National Press Club Morning Newsmaker With Haron Amin, Spokesman For The Northern Alliance

moderated by Daniel Selnick
Federal News Service
October 31, 2001

MR. AMIN: At the outset, I'd like to take this opportunity to thank Mr. Danny Selnick and the National Press Club for having arranged this press conference today. And permit me to say that there has been extensive amount of coverage on Afghanistan, but sadly only after two nations had to be victimized by terrorism.

I will try to go through some of the issues that I think are very paramount in this campaign, and then I'll immediately give the floor to any questions that you might have.

In terms of the military aspect of the war, I can tell you that, as of late, we welcome the whole initiative of establishing a forward command center inside Afghanistan by the allied forces. Certainly I can tell you that the campaign by the United Front, as of September 11, has changed from one of active resistance to one of offense, but certainly the (recipe?) has got to be there before we can launch our ground forces against the Taliban.

The status of military aid still is not satisfactory. The issue of Ramadan is not a big issue to us because the violated it every year. In fact, in 1998 -- (audio break) -- engaged in massive rampage in northern Shomali, displacing as many as 150,000 people.

The political track, meanwhile, since there is no clear-cut time- bound political road map by the international community from any quarter, we have taken the initiative in our own hands. And hopefully, with the effort of the former monarch of Afghanistan, the council of national unity should be taking place, at least the nomination of the first phase of that, soon in Turkey.

I wanted to also say that the role of Pakistan until now, at least, clearly and officially has been very self-destructive, both for Pakistan as well as the region. We certainly see exactly what is coming out in the media and the role that Pakistan in the future could play might be one of advantage to the entire region, conditioned that the Taliban would not be supported and that fanatic elements would be removed from any office in Pakistan. Certainly we welcome a friendly government in Pakistan that will be based on mutual respect and good neighborliness.

Humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan currently are not adequate. Eighty percent of those subject to starvation are in northern Afghanistan, and almost every single person, IDP, internally-displaced persons, are in the north. We anticipate that in the future there is going to be the necessity of a Berlin-style airlift in numerous part of Afghanistan. And even as I speak right now, there are people who are starving in the Yacalang (ph) area of central Afghanistan and Bamian (ph).

I know there has been a lot of talk about human rights issues, and I'll be more than happy to comment on those issues. But certainly let me be very frank that from 1992, when we took over from the communist regime, the infant government that was in place from day one was welcomed with rockets by Golbedinek (ph) Machar (ph), who was the lead man backed by the military intelligence of Pakistan, who rained as many as 600 rockets a day into the capital, with electricity gone. Certainly certain things did happen.

But indeed, let me say that the Islamic state of Afghanistan has never made it a policy to ever advocate any crimes of war, crimes against humanity, whatsoever. And in the areas where we had the opportunity, such as Herat, where there was no skirmishes -- certainly there isn't even one case of violation of human rights.

In terms of the future of Afghanistan, what we aim to do -- and this has been a goal of the United Front for years -- that we want to give our pledge and we have declared our pledge, and we've lost our greatest hero, Commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, in this struggle against terrorism, that our pledge is for the fight against terrorism. It is a pledge also to combat drug trafficking. And it is our pledge to promote human rights, particularly women's human rights, who constitute more than 50 percent of the Afghan nation.

And we also gave our pledge to a pro-democratic government in Afghanistan, based on political pluralism, not the kind of competition that you see from behind military barracks and military front lines. And certainly let me say that peace with Afghanistan's neighbors is a key issue for us. We welcome it, but it has to be based on mutual respect and good neighborliness.

We strongly believe that Pakistan deserves a friendly government in Afghanistan. We also indeed believe that Pakistan has legitimate rights in Afghanistan. But Islamabad should never think of the two equating -- (audio break) -- it has always wanted in Afghanistan, which is a subservient regime.

Now for the questions.

MR. SELNICK: We'll take questions now. And I remind everyone, please identify yourself and the organization you represent.

Q (Inaudible) -- Copley News Service. The problem that American politicians have with the Northern Alliance -- (inaudible) -- small percentage of the country. How are you going to work to create a coalition that can represent all of Afghanistan?

MR. AMIN: Certainly let me say that the United Front is not an exclusively non-Pashtun group. We have in it members in the leadership council, such as Hadji Kadir (ph) and Commander Aref Nuzai (ph), who are themselves of the Pashtun ethnic group. Hadji Kadir (ph) is the brother of the late slain Abdul Haq, and he's a member of the supreme council of the United Front.

