movement, what is created is not so much form-as-such as the time of the event, of this event, here, now, and all potentials grown from that which has emerged.

3. THE NOT-BEING OF IMMEDIACY

When they perish, occasions pass from the immediacy of being into the not-being of immediacy (Whitehead 1967: 237).

The occasion of experience is a limit concept. To think at the scale of a body, for instance, Whitehead speaks of societies of occasions. This is not to suggest that occasions have actual scale. On the contrary, as intensities of experience "taking", no fixed scale could ever be attributed to them. A monument, for instance, is populated with innumerable takings-form, and with that uncountability come an infinity of durations, some of them in the time of the event, some of them in the untimely field of relation of which potential is made. Form in this grander sense is not distinguishable from the way I described it above. It too, is composed of the differential of process/form. To ignore this is to misunderstand the force of the molecular. This is a mistake that is often made in the name of the micropolitical, where the suggestion is that the micropolitical refers to small events that operate at less important scales than those that are macropolitical. Whitehead's account of force-form deeply challenges this, as does the work of

Deleuze and Guattari. The micropolitical is the differential that moves at the interstices of force-form in ways that trouble all grand narratives, including that of the macropolitical. There is no instance of experience that can be separated out from the movement of form's "taking", and no instance of experience that is completely devoid of potential. But there are practices that orient experience toward methods that stultify potential, and there are generalities that mobilize lived experience such that all we feel is the monumentality of things. This too, is what the anarchiving forces us to think.

Techniques for anarchiving must therefore become attentive both to the ways in which generalizations reify the monumentality of experience (be it in the name of politics, of pedagogy, of the family, to name just a few examples) on the one hand, and systematically background the qualities that are cast aside in lieu of these grand narratives. Techniques for anarchiving must connect to the event's minor gestures while remaining sensitive to all the ways the force of variation of the minor gesture is cast aside. We must remain engaged both with the immediacy of being and the not-being of immediacy.

Immediacy of being requires us to attend to the absoluteness, to the matter-of-fact, as Whitehead calls it, of what has come to be. This matter-of-fact remains even after the perishing. *That* coming to form has altered what experience can do. This means that grand narratives too continue to make a difference, even if they are deeply falsifying accounts of how experience "takes." This must be attended to even when it has become clear that it is on the side of the minor gesture that movement and change is most palpable. For "stubborn facts," as Whitehead calls them, always populate the potential of what may reemerge, albeit differently. The "objective immortality" of what perishes, Whitehead maintains, potentially affects all that will come to be. Unlike the archive however, and any account of memory that situates memory as a receptacle that can be returned to wholesale, what re-emerges is not the stubborn-fact "itself." What reemerges can never be decided in advance for its coming-to-be will be ecological at its core, influenced by all the ways in which *these* singular forces compose with *this* singular "taking". Change always happens, no matter what. This is what I take from process philosophy: not that the minor gesture is inherently good or evil (it isn't), but that the minor gesture is always at work, and that techniques are available for orienting how the taking of form contributes to experience in the making.

This account is at once of time and of memory. When Whitehead writes about the not-being of immediacy, he is underscoring the orienting potential of what perishes. How something came to be definitely affects how something else can happen. The past lives in the present, not as cause but as potential, and, even more importantly, as differential.

Thinking from the middle with the question of the not-being of immediacy, another detour is necessary. If experience resists in a fundamental way an account of linear time - past, present, future - it will never be possible to locate an account of it on a continuum. Rather, we will have to think topologically, creating postures and gestures that orient from perspectives other than our own, if ours is to chunk the world into subjects and objects. We will have to learn to not put

process before form or form before process but to think them in their incessant folding. As Whitehead does, we will also have to encounter these questions from the orientation of the more-than human, refusing to speak generally about experience "as" human or non-human, working instead from within a vocabulary that gives voice to that which exceeds us.

4. THE ANARCHIC SHARE

The archive as it is mobilized in contemporary times cannot be detached from the neoliberal obsession with the capture of creativity. Artists everywhere are taught to document document document, the product emphasized, always, over the force of form, especially now that the very act of being an artist has been enshrined by the academic institution in the form of a necessary MFA, and now even a PhD. Increasingly, to make art is to know how to frame it. Of course, accounts of process abound, and with them a long history of resisting this trend - but when it comes down to it, when the grant needs to be written, or the performance dossier needs to be read, or the article needs to be written so that the next exhibit can take place, it is the archive that is turned to, and beyond the archive of the work itself, the cv. An artist without a website is a rare occurrence, and even artists who explicitly resist these normative constraints often can only do so because they have enough prestige to function as the exception to the norm, or because they came into their artistic practice in another era when these kinds of markers of practice were not as current² (CITE Tino Seghal, also the museimification of Lygia Clark).

What results from this is a tendency to inadvertently monumentalize the archive. No artist I've ever met feels the archive does justice to their work. And, as should be clear by now, no archive is completely bound up in form and representation. But how an archive tends to work matters, and this is what is at stake in the anarchival. How else could the work we do be valued? And how could that value continue to be emergent beyond the actual event in ways that are not immediately consonant with the prestige or surplus-value of capital sustained by our infinite archiving? These are anarchival questions.

When SenseLab began the work with the anarchival, we turned to Whitehead's notion of the anarchic share to begin to articulate what it was we were after. Would it be possible, we asked ourselves, to activate that share which itself resists form? Would it be possible to find ways to feed forward the more-than of the event's taking form? And always: how would this more-than kindle new work, new techniques, new processes in ways that coincided in some sense with what took place before but didn't need to conform to it? Was it possible to activate a tendency for future reuptake that hadn't properly actualized in the event and yet was the very germ that made the event what it became?

