ANALYSIS - Pakistani Leader Squeezed Between U.S. and Taliban

Analysis - Pakistani Leader Squeezed Between U.S. and Taliban

by Jack Redden
Reuters
September 13, 2001

ISLAMABAD - Pakistan's years of involvement in Afghanistan's Taliban movement have left military leader Pervez Musharraf squeezed between the United States and his own Islamic militants.

The discomfort of the Pakistani president was evident as he appeared twice on television this week to denounce the terror attacks against the United States, which are increasingly being blamed on the Taliban's "guest" Osama bin Laden.

"Concerted international effort is needed to fight terrorism in all its forms and manifestations," Musharraf said on television on Thursday. "The carnage in New York and Washington has raised this struggle to a new level."

Musharraf, who has not mentioned the Taliban or bin Laden in his comments, pledged to back Washington in what U.S. leaders have now declared is a war: "I wish to assure President Bush and the U.S. government of our fullest cooperation against terrorism."

The United States has long expressed to Pakistan its anger at the Taliban -- who have refused to surrender bin Laden to face charges of blowing up two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998 -- but Musharraf's statement followed a call on Wednesday from U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell.

"There was a telephone call from Mr Colin Powell. This (Pakistan's backing) was conveyed to him," Riaz Mohammad Khan, spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, told Reuters.

"Then our ambassador, along with one very senior official who happens to be in Washington, met Armitage," he said referring to U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. "At that time it was conveyed to the U.S. government and then there is this official statement."

The official was Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmed, head of the Inter-Services Intelligence, which was deeply involved in the Taliban from the days when it was a fledgling military movement in 1994 and is accused by anti-Taliban forces of still providing arms and guidance.

But ending those contacts, and above all helping the United States in a potential attack on bin Laden and the Taliban that would be almost inevitable if Washington concludes he orchestrated Tuesday's attacks, will leave Musharraf in a difficult position at home.

WARNING TO MUSHARRAF

Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, leader of one fraction of the pro-Taliban Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam party that was a promoter from the earliest days, accused Washington of threatening the three countries that recognise the Taliban -- Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates -- and all the Muslim world.

"I will appeal to the Pakistani government that it should warn the U.S. and not allow it to use our airspace or any other facilities for a possible strike on Afghanistan," he said.

"If America uses our soil then it means that we have lost our dignity and sovereignty... if that happened 140 million Muslims (of Pakistan) would retaliate against Musharraf's government," Haq said.

Musharraf has shown himself reluctant to confront all but the most fringe of Islamic groups. But even if he is ready to face the anger that would automatically follow any help in a U.S. attack against Afghanistan, antipathy to Washington's policy is broader.

A meeting of Pakistani political leaders spanning the spectrum agreed in August that Musharraf should not allow U.N. monitors on Afghan soil to enforce the sanctions on the Taliban designed to force the handover of bin Laden.

The Pakistan government has always denied being the guiding force behind the Taliban and it has had problems this year. Western diplomats say Mullah Mohammad Omar, the reclusive leader of the Taliban, was dismissive when Pakistan's interior minister visited him earlier this year in a vain appeal to moderate his order to destroy Afghanistan's pre-Islamic treasures.

PAKISTAN INVOLVEMENT

But details of ISI involvement have been published over the years, naming ISI officers who worked with the Taliban from 1994 to open a trade route into Central Asia that Pakistan badly wanted.

"Some parts of the ISI and the military are saying they're in too deep and can't get out now," one senior diplomat said. "They can't conceive of the Taliban losing."

Musharraf in July defended Pakistan's backing for the Taliban on grounds they control almost all of Afghanistan and because they are overwhelmingly ethnic Pashtuns, who he sees as natural allies.

That group is the largest part of Afghanistan's 20 million population, but there are probably another 20 million Pashtuns among Pakistan's 140 million population.

That merely underlines the dilemma for Musharraf.

Backing a U.S. attack on the Taliban would enrage a substantial part of his own population. Inside his own army, which sets policy on Afghanistan, an estimated 20 percent of the men are Pashtun.

It could also fuel campaigns for moving close to a Taliban view of Islam inside his own country and away from Pakistan's more moderate Islamic traditions shared by Musharraf.

But he is cautious about taking the Islamic groups on. A promise he made to moderate the country's blasphemy laws was quickly dropped and campaigns against rampant gun ownership and sectarian violence have had little impact.

However, if he does not help Washington, the consequences could be worse. Pakistan's support for the Taliban has already left it isolated, weakening a deeply indebted economy that already survives only on a flow of foreign assistance.

Pakistan is scheduled to start negotiations later this month in Washington on a multi-year funding agreement with the International Monetary Fund. All other aid flows take their lead from the IMF decision.

Domestic or international trouble? Judging by Musharraf's condemnations of the attacks on the United States, he has concluded that Pakistan's interests lie in joining the hunt for those responsible.

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