In 1992, when we took over, over 50 percent of all of the positions in the government were taken by the Pashtuns in Afghanistan. But as of late, I can tell you that with the council of national unity, the division is such that it would permit all of Pashtuns who want to be in that government to have the incredible chance to be part of the future set-up of Afghanistan.

Certainly we think that any government that is not going to be proportionately represented is not going to be a plausible or a workable government. And indeed, that is the aim with which we want to go about the convening of the council of national unity, which we hope will take us to the convening of the loya jerga and hopefully the set-up of a transitional government in Afghanistan.

MODERATOR: Yes, please.

Q Lisa Burgess (sp) from Stars & Stripes. Along the same lines, military sources and Special Operations tell me that when they had asked for assistance from Northern Alliance groups in various areas in Afghanistan, targeting coordinates, they go back and check the coordinates and find out in many cases that the alliance are targeting one another's headquarters. This seems that it would bode ill for the type of cooperation that you're talking about.

Can you tell me what's happening there?

MR. AMIN: I can certainly tell you that is not the case. What I can tell you is that there are plenty of targets in the front lines. As of late, the front lines have become sanctuaries for both al Qaeda organization, militants from around the region, as well as the Taliban.

One thing that I can certainly tell you is the case is that if the Taliban have had the ability to engage in counter-offensives, to be able to resupply their front lines and to be able to spearhead certain operations into our territory, that tells you that their ability has not been completely decimated. So what we've asked certainly is that the coalition, international coalition of forces, ought to more aggressively and intensely, with more frequency, pound Taliban positions so that indeed the number of the Taliban would be lessened.

The case that is clear is that it was not compounds only or tanks that came and did the sort of attacks on the United States of America on September 11th. It was individuals. And such individuals, with such draconian and ominous views, you have in the thousands in Afghanistan. And these are the ones that ought to be targeted on the front lines.

Q (Off mike.)

MR. AMIN: What I can tell you is that initially, when we wanted to look for an office space, the people in the building where our lobbyist was working had the sort of sense that they would have wanted to welcome us establishing an office there. Certainly the decision was taken by us with the full support of a lot of the people that we met, that I personally met in the lobby and elsewhere in the building. But there is no point.

Remember that our people and your people have been targeted by the same people, and I think that there is that solidarity that exists between us and the Americans that we both have been victimized by terrorism. And should it have been an office for the Taliban, that concern would have been justified. But certainly this is a case where we are on the same side with the United States, who have been victimized by terrorists.

Q (Off mike.)

MR. AMIN: We signed the lease not long ago, and if that should have been a problem, maybe they wanted to actually not give us the space. But that lease is in place. It has been signed. And we are moving in hopefully quickly.

Q (Off mike.) The question from the reporter from Stars and Stripes brings to mind this question: What is the state of coordination or cooperation between Northern Alliance which the American government seems to support? It suggests to me your response and the question that it isn't close and now that there are some coalition forces on the ground in Afghanistan, it seems you'd be coming closer together.

MR. AMIN: What I can tell you is that certainly if you look at the map of Afghanistan from early on, you clearly see the reds designate areas that have been captured in the year 2001. The greens were there before the year 2000. These were the territories where we had active resistance in Afghanistan. We would have wished the strategy to have focused more along expanding this territory to the north, where there is the feasibility of the active resistance to expand.

If the international coalition would have helped us somehow move in this direction, be able to cut off the Taliban and move in this direction and be able to cut off the Taliban in these territories, that would have certainly reduced the Taliban's strengths and capability to about 50 percent, setting off major rates of defection.

That was not the case, and that's why there has been a little bit of a hurdle in the military campaign. But it's still early on in the campaign to say whether there has been a hurdle or not. What we are saying right now is that even now it is not late. And certainly with the forward command center, that more targeting of the enemy front- line positions in these territories, in this territory as well as around Mazar-e Sharif and around Herat and also certainly parts of Jasharon (ph) and Bagriz (ph), that we are going to be able to hopefully go around this strategy. And our fears at the beginning were that if the military strategy were to be dictated by Pakistan where the Pakistanis were to have a say in the military strategy, then certainly we would have seen more hurdles.

And to some extent we believe that our deduction is correct in concluding that, yes, indeed, the Pakistani government did, in many ways, get in the way. But certainly it seems more and more that the strategy is right now one where they are looking at Afghanistan with a completely neutral-eye perspective and they're going about hopefully with us on the ground in a much more comprehensive way. And certainly our request has been for both technical as well as strategic coordination to go about hopefully achieving total elimination of terrorism in Afghanistan.