² Tino Seghal is an example of a contemporary artist who resists the archive, actively preventing people from taking pictures of his work and refusing to document. The quality of his work rests in the very fact of its ephemerality.

This brings us back to the question of the not-being of immediacy, which is the best definition I've found for the anarchic (provided we never abstract it completely from the immediacy of being).

The anarchic has a pull and it is a pull to immediacy. It wants to activate, to orient. Or, better said, it is always already activating, orienting. This makes it a collaborator in all takings-form. Thinking of it as the event's anarchic share allows us underscore its role in all experience, human and more-than-human. It also allows us to place it on the register of the immanent rather than transcendent. The anarchic is not something "we" do. It is something that catches experience in the making. It is something that catches us in our own becoming.

This makes SenseLab's desire to harness the anarchic paradoxical. We have lived with (and suffered) this paradox since proposing the term. If we continue to persist it is not because we want to prove that a human agency can tame the anarchic. Quite the opposite, our hope is to better account for how the anarchic share composes with the event, and to create conditions for reentering experience from its uneasy middling.

5. IMMORTALITY

This is where Whitehead's concept of immortality is important. In his account of immortality, Whitehead begins with a theory of co-composing worlds which he calls the "world of activity" and the "world of value." These worlds, he emphasizes again and again, are inextricable: they cannot be conceived apart from one-another. That said, as with all philosophy of organism, an easy togetherness must not be imposed from the outside. There is a relation of non-relation activated by the differential of their coming together in each singular instance.

The world of activity is the one which tunes toward the form the actual occasion takes. This is the finite, mortal world. Whitehead describes it as a world of origination that "creates the present by transforming the past, and by anticipating the future" (1968: 62). This phasing into itself of experience is the share of experience where orientations and potentials are reduced to the forms they momentarily take. In the realm of activity, as Whitehead makes clear with the concepts of "appearance" and "reality," all comings-to-be are dancing in the vacillation of the fullness of potential (he calls this reality) and its cleaving into appearance, or form-taking. This is important, as Whitehead emphasizes, since "the infinite background always remains as the unanalysed reason why that finite perspective of that entity has the special character that it does have. Any analysis of the limited perspective always includes some additional factors of the background. The entity is then experienced in a wider finite perspective, still presupposing the inevitable background which is the universe in its relation to that entity" (1968: 60).

I underline this last passage to prevent a reading that might take the world of activity as one of "pure" form. There is no such thing. Form is simply what happens when activity moves toward a limit. And, as I've emphasized above, this limit always includes what exceeds it, its more-than. It is here that it connects to the immortal world, the world of value. For the more-than is untimely,

outside the actualization of form. And as such, it never quite perishes, living on as the qualifying orientation for worlds to come.

Throughout the work on the anarchic, value has been our key concern. As outlined above, the archive tends to impose value from the outside. For Whitehead there is never an exteriority to value. Whitehead's account of the relationship between the world of activity and the world of value works completely differently. The world of activity needs its finiteness. It needs the parameters that allow for the absolute differentiation between now and now. At the same time, it needs a way to conceive of what is always escaping the now, of what cannot quite be captured yet profoundly influences the taking-form of processes underway. Moving at the pace of the more-than what the world of value connects to is the anarchic share of the process's coming to form. What is valued here is not the form the process takes but its force-of-form.

Whitehead defines value as outside of time and volition. Value for Whitehead is not something added or composed from the outside of an occasion's coming to form. We cannot claim it or impose it. And yet "it loses its meaning apart from its necessary reference to the World of passing fact. Value refers to Fact, and Fact refers to Value" (1968: 62). Value, like the force of form, cannot be abstracted from what comes to be. At the same, because of its timelessness, it cannot be absolutely contained by the occasion as it comes to form: "the value judgment points beyond the immediacy of historic fact" (1968: 62).

All occasions of experiences are oriented by value. This is not a morality. Value as Whitehead defines it has nothing to do with preimposed systems of belief. Valuation is more of a tending than it is an encapsulating. The question is not whether something is good or evil, but to what degree it holds contrasts in germ, to what degree it activates the potentiality of an inner discordance. "Thus the World of Values must be conceived as active with the adjustment of the potentialities of realization" (1968: 62).

If the work of the world of activity involves catching experience in the making, the work of the world of value involves immanent modifications of that catch: "evaluation involves a process of modification: the World of Activity is modified by the World of Value" (1968: 63). But there is a hitch: "evaluation always presupposes abstraction from the sheer immediacy of fact. It involves reference to Valuation" (1968: 63). What is being valued is not the occasion. What is valuing itself is the more-than.

Value is a capacity for intensification. When the world of activity composes with the world of value, a share of experience becomes immortal. A quality of worlding is invented. This is what the anarchic does: it inserts itself in the schism where the finite and the infinite come together and makes that schism tremble, valuing it from the inside. The ineffable is felt.

If something is captured in the activation of an anarchic it cannot be value itself. For, as Whitehead writes, "either World can only be explained by reference to the other World; but this reference does not depend upon words, or other explicit forms of individuation" (63). What is

captured is force's uneasy connection to what takes form. Not the form, and not exactly the more-than, but something that cleaves the two and offers up different orientations from the ones actually taken.

