FBI Director Testifies About 9/11

by John J. Lumpkin
The Associated Press
September 26, 2002
http://story.news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story2&cid=542&ncid=693&e=8&u=/ap/20020926/ap_on_go_ca_st_pe/attacks_intelligence

WASHINGTON - The FBI has found no one in the United States who had foreknowledge of the Sept. 11 attacks other than the 19 hijackers, FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III told Congress.

"While here, the hijackers' effectively operated without suspicion, triggering nothing that alerted law enforcement and doing nothing that exposed them to domestic coverage," according to a declassified copy of written testimony Mueller gave in June to the congressional inquiry into the attacks.

It is unclear whether Mueller's statement on the 19 hijackers includes Zacarias Moussaoui, who was arrested in August 2001 and later charged in connection with the attacks. In his testimony, Mueller specifically keeps Moussaoui out of his statements because of the pending case against him.

One hijacker, Nawaf Alhazmi, even reported an attempted street robbery to police in Fairfax, Va., on May 1, 2001, but later declined to press charges, Mueller related.

The disclosure of his testimony came as the top counterterrorism officials of the CIA and FBI at the time of the attacks defended their agencies' efforts to lawmakers conducting the inquiry.

In addition, the FBI has identified several more people they believe served as the paymasters of the Sept. 11 attacks, according to Mueller's testimony.

Among the hijackers, Marwan Al-Shehhi has emerged as the moneyman, he said.

U.S. authorities have previously said that an al-Qaida senior operative named Mustafa Ahmed al-Hisawi distributed money from the United Arab Emirates to the hijackers. He is believed to Osama bin Laden 's financial chief, Shaikh Saiid al-Sharif.

But Al-Shehhi also received money from a man named Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, also known as Isam Mansar, and Mohamed Yousef Mohamed Alqusaidi, believed to be Al-Shehhi's brother, Mueller's statement said. Their whereabouts are unclear. Ali also sent money to other hijackers, his statement said.

In addition, Mueller said, al-Hisawi's accounts in the UAE connect him to a man named Abdulrahman A.A. Al-Ghamdi, whom authorities now believe is Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, the alleged operational mastermind of the Sept. 11 attacks. Both al-Hisawi and Mohammed are at large and are among the most wanted al-Qaida figures remaining.

Ramzi Binalshibh, the al-Qaida operative captured in Pakistan on Sept. 11, 2002, is another alleged moneyman, according to the FBI director.

Mueller's testimony also details how the 19 hijackers staged the attacks. It breaks them into two groups: the four pilots and two other chief organizers, and 13 men that Mueller described as "muscle."

The pilots — Mohamed Atta, Al-Shehhi, Ziad Jarrah, Hani Hanjour — and organizers — Khalid Almihdhar and Alhazmi — constituted the core of the plot and operated in the United States for some time before the attacks, it said. Mueller said the 13 others entered the country in pairs in the spring and summer of 2001, each passing through the UAE on their journey.

Also Thursday, Cofer Black, the CIA official who led counterterrorism efforts at the time of the Sept. 11 attacks told lawmakers the agency did the best it could with limited staff, money and legal restrictions.

Black was defiant and direct as he spoke to the House and Senate intelligence committees that have been looking into intelligence shortcomings leading up to the attacks.

Noting that he had been offered an opportunity to testify anonymously behind a screen, Black said "I don't want to be just a voice behind a screen.'

"When I speak, I think the American people need to look into my face. and I want to look the American people in the eye."

The appearances of Black and Dale Watson, a top FBI counterterrorism official, came after Eleanor Hill, staff of the committees inquiry, issued three reports over the past week outlining many missed clues and warnings that could have pointed toward the Sept. 11 hijackings.

In an attempt to address some of the interagency communications problems, the Senate agreed late Wednesday to create the Terrorist Identification Classification System, a database of known or suspected international terrorists that would be available to local, state and federal agencies.

Provision for such a database was a part of legislation authorizing money in the new fiscal year for the intelligence community, and it was approved by voice vote. It will have to be reconciled with a separate version passed by the House in July.

The figures in the bills are classified, but they are believed to call for more than $35 billion in intelligence spending.

In his testimony, Black said CIA officers were overwhelmed and did an excellent job with the limited resources they had.

He said the counterterrorism center had as many people as three infantry companies. "Three infantry companies can be expected to cover a front of a few kilometers. Our Counterterrorism Center has worldwide responsibilities for all terrorist threats."

He said when he became the center's chief, he had to cut the budget of most of his units by at least 30 percent.

Despite limitations, intelligence officials had successes, including thwarting a 1998 attack on the U.S. embassy in Albania, unveiling the Jan. 1, 2000, Millennium plot and uncovering threats on U.S. embassies in Yemen and France in 2001, he said.

Pulling close to the microphone, Black said he wanted to speak to everyone at the counterterrorism center.

"I was proud of them when I led them, I am proud of them now and I'll be proud of them as long as I live," he said.

Black ran the CIA's Counterterrorism Center from 1999 until May, and he remains with the agency. He previously served as an undercover CIA officer and played a role in France's capture of Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, commonly known as Carlos the Jackal, once the world's most famous terrorist. He also survived an al-Qaida plot to kill him in the Sudan in the early 1990s, he said.

Watson is retiring Friday from his post as assistant director of the FBI's counterterrorism division. He also expressed pride in his bureau's work.

"We don't do everything always right," he said. "We're like a soccer goalkeeper. We can block 99 shots and nobody wants to talk about any of those. And the only thing anyone wants to talk about is the one that gets through."

Copyright © 2002

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