Q (Off mike.) (Inaudible) -- military aid is not satisfactory. What would -- (inaudible)?

MR. AMIN: A few air drops here and there would not certainly get the job done. Remember, we have gone from active resistance to right now the (demand?) being on active offense. That requires much more logistics than we would formerly expect. Certainly we welcome what we're receiving right now, but that is not adequate to give us the opportunity. Once air raids occur and Taliban positions are decimated, the (front line is?) for us to make an effective combat move, ground move, in the area.

The promised aid that was mentioned, we haven't received it. And we cannot confirm it. Certainly when we receive anything to such caliber, that might certainly make a difference.

MR. SELNICK: Yes.

Q (Inaudible.) First question: Could you tell me whether the Northern Alliance is willing to have contacts with the Pakistani government in order to manage more the information of the governments, which can peacefully resolve the questions -- (inaudible)? And the second question: Do you think, if international military force, peace force, could be a solution for preserving peace temporarily in Pakistan after the war ends and the new government is set up?

MR. AMIN: You mean in Pakistan or in Afghanistan?

Q (Inaudible.)

MR. AMIN: What we can tell you is we don't know the merit of always saying whether we want peace with Pakistan or us trying to diplomatically approach Pakistan. I think that has never been the question. We have had contacts with the Pakistanis in the past. We have no problem of engaging the Pakistanis in diplomatic talks in the future. It has to be based on mutual respect. The sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of Afghanistan have to be respected.

In light of that, should Pakistan completely wish to not in any way impose a government of its own liking in Kabul and not support elements that create trouble in Afghanistan, particularly so-called dissident elements and/or moderate Taliban, then we welcome such initiative. But we have to tangibly see good intent on the part of the Pakistanis.

Let me emphasize that we strongly believe that Afghanistan needs Pakistan for access to the warm waters. Afghanistan needs to have a neighbor that will be stable. We're much more alarmed about the Pakistani Talibanization of Pakistan itself, which is the recipe -- which is a taste of its own recipe. But we certainly also believe that Pakistan has legitimate rights in Afghanistan and deserves a friendly government in Afghanistan. But the two should never be taken as establishment of a subservient regime in Afghanistan.

Do not go further than the events since 1992. You had, with the backing of the Pakistani military intelligence, Afed Matiar (ph), who rained as many as 600 rockets into the city per day. The world never paid attention. Then the Taliban emerged. Certainly it was Pakistan that was the godfather to the Taliban. The world did not care.

Now that two nations had to be victimized by the same terrorist organization which had the full backing of the Taliban that the international community is paying attention. What we are saying is cap the Pakistani influence and the militant ideology that goes on around in the region.

We certainly welcome the initiative by President Pervez Musharraf, who has given his pledge that he wants to counter terrorism.

We want the international community to engage with Pakistan in trying to fight that sort of terrorism and fanaticism in Pakistan. But certainly a future between two countries that is going to be peaceful, it has to be based on peaceful coexistence and good neighborliness with mutual respect.

MR. SELNICK: Yes.

MR. AMIN: Yes, I'm sorry, the second part of your question.

Q (Off mike.)

MR. AMIN: We have asked for the international community to engage in some sort of deployment of some kind of force. Certainly the deployment of U.N. forces would take up to three months and so on. There has also been talks by various circles about deployment of troops from various Muslim countries. We have not officially asked this, but it is a good initiative. The government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, the United Front, welcomes such initiative, given that we've asked for a demilitarized Kabul.

We have asked for the process of the convening of the loya jerga to be done in a condition of peace and security, given that certain circles from across the border, certain fanatic circles, would not take advantage of the situation and be able to mobilize again and then create the kind of instability in Kabul. But we do welcome such deployment if the international community, in light of having a clear- cut mandate for peace in Afghanistan, should wish to deploy such a force.

MODERATOR: (Inaudible.)

Q Wayne Madsen (sp), Intelligence Online. Do you have any information on whether Pakistan's ISI might have been involved in tipping off the Taliban about the presence of Abdul Haq in the country? And doesn't that throw into question the feasibility of sharing any type of U.S. sensitive intelligence with the government of Pakistan?

MR. AMIN: We can clearly tell you that right now more and more is coming out about the role that Pakistan has had, the military intelligence of Pakistan, the ISI, about the creation of the Taliban and how linked and how intertwined that relationship has been, both with Osama bin Laden as well as extremists in the region.