Or, maybe not different, but immanently included without being expressed as such.

Two shapes compose: "a shape of value and a shape of fact" (1968: 64). To conceptualize these compositions across time and timelessness as shapes perhaps gives us a way to conceive a passage from the ineffable to the activation of a process seed bank made of anarchival germs.

In *Always More Than One*, I wrote about the shape of enthusiasm (2013: 185). This came out of a critical reading of psychoanalyst Francis Tustin, in particular her accounts of how autistics encounter shape. Tustin writes: "In the days when I was working as a psychoanalyst child therapist with young autistic children, as they began to talk, they would tell me about their 'shapes'" (1984: 278). "They were not the shapes of any particular object." "Just 'shapes.'" "I do not know what other forms were covered by what they referred to as 'shapes' [...] it was not the shape of a specific object which existed in actuality; it was just a 'shape'" (1984: 278). My argument in that earlier piece was that the problem was not with autistics but with Tustin: "That Tustin cannot quite articulate the nature of a 'shape' is not surprising: the shaping of experience in the making is dynamic and amodal - active in the perceptual field where language is not-yet. It is [...] a vitality form, a pre-conscious verging toward a coming-to-act that tunes to the relational milieu of experience. Such a vitality form occurs in the half-second or less of an event's coming to expression. It is, as Daniel Stern underlines, a 'manifestation of being alive' that is all about movement - vitality forms shape the lived experience of duration, giving incipient experience its activation contour" (Manning 2013: 187).

To speak of the shape of experience is to find a way to touch the middling of events forming, to be interested not only in the form they will inevitably take, but in the valuing of how force and form conjugate in this singular instance of an event's coming to be. What I called the "shape of enthusiasm" in *Always More Than One* might well be in close relation to Whitehead's world of value - a lived encounter with the force of the not-yet in the forming of experience. In the words of the earlier piece: "Giving this activity of shaping the name of enthusiasm, making enthusiasm the force of the not-yet, emphasizes the towardness, the exuberance and the intensity of vitality forms, calling forth the way in which they manifest always in excess of actual forms in the towardness of a coming-to-be. Vitality forms take the shape of the not-yet such that they in-form not simply the content of the experience but its affective tonality: 'they are the felt experience of force - in movement - with a temporal contour, and a sense of aliveness, of going somewhere' (Stern 2010: 8). They are the 'shapes' of sound, smell, taste and sight' that are 'felt' rather than heard, smelled, tasted or seen' (Tustin 1984: 279)" (Manning 2013: 187).

The world of value and its shape of enthusiasm, even if timeless, is not without appetite. Indeed, it is appetite at its most urgent. For value "styles" the occasion (1968: 66). Activity is harnessed, for now, in just this way. It takes shape.

6. CUFF

A shape I've become fascinated by is that of the cuff. My interest in the cuff can be connected to a long-standing curiosity about and engagement with the fold, in particular the way it has been taken up by Deleuze in his most Whiteheadian book *The Fold*. For Deleuze, the Baroque takes the shape of the fold. That is to say, the Baroque can in an infinity of ways be conceptualized as the period that most welcomes the involutions and convolutions of a shape that refuses beginnings and endings. Deleuze writes: "The Baroque refers not to an essence but rather to an operative function. It endlessly produces folds. It does not invent things: there are all kinds of folds coming from the East, Greek, Roman, Romanesque, Gothic, Classical folds... Yet the Baroque trait twists and turns its folds, pushing them to infinity, fold over fold, one upon the other" (1993: 3).

The fold is the figure of the labyrinth, or more precisely the shape of its vertigo. It is multiplicity itself - an impossible recounting of how the parts connect to the whole. For with the fold there are never parts, just more folding. "A fold is always folded within a fold. like a cavern in a cavern. [...] Unfolding is thus not the contrary of folding, but follows the fold up to the following fold" (1993: 7).

In the process of experimenting with the anarchic share of experience and attempting to tune it toward the mobilization of some kind of form-like instance of archiving, SenseLab returned to the fold again and again. What better concept to attend to the ways in which the world of activity and the world of value coincide if not through the shape of the fold? The problem was that the fold was not helping us move toward form. It kept us resolutely on the side of the more-than with little appetite for the finiteness of mortal forms. This is of course not the fold's fault. It is more of a technical problem. We needed a concept to shift the conditions of exploration such that we might, later, return to the fold in a different way.

That concept was the cuff.

The exploration began in a simple fashion: asking ourselves what exactly a cuff could do. It's an unusual word, the cuff, particularly in the English language where the term denotes at once the finishing of the sleeve or the pant-leg, a slap about the head, certain earrings and bracelets and, not to be forgotten, the hand-cuff, usually used in the plural. Right away it seemed that this might be a concept, if explored deeply enough, of capture itself, a concept that might embolden a technique that would return us to the world of activity.

The term cuff seems to come into usage in the English language around the 15th century. A variant of the medieval English "coffe" (mitten), it referred to the turned-back part of the sleeve of a garment. From the late 17th century onwards, cuff-links were used to close the vent in the cuff or wristband of the shirt, replacing the earlier "cuff-strings," though the cuff-strings did remain in use until the first buttons were sewn onto shirts toward the end of the 19th century.

Originating in the 16th century, the verb "to cuff" is defined as striking with an open hand, especially on the head. The Myriam Webster suggests that the word may come from the Middle English, now obsolete, "glove," first recorded in 1530.

A few things stood out immediately. When I sew a cuff on a garment, I am opting to finish a seam differently. Is this ornament? And if so, does that mean it is in excess of form? Or is it part of the taking-form of that which is being cuffed?

Despite a months-long sewing frenzy of cuffs, my main concern remained one of technique. What definition of the cuff would allow us to begin the process of anarchiving differently? Collaborator Marcelino Barsi suggested a first definition: a cuff is a change of direction. To sew on a cuff usually implies working with the fabric's weave in countercurrent to the sleeve: it usually involves sewing into the garment in a direction perpendicular to the arm seam. This first definition got us going. If a cuff was a change of direction, perhaps the shape of that change of direction was that of a levee. A temporary stopping of the flow?

The question morphed. What was an architectural cuff? Could a balcony be a cuff? And if so, did that move us beyond ornamentation to supplementarity, in the Derridean sense? What was a movement cuff? Would that be a trip? A quick change of direction? And a landscape cuff? Would that be Bernard Cache's inflexion? The underscoring of how landscapes themselves orient how architecture builds itself? Which could only take me to lines, and to a close reading of Tim Ingold's lovely books on lines. Certainly a cuff was not a line, if a line was a "living-along" (2015). But the cuff would matter to the line, it seemed to me, cracking it in ways unforeseen and reorienting it. If nothing else, the line reminded us that form-force could not be seen as opposites, and so also with the cuff and the fold.

7. SYMPATHY

Lars Spuybroek's book *The Sympathy of Things* consolidated my thinking. The cuff, now emerging as a technique for orienting toward the anarchic share of experience in the making - giving us the tools to be less tentative about the hard gestures of finishing, cutting off, redirecting - was another kind of fold. Folds are full of cuffs, it turns out. They are not simply endless convolutions - they also reorient. After all, doesn't Deleuze give us the figure of the inflexion and Klee's line precisely to remind us that the fold vectorizes?

In *The Sympathy of Things*, Spuybroek takes us on a journey toward amodern seeing in the context of Gothic design. Through detailed explorations of the techniques at the heart of Gothic architecture and design, Spuybroek demonstrates how the Gothic refutes the combinatorial approach that privileges segmentarity. In the Gothic, he argues (with Ruskin always by his side), "the relation between elements is internal to the form-taking process and the sweeping up of the elements in a continuous variation. That relation is one with the movement of

design-work rendering force-of-form. There is only one 'plane,' that of the movement of the design-work itself, on a level with the material" (Massumi in Spuybroek CHECK).

The cuff in this context could go in different directions. It could be conceived as that which segments. Or, very easily, it could be seen as pure ornament (but what about the mitten-like tendencies of early cuffs?). Yet this would be to ignore its capacity to activate a change of direction, to ignore the shape of its orientation. And so, with my amodern eyes, I prefer to see the cuff as the embankment that holds certain potentials at bay while a taking-form happens and a change is apprised in the welter of experience in the making. For this is what a cuff can do, I think: to make apparent that all activity edges.

When experience is understood as that which cleaves the world of activity and the world of value, the concept of ornamentation changes dramatically. If the world of value is that which brings emphasis to how things come to be, and if that emphasis can never be understood as separate from the activity itself, there is no place for a concept that would signal "mere decoration." How would that work? Wouldn't everything make a difference, no matter how trivial? This is certainly what Whitehead would say, and it is with this in mind that I situate the cuff as that which participates in ways that make a real difference to the world's foldings of activity and value. For the cuff, as Spuybroek might say, echoing Henri Bergson, has sympathy for the fold.

Spuybroek writes: "Sympathy is what things feel when they shape each other" (3, 3 CHECK) Sympathy is not a personal standpoint. It is the motor of intuition, in the event. It is how the event composes with its qualitative excess, with its more-than. "There is nothing personal about sympathy. It is an objectivity focused not on inert matter but on matter as part of time, on matter as something transformable and ever-changing." (3, 16 CHECK).

To cuff is to move with the material toward its change of direction, and to follow the limits of that change. To cuff is to corner the change and link it, breaking the line. To cuff is to experiment with how a cut alters a process. To fold is to follow that process, to risk the labyrinthine. These are not only human tasks - more-than human worlds cuff and fold all the time - but they may be interesting starting points as regards creating conditions for the activation of the anarchic share in the force-form of the anarchic.

Just as the not-being of immediacy was key, so is sympathy. In fact, if we understand intuition as the modality of attention, in the event, that tentatively directs a process, we might see intuition as working in close proximity to the world of value. Intuition is full of potential. This potential, this attuning-toward the force of form, requires a motor. For Bergson, sympathy is the motor. It is sympathy that moves intuition toward the world of activity. It is sympathy that cuffs the process.

Care for the event is at the heart of the relation between sympathy and intuition, just as it is between activity and value. How the event comes to be matters. This is why there is always a Nietzschean *necessity* to value.

Whitehead writes: "The essential character of the World of Value is coordination. Its activity consists in the approach to multiplicity by the adjustment of its many potentialities into finite unities, each unity with a group of dominant ideas of value, mutually interwoven, and reducing the infinity of values into a graduated perspective, fading into complete exclusion" (1968: 68). The work of value is to fold activity toward the manner of its becoming. And that matters.