The ISI has been a (stake?) within the Pakistani state. It has driven most of the foreign policy of Pakistan, at least in the immediate region, both in Kashmir as well as in Afghanistan. And certainly we think that in the latest assassination attempt on Commander Abdul Haq, we strongly believe that any attempt aiming to dislodge the Taliban which originates from Pakistan would be bound to fail for the very reason that you have this very close relationship.

And we hope that with the purging of Mahmoud Ahmad (ph), the latest ISI chief, who again was linked to the transfer of $100,000 to Mohammed Atta, we strongly believe -- we welcome that, but we also want the future members of the ISI to look along the path of trying to have a stable region and a region where you would have not any threats to peace and security of the entire area, to hopefully be able, for the government of President Pervez Musharraf, to remove elements that have fanatic or extremist tendencies and to put an end to the adventures, military adventures, and hegemonic tendencies with which the ISI has been over the years able to navigate the course of events in the region.

Q (Off mike.) What kind of relations are there between Turkey and the Northern Alliance? -- (Inaudible.)

MR. AMIN: Afghanistan has had very good fraternal relations with Turkey over the last century. And we have official recognition by the Turkish government. We have an embassy in Turkey. Certainly we want Turkey to play a role in the future of Afghanistan, as we want other Muslim states to also play a role.

But in terms of your question regarding Turkish troops in Afghanistan, certainly there's not even a single Turkish troop in Afghanistan. But should the international community, in light of a mandate to deploy Muslim forces from around the region, should that initiative go forward, we would welcome the deployment of Turkish troops among many others in Afghanistan for peacekeeping purposes.

Q Jonathan Watson from the London Times. (Inaudible) -- and are you aware of this -- (inaudible) -- from the United States -- (inaudible) -- troops to be deployed imminently with your forces? If so, when would you expect to have to -- (inaudible)? Who did that come from? And when -- (inaudible)?

MR. AMIN: I was able -- I had a meeting yesterday with Mr. Richard Haass. And certainly the United States has got a clear position vis-a-vis Afghanistan in the sense of nation-building. We believe that the United Nations would be in a position to play a much more active role. Mr. Brahimi is in the region on the first assessment of the situation. He's having talks both in Islamabad as well as in Iran, and hopefully in neighboring countries of Afghanistan as well.

We strongly believe that the United Nations can play a central and pivotal role in this context. Given that mandate, I think that, you know, with the help of the Security Council, I think that they would have an early takeoff. And that's where the deployment of any forces would come into the picture. But certainly it would have to be anticipated. It would have to be expected under that specific mandate, which is not the case as of now.

On a unilateral initiative, I am not informed whether the United States has asked the government of Turkey to deploy such forces.

Q Paul -- (inaudible) -- with Bloomberg. You mentioned, in response to an earlier question -- (inaudible). Could you be more specific in terms of who promised what aid and what form of aid -- (inaudible)?

MR. AMIN: Certainly there has been a lot of talk by U.S. officials about sending aid to Afghanistan, tanks and APCs and so on and so forth. The amount of aid that our forces have been receiving, particularly the mention of parachute drops, that has been very limited. It has been very minute. And it is not the kind of supplies that would enable us to make a major move on the ground.

What I can tell you is that the amount is very negligible. It is not adequate. We hope that more could be dropped in, more could be delivered, so that, once the operation starts, to hopefully make a major move against the Taliban, that we would be in a position to do so.

Q You said that the U.S. military promised military aid, military equipment to you?

MR. AMIN: I'm saying that certain U.S. officials have said on TV -- we've seen their interviews and so on -- that they are going to deliver aid and so on into Afghanistan. But that is something that we have not seen as of now.

Q (Inaudible.) Do you think that more bombing and military supplies would be enough to allow you to make a major move on the Taliban, or do you think that the U.S. would have to make much more of a ground presence?

MR. AMIN: We strongly believe that we have enough fighters on the ground who are competent, who are battle-hardened, who can do the fighting themselves. We also believe that enough international lives have been lost by these terrorists that not more is needed. What we're saying specifically is, "Give us the tools and we shall finish the job."

Certainly we have our own way of conducting battles in Afghanistan. We strongly believe that reliance on solely just the Special Ops and, let's say, just bombardment is not going to get the job (done). There needs to be a constellation of various methods, various means of being able to dislodge the Taliban from Afghanistan. You cannot hand down Osama bin Laden if you do not decimate al Qaeda. And both of those things could not be done without rolling back the Taliban.