8. THE ANARCHIVE

The anarchieve is a manner of becoming that matters. Its work is to cuff experience such that its folds can be more keenly felt, unfolded as they momentarily are by the cuff's cleaving gesture. It does not have a form per se, but it does pass through form. Its force is its capacity to sidle form without fully giving in to its contours, or becoming seduced by its false promise of reproducibility. While it cannot ever be created as such, it does benefit from a certain taking-form in order for the cuffing to express a change of direction that the folding can take up. Summed up in the collective work of SenseLab, here are a few ways it can be defined:

1. The anarchieve is a *repertory of traces* of events. The traces are not inert, but are carriers of potential. They are reactivatable, and their reactivation helps trigger a new event which continues the creative process from which they came, but in a new iteration.
2. Thus the anarchieve is not documentation of a past activity. Rather, it is a *feed-forward mechanism* for lines of creative process, under continuing variation.
3. The anarchieve needs documentation – the archive – from which to depart and through which to pass. It is an excess energy of the archive: a kind of *supplement* or surplus-value of the archive.
4. Its supplemental, excessive nature means that the anarchieve is never contained in any particular archive or documentation element contained in an archive. *It is never contained in an object.* The anarchieve is made of the formative movements going into and coming out of the archive, for which the objects contained in the archive serve as springboards. The anarchieve as such is made of formative tendencies; compositional forces seeking a new taking-form; lures for further process. Archives are their waystations.
5. Since it exceeds the archive and is uncontainable in any single object or collection of objects, the anarchieve is by nature a *cross-platform phenomenon*. It is activated in the relays: between media, between verbal and material expressions, between digital and off-line archivings, and most of all between all of the various archival forms it may take and the live, collaborative interactions that reactivate the anarchival traces, and in turn create new ones.
6. The anarchieve pertains to the *event*. It is a kind of event derivative, or surplus-value of the event.
7. Approached anarchivally, the product of events is process. The anarchieve is a technique for making practice a *process-making engine*. Many products are produced, but they are not *the*

product. They are the visible indexing of the process's repeated taking-effect: they embody its traces (thus bringing us full circle to point 1).³

There is no method to the anarchieve. Because its work is to proliferate, to make felt, for future reuptaking, germs of experience excluded from the occasion's taking-form, it cannot be approached the same way twice. Every event will have to invent its own process of anarchiving. But one thing that can probably be maintained across the momentary reorienting of the anarchic share is the synpathy of the cuff for the fold, and vice-versa. For without that sympathy, the process will stall. The mattering of the anarchieve requires the turn of the brush where line begins to fold and inflects toward other form-takings.

9. DISCORD

The anarchic share of the event will always resist capture. It will always live in the untimely world of value, on the side of force. But it will also always have made a difference, and this difference will have transformed how the event came to be. To seek the anarchieve is to care for the *how* of this difference. It is to care for how the event has concern for its shape.

An event always carries, in potentia, the shape of enthusiasm. This is something I know from my work on neurodiversity: for those who always feel too much, for whom the borders of sensation are liquid, there is always more-than. In this vista of becoming, force is still palpable. The edges and folds and cuffs are still perceptible. The shape is open, ebullient, and deeply uncertain.

Enclosures are built to safeguard us from the force of form. The demand for discernable signs of our creativity - our archives, our cvs - is everywhere repeated. For, it is believed, these are the signs that will embolden our own shape-taking, that will frame us into our identities and build our personalities. But some of us - the most neurodiverse amongst us - know that there is no safeguarding from force, and there is no way to account for being without accounting at one and the same time for becoming. When perceived from the middling of experience in the making, form is force.

Discord is key to how value moves the event and it must not be separated out from the event's concern for its shape. This is the politics of the anarchieve: that it creates the conditions to bring out not only the anarchic share, but the anarchy that breaches the levee of time. The anarchieve refuses the easy flow of time. Its work is not to document but to germinate seeds for new processes, processes that will likely unmoor the shape of the event as it reveals itself today.

The work of care for the event involves a deep commitment to modes of attunement, in the event. As SenseLab experiments with it, it asks of us to learn to move at the pace of the

³ These definitions of the anarchieve were written by Brian Massumi during our 2016 event *Distributing the Insensible, Performing the Anarchieve*. They are based on the collective work done by SenseLab on the anarchieve between 2014-2016.

impersonal, in the collective magma of experimentation. In doing so it moves us to become more acutely in tune with the edgings of a sympathy that can alter the course. In his process philosophy, Whitehead searches for a concept that might do justice to this necessary work of reorientation that moves experience to its limit, a concept that can risk the uneasiness of discord while connecting it to the necessity of care, in the event.

Care in the event returns us to the immanence of the occasion, to its own self-enjoyment. Recall how the event moves through concrescence toward subjective form. This taking-form is described by Whitehead as the occasion's self-enjoyment. Motored by sympathy (the force of feeling), the event has come to be in just this way.

There is no morality here, but there is value. And value brings discord, or what Whitehead elsewhere calls contrast. It is in his account of beauty that Whitehead perhaps most clearly emphasizes what is at stake in the valuation of an occasion.

The most typical kind of beauty is defined by Whitehead as "anaesthetic." In this case, the subtraction of experience into a form-taking values itself with as little discord as possible. There is little contrast, few edges reveal themselves: reality has been backgrounded. Such beauty is appearance easily extracted from the welter.

With this kind of beauty there is no sense of the untimely, and there is little at stake. Whatever was dangerous to the form has been inhibited. Easy harmony.

The stronger concept of beauty - what Whitehead calls Intensity Proper - is much more dangerous. Here, contrasts are keenly felt. We feel the force of form. This kind of beauty has nothing to do with an external aesthetic judgement. It is operative and felt more than it is seen. This beauty works on us more than we possess it, moving us with its more-than human intensity.

To consider the work of the anarchic - and of the anarchic share - in terms of beauty may be counterintuitive. But it holds sway, I think, if we consider the force of the aesthetic, or what Felix Guattari calls the ethico-aesthetic. In *The Minor Gesture*, I proposed that the medieval definition of art as "way" might give us the tools to rethink the work of intuition and sympathy at the heart of what I called "the artful." The artful, for me, far exceeds art, though art may also be artful. Artfulness moves with Raymond Ruyer's aesthetic yield: it opens to experience in the making, altering the conditions for living. Replete with the force of minor gestures, it is always closer to an event than to the form abstracted from the event. Or, put differently, it moves with the occasion, exploiting the ways in which the occasion is always more of a "taking" than a taking-form.

Discordant beauty for Whitehead is close to a definition of tragedy that is reminiscent of Nietzsche's. Indeed he directly connects discordance to tragedy: "Each tragedy is the disclosure of an ideal: What might have been, and was not: What can be. The tragedy was not in vain" (1967: 286). For Nietzsche tragedy is less a form than a conduit for difference. Tragedy

alters the field. It breaks it in ways that recalibrate experience. It is the force of affirmation. Similarly, for Whitehead the force of the discordant is what moves experience toward its difference. "For otherwise actuality would consist in a cycle of repetition, realizing only a finite group of possibilities. This was the narrow, stuffy doctrine of some ancient thinkers" (1967: 259).

If artfulness is discordant beauty's motor, it must always be understood as that which moves from the momentum of the event, and not the individual. Conditions for bringing the artful into resonance with this or that occasion can be created - these are the techniques we sought for the articulation of the anarchic - but they cannot ever emerge in abstraction from the wider ecology from which they stem.

The artful moves in resonance with what Whitehead calls mentality. Each occasion of experience has two poles, the physical and the mental. The mental pole is on the side of immortality - it is here that experience speculates. Keeping in mind that for Whitehead there is never an absolute separation between the organic and the inorganic, between the human and the non-human, between the physical and the mental, we must not attribute the mental pole to consciousness or to the human per se. For while mentality is most apparent in what Whitehead calls the higher forms (which are also the forms which enjoy consciousness), mentality is always at work, in each occasion, though to a differing degree.

The anarchic share, moved by the artful, tugs at the mortality of the occasion to move it toward the immortality of mentality. Pulling toward difference, it tunes the anarchic share toward the valuation of the event's surplus. Working together they not only mobilize the more-than, they value it.

There is always more that yields in the articulation of the artful, and that more-than need not coincide with consciousness. In fact, consciousness may be anathema to the artful precisely because it is so selective. When Whitehead writes "but that art which arises within clear consciousness is only a specialization of the more widely distributed art within dim consciousness or within the unconscious activities of experience," he is signalling that to place art within the realm of "clear and distinct" consciousness is to deny the complexities it yields to beyond actual consciousness (1967: 270). The artful is lively in the infra of consciousness where the dimness momentarily coincides with distinctness and folds back into dimness. There is much more that shimmers in experience than what can be captured consciously.

The anarchic, given its relationship to the welter, continuously negotiates the field of dim apprehension. What "takes" in the anarchic is always unsettling precisely because it emerges from and goes back to the infraconscious realms of experience. "What leaps into conscious attention is a mass of presuppositions about Reality rather than the intuitions of Reality itself. It is here that the liability to error arises. The deliverances of clear and distinct consciousness require criticism by reference to elements in experience which are neither clear nor distinct. On the contrary, they are dim, massive, and important" (1967: 270). The artfulness of the anarchic

yields to this massiveness by refusing a distinction that would put it on the side of appearance only. In that sense, it is not art in and of itself. It is the *way* of art.

Interestingly, Whitehead nonetheless makes art the motor of consciousness. "Consciousness itself is the product of art in its lowliest form" (1967: 271). This suggests that subtraction is always, to a certain degree, tuned toward the artful. He writes: "art [...] enhances the value of that appearance which is the subject-matter for art. In this way the work of art is a message from the Unseen. It unlooses depths of feeling from behind the frontier where precision of consciousness fails. [...] By the growth of such Art the adventure of mentality gains upon the physical basis of existence" (1967: 271-272). To experience is always, to some extent, to move and be moved aesthetically.

10. CARE

The ethico-aesthetic adventure of living artfully mobilizes the anarchic share of experience in the making. In the uneasy form of the anarchive, the stakes of the event of experience are catalyzed. This is the politics of the anarchive, that it move the adventure of the event toward its future potential.

The politics of the anarchive are always politics of care for the event. When Whitehead speaks of concern, he is referring to the necessity to attend to how the occasion itself creates its subjects and objects, or recipients and provokers (1967: 176). In the relation of non-relation of cuff's sympathy for the fold, much is at stake. Too often, the event is cast as secondary to experience, as though it could be archived in advance, mobilizing not the adventure of a politics of the anarchive but a politics of resemblance. In a context like SenseLab where we work between artistic practice, philosophy and the political, the question of how the anarchic share affects the passage into life-living really matters. Aware of the politics of identity that are everywhere threatening a return to an account of experience as resemblance, we seek ways of encountering difference that maintain the differential without presupposing a fixed form. At the same time, we learn, through the anarchive, not to reduce experience to infinite process as though the cuff weren't all the while creating breakers that resituate the now of experience in the making. How we articulate and live the impersonality of our coming together matters, and this is a politics that deeply affects the art of living.