In this campaign, what we are saying is there needs to be adequate provision of military supplies to our forces, and that given in terms of close coordination from the air that would enable us to go about hopefully rolling back the Taliban, which would pave the way for the hand-down of Osama bin Laden.

Q I have a question about the post-Taliban Afghanistan, the arrangements that are being made. Would any form of representation of the Taliban in the next government be acceptable to you, the Northern Alliance?

MR. AMIN: We welcome anybody who is working currently with the Taliban who is in a position to defect, because they would do a just thing, not only for themselves but also for this campaign. And they would not be on the evil side. But certainly in the post-Taliban regime, we have said that Taliban, being a very intrinsically fanatic element, and so no moderate Taliban exists, and the very moderate Taliban that the Pakistanis promoted as being moderate was the very person who specifically stated that Osama bin Laden should be protected.

Given that, we believe that there would be no room for the moderate Taliban in a post-Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

Q You said you didn't -- Ed Epstein (sp) from the San Francisco Chronicle. You said the United Front does not want or need the U.S. combat forces. But it's been suggested that the United States try to establish a forward humanitarian -- (audio break) -- air strips, maybe safe havens from where this food could be more adequately distributed. Would you like to see the U.S. do that now before the winter sets in?

MR. AMIN: We strongly believe that the humanitarian situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating, and it's deteriorating on a very large scale. We're expecting that up to 8 million people could be subject to starvation, most of these people being in northern Afghanistan. We strongly think that the time has come, and the amount of food drops that the international coalition has been able to do is not adequate. It is not sufficient whatsoever. We think that there might be necessity of even Berlin airlift-style drops into Afghanistan. We welcome any initiative that would look into that.

But certainly we can tell you that many things in this context would have to be looked at, scrutinized. Number one, Afghanistan's neighbors should be requested to open their doors to those fleeing. We also think that the donor states should recognize the severity of the situation and to be most magnanimous in this context. And certainly we want the international community and aid agencies to streamline a joint operation or a common strategy to try to overcome the menace that we have at hand.

MR. SELNICK: Yes, please.

Q (Off mike) -- the Washington Times. Have you gotten any -- (audio break)? (Inaudible) -- with Ramadan coming up -- (inaudible) -- and what would be the effect of that -- (inaudible)?

MR. AMIN: Yeah, in that context, we can clearly say that the Taliban have always violated the sanctity of the holy month of Ramadan. For example, during Ramadan of 1998, they displaced as many as 150,000 people from their homes. We strongly believe that the Taliban need to be engaged. We believe that the holy month of Ramadan, during which the holy Quran was revealed to us, that this is a month for fasting. It is not a month during which you stop combating terrorism.

Our take on that is very clear. We're going to continue to fight the Taliban on the ground. And we hope that the international community will realize that any pause in the air campaign on the Taliban is going to give them the ability to mobilize additional forces for them to be able to gain strength here and there and to be able to do the appropriate transfer of men from one region to another. That might give them the chance. I think that Ramadan should not be a point for the international community to give the Taliban the opportunity to mobilize. And certainly we are going to engage them during the holy month of Ramadan.

Q (Off mike.)

MR. AMIN: That was not a subject, a topic in the discussion we had.

Q (Off mike.) Fox Morning News. How difficult would it be to -- (inaudible) -- airlifts?

MR. AMIN: We strongly believe that, given the appropriate coordination and a common strategy for the capture of certain towns in Afghanistan, that we think that hopefully the time will come in the very near-future for us to be able to have access to the kind of facilities that would accommodate that.

MODERATOR: Yes.

Q (Inaudible.) Dallas Morning News What about military assistance from Russia and India? Are you getting any more (Inaudible.)

MR. AMIN: As the legal government of Afghanistan, we have been able to purchase arms from Russia at a discounted price for them having feared instability in their southern -- you know, in the southern borders of the Central Asian republics. What we are receiving, remember, again, has been something that has been able to give us the ability to resist the Taliban domination in Afghanistan.

The strategy right now calls for much more than that. The strategy calls for active combat on the ground, for active offense on the ground. And certainly, in light of needs strategy, what is needed is by far much more than what we were able to get in the past.

MODERATOR: Yes.

Q (Off mike.)