Whitehead's concept for the art of living is peace. It is a difficult concept to work with given its long and often unproductive connection with humanism. He clearly struggles with the term as well: "The notions of 'tenderness' and of 'love' are too narrow, important though they be. We require the concept of some more general quality, from which 'tenderness' emerges as a specialization [...] 'Impersonality' is too dead a notion, and 'Tenderness' too narrow" (1967: 284-285).

In his final article, "Immanence, A Life," Deleuze perhaps offers us a way to vivify the impersonality Whitehead struggles with here. For the art of living is at its most powerful, it seems to me, when it moves impersonally in the register of the more-than.

In "Immanence, A Life," Deleuze moves life into the realm of the impersonal. Life is here no longer reduced to the human life, but courses instead across all ecologies of living, connecting to their more-than. Deleuze calls this *a* life. He writes: "we shouldn't enclose life in the single moment when individual life confronts universal death. *A* life is everywhere, in all the moments that a given living subject goes through and that are measured by given lived objects: an immanent life carrying with it the events or singularities that are merely actualized in subjects and objects. This indefinite life does not itself have moments, close as they may be to one another, but only between-times, between-moments. It doesn't just come about or come after but offers the immensity of an empty time where one sees the event yet to come and already happened, in the absoluteness of an immediate consciousness" (2001: 29).

A life is this life's more-than, the orientation toward living caught in the indefinite. It is what lives at the cusp where mortality and immortality meet, where the world shifts from its account of actual subjects and objects toward the force of their actualisation and perishing. *A* life is in the movement, in the acrossness of the cuff-fold relation.

The politics of care at the core of the anarchic are enfolded in this kind of indefiniteness. They are impersonal not because the singularity of *this* life, *this* event does not matter, but because *it matters so much*. They are impersonal because how the event matters could not possibly be ascertained only by its actualization. And certainly not by our conscious appraisal of it. Much more is at work, and it is this muchness, this massiveness that we need techniques for.

For Whitehead, the ultimate adventure is the adventure that includes such a politics of care. This care for *a* life - which he calls peace - must never be abstracted from discord. It is intense, massive and ineffable. Language will never contain it except, perhaps, in the rhythms of language's outdoing (2013: 156-171). Aesthetic to its core, ethico-aesthetic, this is not a living that seeks harmony: "The Peace that is here meant is not the negative conception of anaesthesia. It is a positive feeling which crowns the 'life and motion' of the soul. It is hard to define and difficult to speak of. It is not a hope for the future, nor is it an interest in present details. It is a broadening of feeling due to the emergence of some deep metaphysical insight, un verbalized and yet momentous in its coordination of values" (1967: 285). Peace, the art of life-living, is about the way the event values itself, about the *way* itself, and the techniques that orient it toward value.

A politics of care moves at the pace of the minor gesture. The work it does is that of immanent variation, troubling the way the image of form tends to assert itself as having the final word. Keeping form uneasy, keeping the terrain unsettled, a politics of care surpasses the individual to connect to whatever is impersonal at its heart. It is here that it operates, in the transindividuality

that moves impersonality across registers of experience. A politics of care works at the level of the fold's inflexions, moving into those inflexions to better support the force of variation.

None of this is comfortable. To move in the register of *a* life, to move in the rhythm of the more-than, is an unsettling operation. Very little in our contemporary worlds supports such risk. And isn't there also a grave risk, you might ask, in a world of violence and deep injustice, that we sideline what is *actually* happening? Don't we need the archive to allow us to give voice to those injustices? And isn't it *my* actual body, *this* body, *now*, that is being threatened? Yes. But I don't think it has to be either-or. After all, the world of activity and the world of value coincide, as does this life and *a* life. A logic of both-and is necessary. For it is only from the perspective of the both-and that new operative techniques for articulating the *what else* of experience can be developed. And we need those techniques for the art of life-living.

Whitehead speaks of peace as carrying "a surpassing of personality" (1967: 285). The art of life-living cannot be attached to one instance or one account of experience. A politics of care moves across, in the betweenness Deleuze attaches to the concept of *a* life, the betweenness of time, the betweenness of experience. For like the world of valuation, which exists outside of the actualization of time, *a* life is never actual. It is contributory. It accompanies actual experience but *is* not. It holds the event just a little while longer in the indefiniteness of its coming-to-be. "There is thus involved a grasp of infinitude, an appeal beyond boundaries" (1967: 285).

Like the minor gesture, "the experience of Peace is largely beyond the control of purpose" (1967: 285). The art of life-living must be honed. Techniques must be invented that allow for emergent attunement to its potential. If, as Whitehead says, "it comes as a gift," it does so in the sense that the impersonality it generates is a gift to experience (1967: 285). When the force of the anarchive is felt, making apparent pathways toward minor gestures already at play, there is definitely a sense of having received a gift of intensity, of beauty's massiveness.

If there be any claim to beauty within this politics of life-living, it would only be in the sense of the ineffable quality of the more-than discordant beauty brings to lived experience. "The deliberate aim at Peace very easily passes into its bastard substitute, Anesthesia," writes Whitehead (1967: 285). To say that the world is not ours to make may sound like a negation of the necessity of agency. And it is, in a sense. But it certainly isn't an appeal to passivity. It is, quite the contrary, a commitment to an ecology of practices that includes us but isn't driven only by us. It is a commitment to a mode of encounter which includes the forces that populate experience, those forces that are beyond volition, beyond deliberate aim. Because, as I argued at length in *The Minor Gesture*, deliberate aim as the motor of existence not only does not coincide with how experience comes into itself as act, it also makes the human the center of experience, and a return to humanism does not return us to just any human, but specifically to that human who holds the power to aggressively negate *what else* is at work. That human always takes the form of the neurotypical. He is the one who holds structural power, the one who writes the truth of being.

Whitehead's concept of truth is very different from the one described above. His is not a truth that generalizes existence. For Whitehead truth refers to how an occasion of experience activates the coincidence of the world of value and the world of activity. He writes: "Truth of belief is important, both in itself and in its consequences. But above all there emerges the importance of the truthful relation of Appearance to Reality. A grave defect in truth limits the extent to which any force of feeling can be summoned from the recesses of Reality. The falsehood thus lacks the magic by which a beauty beyond the power of speech to express can be called into being, as if by the wand of an enchanter" (1967: 283) Truth is never simply appearance. It is the conjunction of appearance with the more-than.

This kind of truth is at the heart of a politics of care. It speaks not to how things should be, but to how they are, here, now, in their unfolding, activating the ethico-aesthetic conditions for the event's tuning to beauty in its massiveness and discord. This kind of truth moves with the art of life-living, engendering a current that, if the techniques are right, can mobilize new forms of encounter. This is what Whitehead means, I think, when he speaks of peace as "the removal of inhibition, and not its introduction" (1967: 285). Inhibition is the motor for self-control. What is at stake in a politics of care is something else altogether. What is needed most are conduits that allow us to connect to the adventure of *a* life. This is something quite different from the self-control of agency. It is an orienting, a compass that leads us toward the kind of participation that makes felt the anarchic share that was there all along. "Peace," writes Whitehead. "enlarges the field of attention. Thus Peace is self-control at its widest, at the width where the 'self' has been lost, and interest has been transferred to coordinations wider than personality" (1967: 285).

11. ADVENTURE

The art of life-living seeks techniques for proliferation, for abundance, for what SenseLab, in its exploration of the anarchive, has termed the surplus-value of life. What is at stake is not the creation of another enclosure, but techniques to survive the momentary escape from those very enclosures that hold us captive, as much thought-enclosures as anything else. Seen by Whitehead as a "barrier against narrowness" the art of life-living is the enthusiastic taking up of the adventure of discord that is ethico-aesthetics, and merging it with the adventure of ideas.

In *Chaosmosis*, Guattari make operational the concept of ethico-aesthetics, creating the conditions for us to think-with the adventure of discord at the heart of life-living. Given his well-known work at La Borde, it is important, I think, to note that the concept first comes up in the context of the therapeutic. A politics of care is implicitly at work in all ethico-aesthetic paradigms (1995: 7-8). I note this here not because the anarchive is directly therapeutic in its approach to experience, but because the Guattarian practice of schizoanalysis, the therapeutic practice of approaching group subjectivity from the angle of the impersonal, has always been of central importance at SenseLab and has influenced our trajectory toward the anarchive, making us more sensitive to how that which is excluded from actual experience affects the event. In so doing, it has allowed us to refine an account of subjectivity that is transindividual, mobilizing attention on the dance of the event rather than on personal stakes. While this is not always easy -

discord is everywhere active! - the anarchic requires it. For when an event devolves into personal stakes, when it turns toward pre-composed identities and expectations, its more-than tends to be eclipsed, losing the very intensity that gave it its eventness. When the event is reduced to the sum of its parts, its massiveness declines and what is left cannot carry the anarchic share.

Guattari writes: "We know that in certain social and semiological contexts, subjectivity becomes individualised; persons, taken as responsible for themselves, situate themselves within relations of alterity governed by familial habits, local customs, juridical laws, etc. In other conditions, subjectivity is collective - which does not, however, mean that it becomes exclusively social. The term 'collective' should be understood in the sense of a multiplicity that deploys itself as much beyond the individual, on the side of the socius, as before the person, on the side of preverbal intensities, indicating a logic of affects rather than a logic of delimited sets" (1995: 9). To work as an event, to mobilize the anarchic share, the work needs to happen in the register of the impersonal, across tendencies rather than individuals. The adventure of living well that the anarchic makes felt always works on the side of those preverbal intensities Guattari mentions, in a logic of affects rather than a logic of delimited sets.

An ethico-aesthetic paradigm is always a speculative proposition. It offers no promises and knows no easy routes. In this unknown territory, it is the lure of the anarchic we move with, asking ourselves how to move beyond equivalence toward excess, toward the more-than that cuffs the fold.

LIST OF WORKS CITED

- Deleuze, Gilles. *The Fold*. Trans. Tom Connolly (Minnesota UP, 1993).
- Guattari, Felix. *Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm*. (Indiana UP, 1995).
- Ingold, Tim. *The Life of Lines*. (Routledge, 2015).
- Manning, Erin. *The Minor Gesture* (Duke UP, 2016).
- . *Always More Than One: Individuation's Dance* (Duke UP, 2013).
- Spuybroek, Lars. *The Sympathy of Things: Ruskin and the Ecology of Design*. Introduction: Brian Massumi. (Bloomsbury, 2016).
- Whitehead, Alfred North. "Immortality" in *Essays in Science and Philosophy* (Greenwood, 1968).
- . *Adventures of Ideas* (Free Press, 1967)