MR. AMIN: We have relations, good relations with Turkmenistan. We have an embassy there. We have Turkmen people in Afghanistan who are Turkmen who have ethnic affinities with the larger Turkmen people in Turkmenistan. We hope that the Turkmen government would work closely with the international community, being one of Afghanistan's neighbors, and also being a member of the group of six-plus-two, to hopefully go about trying to establish the kind of government that everyone desires in the region. Certainly there might have been certain circles in any country that might have aided the Taliban in one way or another, but we think that the times have passed. And we welcome future collective and joint efforts aiming to create a stable region.

Q (Off mike.) Do you intend to enter into Kabul if you can get enough military supplies, and with the backing of the U.S. -- (inaudible) -- what is your -- (inaudible)?

MR. AMIN: There is no intention of trying to liberate Kabul. That is not the immediate priority whatsoever. And we have no intention of liberating Kabul in the future at all. What is important, in the context of Kabul, is that there needs to be a clear- cut political road map in place. We've asked the international community to provide one so that we can go about this -- you know, we can go about this with the international community. There hasn't been one put in place by the international community. Certainly other quarters of the world have not been able to produce one either.

Mr. Brahimi's efforts in this context are welcome, absolutely. But we certainly think, in light of the military campaign that is going on, that that is lagging a bit behind. So hence we took the initiative in our own hands and we were able to come up with the council of national unity between the United Front and the supporters or people nominated by the former monarch of Afghanistan, whom we hope will be able to play his role as a unifying figurehead and not to reinstitute monarchy in Afghanistan.

What we have asked and what we have sought and what the king has also sought is for Kabul to be demilitarized, hopefully placed under some sort of international military force. And meanwhile, we have also trained police officers, as many as 4,000, to be able to be deployed in Kabul for the security of the people. So there is no clear indication on our end that we want to liberate Kabul.

But in light of movements or defection of the Taliban and/or military changes in Afghanistan, we hope that no other entity in Afghanistan and no dissident element and/or others should take opportunity or should take advantage of the situation and be able to infiltrate people or individuals or armed men into Kabul in the future, because that would, again, be a whole question of action, reaction, and it might prompt the whole -- somebody else, another entity, to go about and react on that very specific issue.

But at the same time, we are also getting clear indications that the Taliban are forcing people out of their homes.

They're using some of these houses to try to place their troops, to try to hide tanks and other vehicles. So that is also an issue that is of concern to us.

MR. SELNICK: Yes, please.

Q (Off mike) -- for TV Asahi. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld said yesterday, there is a -- (inaudible) -- number of countries -- (inaudible) -- Afghanistan. Can you tell me specifically what kind of relatin does the -- (inaudible) -- and the -- (inaudible) -- alliance has? What are they doing together and what are you asking them to do?

MR. AMIN: The aim of the deployment of these individuals, (U.S.?) people in Afghanistan, according to both U.S. officials, also on us, is basically to be able to coordinate the attempts on the ground. We strongly believe that sometimes a lot of these stray bombs are the result of the fact that the intelligence wasn't being exchanged in the appropriate and immediate way. We think that the deployment of these individuals would facilitate the kind of coordination that we have sought for a long time. And it would also look into the humanitarian aspects as well as the logistics-related issues of the operations in Afghanistan.

MR. SELNICK: Yes, please.

Q Again, Lisa Burgess (sp) from Stars & Stripes. If the Taliban is (defiling?) the holy place of a mosque to hide tanks and troops in there, does that make it a legitimate target? Would you object if the United States started bombing mosques in order to get out tanks?

MR. AMIN: We think that we are in a position to be able to look at issues, such as the one you mentioned. And I think that we would be in a position to take care of an issue like that with our ground forces.

Q You mean yes, it would be all right to bomb a mosque to get tanks out, or no?

MR. AMIN: No, we're saying that should a problem such as the one you mentioned arise, I think that that would be within our command people inside Afghanistan to determine which way one ought to go.

MR. SELNICK: Yes, please.

Q Karen Krum (ph) from the Boston Herald. You've talked a lot about aid that you said it's inadequate. Can you give us some specifics on what it is militarily you're looking for? Are you talking 'x' amount of tanks? What is it that you -- (inaudible)?

MR. AMIN: The request has been made a long time ago. And what we have sought, I think, is a very technical issue, and it has been funneled through various channels to the various countries, international coalition, that has sought a list from us. We're talking about tanks. We're talking about helicopters. We're talking about APCs, other heavy weapons, as well as -- (audio break) -- in Afghanistan, and given the adequate number of ammos and the backup ammos for operations to be sustained on a long-term basis.

MR. SELNICK: Over here.

Q Can you tell us anything about the whereabouts of bin Laden? (Inaudible.)

MR. AMIN: Our people, our intelligence people on the ground, are keeping track of any information that comes about Osama bin Laden. Earlier last month we were able to -- or earlier this month we were able to specifically mention where he was. At the time he had been seen specifically in Oruzgan province. That may have changed. But it's something that right now is being exchanged on the ground whenever that request comes through. But certainly remember that Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda organization is an organization that we are hunting for, I would presume maybe more than others.

But at the same time, in this joint venture, we are trying to exchange as much information as possible. We're much more concerned about the way to go to hunt him down rather than just to be able to spot him. And we clearly think that we should roll back the Taliban. That way the area he has for him to move around the country would be severely limited, and that would give us the opportunity hopefully to try to reduce it down and then to be able to go about hopefully eliminating him.

Q (Off mike.)

MR. AMIN: In terms of defections, there were defections as of two weeks ago, certainly at the beginning of this whole campaign, that numbered as many as 4,000 to 5,000. As of late, around Faria (ph) province in Kondos (ph), people, as many as 300 defected as of yesterday to our people in northern Afghanistan.

We strongly believe that when the appropriate strategy is in place and when everything is going to be done in the right way, particularly if the northern parts of Afghanistan could be liberated, that would certainly send major alarm bells to the south, and you would have a lot of Taliban who would want to defect to our side. But the strategy has got to be clear. The strategy has got to be one that is feasible, as well as desirable. I think that puts it at the stage for additional defections.

In terms of the reaction by Pashtuns, certainly we want the future government of Afghanistan to have all of the Pashtuns to play a role in that government, as should also members of other ethnic groups in Afghanistan. But we certainly think that the Pashtuns in the southern parts of Afghanistan have been terrorized under the Taliban.

Certainly the whole fabric of the Afghan culture has been changed under the Taliban. And Afghanistan has always had its own traditions and its own culture, and they have been victimized in many ways more than other people because, with this flow of the Ubandi (ph) school and thoughts from across the border, people of Afghanistan have been shocked in many ways. There are stories of how people in Kabul are shocked with these new ideas and the role of women and the other things that you see with the Taliban.

But we strongly believe that there are a lot of Pashtuns in the southern parts of Afghanistan who have been disarmed, who have been unarmed, who want to do something. But I think the path ought to be one that would give them the opportunity to rise up, not as sitting ducks, but for them to be able to rise up and to be assured of assistance, whether it's financial or whether it's military, so that they can continue their campaign on a long-term basis.

Q (Off mike.)

MR. AMIN: You mean the Pakistani leadership?

Q (Off mike.)

MR. AMIN: We believe that certainly the course of events in Pakistan in the whole Talibanization of the region was something that every country should have been fearful of. And certainly, above anybody else, we believe that the Pakistani president should have also thought of this a long time ago and/or those that preceded him. But we think that the situation seems to be under control.

And these militants, as threatening as they might sound, certainly do not constitute a significant portion of the seats in the Pakistani parliament. So the outpourings and the crowds on the street are alarming, but certainly it seems that the whole country of Pakistan should be able to overcome the current crisis in the current juncture and be able to step forward beyond this and hopefully continue this campaign.

Q (Off mike.)

MR. AMIN: In terms of China, we do have an embassy which is open in China. That embassy has belonged to the Islamic State of Afghanistan. We've had officials there. They work and they have relations with the ministry of foreign affairs of China.

China is also one of the members of the group of six-plus-two, so we certainly value the role that China plays in the group of six-plus- two, as well as on the Security Council. We know that there is a consensus, and this consensus indeed is one that extremism and fanaticism and terrorism need to be fought. And certainly China is on board when it comes to this agenda; we certainly hope a lot, given that China is one of the countries in the Security Council, as well as in the six-plus-two, to hopefully be able to facilitate the kind of support that we need in combating terrorism effectively.

As to your second question --

MR. SELNICK: Second question?

Q (Off mike.)

MR. AMIN: Oh. We have had no clear-cut posture by any country telling us not to take Kabul. The decision not to take Kabul is one of our own. We've certainly made a big deal out of it because we want the international community to pay attention to Afghanistan. In the formation of the future set-up of Afghanistan, we have welcomed the international community to play a bigger role, because it is required -- it is one of those ingredients; it is one of those prerequisites to be able to hopefully have a future stable government of a future Afghanistan.

MR. SELNICK: Yes, please.

Q (Off mike.)

MR. AMIN: We think that there are certain areas where we are able to launch operations. In terms of the comprehensive strategy that we want to expand throughout most of the country, that was more the thrust of my comments. But certainly, in certain areas, we are able to launch certain operations. But my whole discussion was more about the overall long-term and broader strategy.

Q (Off mike) -- for the St. Petersburg Times. A couple of days before the air campaign started, I had an interview with the -- (inaudible) -- and he said that U.S. forces had been on the ground with the Northern Alliance almost immediately after September 11th. Yesterday the Pentagon said, or suggested, that it had only been a couple of days. And I was wondering if you could clarify that. And then secondly, I'm wondering, you say that you had information on the whereabouts of Bin Laden. What happened to that information and why didn't you apprehend Bin Laden?

MR. AMIN: In terms of your first question, I can tell you that contacts had been in the region. They had not been on the ground. And the information that was given yesterday by the Defense Department, U.S. Defense Department, is one that is correct.

As to your second question, we can say that the information was passed on. But remember that, you know, between passing on information and being able to effectively do something with it, there is, of course, a difference. And intelligence-gathering is one sort of operation, going about defining the target and whether that target is mobile or not mobile, that's a different thing. Certainly information, daily updates and hourly updates, when they're available, is being forwarded to the international coalition.

Q Did you guys see him physically, or did you have information that he was spotted physically?

MR. AMIN: The information at the time was that he was there, yes.

MR. SELNICK: Yes, please.

Q (Off mike.)

MR. AMIN: We can't be more specific than that. I can't be. But certainly our officials in our territories had given that information, and that information indeed was passed to the international coalition.

MR. SELNICK: Who have I not called yet? Yes, please.

Q (Off mike.)

MR. AMIN: Certainly the destruction of the colossal, monumental, fifth-century Buddhist statues in central Afghanistan was one that was pretty much, according to our people, prompted by the whole Wahabi (ph) school of thought, which had its blessing also from the Obandi (ph) school of thought.

Afghanistan is a country where the predominant sect of Islam is the Hanafi, Sunni Hanafi. And we also have Shi'as in Afghanistan. The fact that Afghanistan became Muslim in the eighth century A.D. and the statues had been preserved since then, and that we have had numerous Islamic governments in Afghanistan and they have been spared; so certainly we see the import of some sort of new ideas into Afghanistan of which the Taliban at least have acted on behalf of the Obandi (ph) school of thought.

We hope that, regardless of in the past as to who tried to support the Taliban, that now the time has come for the international community to stand on the side of justice, to fight against evil and the evil-doers. And we hope that the Taliban, as defiant as they were in the past, as reclusive as they have been, as ominous and draconian as they have been in the past, that the time for them has come to an end, and for those that want to be on good terms with the international community, for them to respect the wish of the international community and to hopefully fight with those that want to fight terrorism.

MR. SELNICK: Thank you. One more question. Yes, please.

Q (Off mike.)

MR. AMIN: We strongly believe that that is a conclusion that the United States and the international community has reached on its own. A neglected Afghanistan has had a very high price. It has had a high price for the people of Afghanistan. It had a high price for the United States of America. And that was negligence.

We had knocked on various doors in the past hundreds of times. Commander Massoud's first appeal in 1992 was, "If you do not help us, you will have three things at hand: Terrorism, drug trafficking, human rights violations." That was a message that I carried from him when I left the fight against the Soviets in 1990 to Washington. That message was repeated over and over by our government in 1994, '95, '96, as late as four weeks prior to the attacks on the -- three months prior to the attacks on the United States of America. I think that the world has paid a very high price.

And this time we hope that the international community will not only look at combating terrorism, but hopefully the mandate would be there for the establishment of a broad-based government in Afghanistan that would not only suit the aspirations of the Afghan people but would also constitute -- manifest itself as a healthy member of the international community.

But certainly we are asking the U.S. administration, we're asking the international community, to effectively engage with us on a long- term strategy, because if the objective is to only go about, let's say, rolling back the Pentagon and/or hunt down Osama bin Laden, that is not going to yield the desired result.

And certainly if it's going to be left in the middle of -- if it's going to be left unfinished, we hopefully believe that it's going to come back and haunt the United States or the international community in a different way. So we are still indeed making the appeal, but at the same time, we think that the appropriate promises are being made. What in the future will happen, no one can ascertain.

(End of available audio.)

Copyright 2001 Federal News Service, Inc.

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